Voluntary Taxation and Beyond - The Promise of Social-Contracting Voting Mechanisms

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres
Keyword(s):  
Social Contracting ◽  
Voting Mechanisms

The flypaper sticks even when aid travels overseas

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 717-753
Author(s):  
Emily C. Marshall ◽  
James W. Saunoris ◽  
T. Daniel Woodbury
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Public Spending ◽  
Government Expenditures ◽  
Flypaper Effect ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Voting Mechanisms

This paper extends the current literature by considering the existence of the flypaper effect internationally, with donor countries supplying foreign aid to recipient countries. The flypaper effect refers to the empirical anomaly associated with intergovernmental grants stimulating government expenditures more than can be explained by a pure income effect. The results reveal evidence of flypaper behavior such that for recipient countries one dollar of foreign aid raises public spending by $0.21-$0.42, whereas an equal increase in domestic income raises government expenditures by only $0.09-$0.16. Furthermore, we exploit variation in political institutions across countries and find that the flypaper effect is most pronounced in less democratic countries and find no flypaper effect in more democratic countries. This suggests that government officials are more likely to behave as expected by the median voter model when they are held accountable. Furthermore, countries with proportional, rather than majority/plurality, voting mechanisms do not display flypaper behavior.

scholarly journals Coalitional Strategic Behaviour in Collective Decision Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (10) ◽  
pp. 13722-13723
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Lisowski
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Voting Mechanisms ◽  
Selection Of

In my PhD project I study the algorithmic aspects of strategic behaviour in collective decision making, with the special focus on voting mechanisms. I investigate two manners of manipulation: (1) strategic selection of candidates from groups of potential representatives and (2) influence on voters located in a social network.

The Evolutionary Firm and Its Moral (Dis)Contents

ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 145-176
Author(s):  
William C. Frederick ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Business Firm ◽  
Evolutionary Time ◽  
Natural Evolution ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Business Corporation ◽  
Natural Agents ◽  
Social Contracting ◽  
Normal Expression ◽  
Market Dominance

The business firm, called here the Evolutionary Firm, is shown to be a phenomenon of nature. The firm’s motives, organization, productivity, strategy, and moral significance are a direct outgrowth of natural evolution. Its managers, directors, and employees are natural agents enacting and responding to biological, physical, and ecological impulses inherited over evolutionary time from ancient human ancestors. The Evolutionary Firm’s moral posture is a function of its economizing success, competitive drive, quest for market dominance, social contracting skills, and the neural algorithms found in the minds of its executives and directing managers. Behavioral, organizational, and societal contradictions arise from the normal expression of these nature-based executive impulses, so that the business corporation cannot simultaneously satisfy society’s moral expectations and perform its nature-dictated economic functions.

The Reliability of Voting Mechanisms

1987 ◽  
Vol C-36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1197-1208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara ◽  
Garcia-Molina
Keyword(s):  
Voting Mechanisms

scholarly journals The balance between resource development and environmental protection is “Social Contracting”: The case of LAPSSET project in Kenya

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Onditi 1
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Resource Development ◽  
Eastern Africa ◽  
Public Infrastructure ◽  
Political Dynamics ◽  
Social Contracting ◽  
Initial Idea ◽  
Mind Set ◽  
The Mind

The LAPSSET project is a mega undertaking with heavy investment. Like any other public infrastructure depends entirely on fund availability and proactive involvement of respective governments, particularly Kenya, given its role as the base of the port in Manda. Unfortunately, the mind-set in the region are fixated to believe that hegemonic tendencies of Kenya will divert the initial idea of connecting Africa. Moreover, given the high costs involved compared to most country’s GDP in the region, cooperation with other sub-regions beyond Eastern Africa is indispensable. This article assess the feasibility of the LAPSSET project within the regional political dynamics. 

Youth, Social Contracting and the Postcolony

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Everatt
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Global South ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Past ◽  
Social Contracts ◽  
Social Contracting ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Employment Inequality

Social contracts are concerned with the legitimacy of the state over the individual. The social contract offers mutual benefit and reciprocal obligation and is intrinsic to liberalism’s assertion that freedom is normative and encroaching on freedom requires justification. The social contract is both a philosophical idea and a toolkit for defusing conflict and tying participants to core liberal values. Talk of new social contracts, including intergenerational contracts, focus on maintaining a peaceful status quo, not transcending it. For the Global South in general, and youth in particular, the experience is more contract and less social. There seems little opportunity for southern youth to move from the margins to center stage, mimicking the inability of the Global South to do the same. Southern youth bear the brunt of limited economic opportunities, precarious employment, inequality, racism, and violence, compounding their marginalized place in society. What value can social contracting play beyond a short-term band-aid, unless it incorporates a fundamental rupture with the past?

scholarly journals Communication, Distortion, and Randomness in Metric Voting

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 2087-2094
Author(s):  
David Kempe
Keyword(s):  
Lower Bound ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Metric Spaces ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Ordinal Comparison ◽  
First Choice ◽  
Voting Mechanisms ◽  
Sum Of Distances ◽  
Social Choice Rules

In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, voters and candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space. Voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance. The mechanism, receiving only this ordinal (comparison) information, must select a candidate approximately minimizing the sum of distances from all voters to the chosen candidate. It is known that while the Copeland rule and related rules guarantee distortion at most 5, the distortion of many other standard voting rules, such as Plurality, Veto, or k-approval, grows unboundedly in the number n of candidates.An advantage of Plurality, Veto, or k-approval with small k is that they require less communication from the voters; all deterministic social choice rules known to achieve constant distortion require voters to transmit their complete rankings of all candidates. This motivates our study of the tradeoff between the distortion and the amount of communication in deterministic social choice rules.We show that any one-round deterministic voting mechanism in which each voter communicates only the candidates she ranks in a given set of k positions must have distortion at least 2n-k/k; we give a mechanism achieving an upper bound of O(n/k), which matches the lower bound up to a constant. For more general communication-bounded voting mechanisms, in which each voter communicates b bits of information about her ranking, we show a slightly weaker lower bound of Ω(n/b) on the distortion.For randomized mechanisms, Random Dictatorship achieves expected distortion strictly smaller than 3, almost matching a lower bound of 3 − 2/n for any randomized mechanism that only receives each voter's top choice. We close this gap, by giving a simple randomized social choice rule which only uses each voter's first choice, and achieves expected distortion 3 − 2/n.

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