East Asia Decouples from the United States: Trade War, COVID-19, and East Asia's New Trade Blocs

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter A. Petri ◽  
Michael G. Plummer
Author(s):  
Kamran Jafarpour Ghaleh Teimouri ◽  
Seyed Mohammad Taghi Raeissadat

For more than a century, American had the biggest economy and the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) about 24.1%. On the other side of the world. Recently, China with 15.1% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) placed as the second biggest and the most influential economy in the world in 2017 (World Bank, 2019). Therefore, China and United States together have over 40% of the world GDP with the huge spatial economic influence in the world. The impact of a trade war between the United States and China has a negative influence in other countries and regions in particular in the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN countries are very exposed to China and United States they are more vulnerable to trade war between the United States and China. This study first evaluates the degree of negative impact of China and United States trade war on ASEAN countries. After that, show how an effective regional economic integration can minimize such problems in future. This research is based on available secondary data in United States government reports (e.g., United States Department of State, Office of United States trade) and (e.g. OCBC Bank and ASEAN). Based on data and research the descriptive-analytical method is used in this paper.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 272
Author(s):  
Jingyu Song

<p>By see the tariffs and trade wars in different time periods, each countries’ aim to start the trade war and tariff are protecting themselves. Analyzing and comparing the tariff acts in the colonial and antebellum period, the trade conflicts between the United States and Japan in the 1980s, and 2019’s China-United States trade war, we can see how tariffs work the same but also different in different time periods. </p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiandong Shi

This paper analyzes the direct cause of China–United States trade war, a trade imbalance between China and the United States, and summarizes the causes of this trade imbalance. I have discussed the trade imbalance from the three perspectives of trade structure, trade mode, and trade policy, which focus on the respective trade policies of China and the United States. Moreover, I have examined the subjective factors affecting the trade imbalance between China and the United States. A significant impact of trade policies on trade imbalance has been demonstrated in this study to call for attention from both sides.


Author(s):  
Beverley Loke

Abstract China's rise has raised important questions about the durability of US hegemony in East Asia. Much of the debate, however, has generally been cast in fairly simplistic terms, suggesting the durability or end of US regional hegemony. Such framings nevertheless fail to fully capture regional dynamics and complexity. Advancing an English School conception of hegemony, this paper examines the politics, contestation, and renegotiation of the post–Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia. It maps out four logics of hegemonic ordering in the existing literature, outlines their shortfalls and advances a twofold argument. First, although regional order will not disintegrate into binary “order versus disorder” or “US versus Chinese hegemony” scenarios, the politics of hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—will intensify as the United States and China continue to both cooperate and compete for power, position, and influence in East Asia. Second, I argue that the East Asian regional order will evolve in ways that resemble hybrid forms of hegemony in a complex hierarchy. Specifically, I develop a new logic—“coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy”—that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization. It demonstrates that Washington and Beijing will not only form coalitional hegemonies, seeking legitimation from multiple and often overlapping constituencies, but also engage in a collaborative hegemony on shared interests. This better reflects evolving regional dynamics and yields theoretical insights into examining hegemonic transitions less as clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next, and more as partial and hybrid ones.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-437
Author(s):  
Xiangfeng Yang

Abstract Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as well as political considerations prevented them from fully grasping the strategic shift against China in the US.


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