Local Warming Increases Climate Policy Support: Analysis of Behavioral Intentions, Internet Searches, and US Congressional Vote Shares

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew R. Sisco ◽  
Elke U. Weber
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukas Wallrich ◽  
Keon West ◽  
Adam Rutland

Valuing diversity and intergroup contact predict less prejudice and discrimination, yet their relationship deserves closer attention. The evidence suggests that valuing diversity and (interest in) intergroup contact are associated, but the directionality is not clear, and it has not been tested whether the established effects of contact come about through changes in valuing diversity. We address this in three studies. In Study 1 (N = 211), using longitudinal survey data, both positive and negative contact affected the value placed on diversity over time, while valuing diversity did not significantly predict the frequency of future contact. Studies 2 (N = 224) and 3 (N = 2,618) consequently considered valuing diversity as a mediator and showed that it mediates the relationships of intergroup contact with prejudice, behavioral intentions, and policy support. Our results increase the understanding of pathways from intergroup contact to intergroup relations and offer a lever that contact interventions can target.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdurakhim Rakhimov ◽  
Erik Thulin

Promoting individual behavior change has been criticized as a strategy for addressing climate change due to its potential to diminish climate policy support. In a pre-registered study, we find that messages recommending the adoption of individual climate behaviors and highlighting their large impact do not affect support for a carbon tax. Programs that encourage personal behavior change with substantial mitigation potential offer complementary opportunities to policy without undermining its effectiveness.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matto Mildenberger ◽  
Samuel Trachtman ◽  
Peter Howe ◽  
Leah Stokes ◽  
Mark Lubell

Abstract Unmitigated climate change threatens to disrupt energy systems, for example through weather- and wildfire-induced electricity shortages. Public responses to these energy crises have the potential to shape decarbonization trajectories. Here, we estimate the attitudinal and behavioral effects of Californian power shut-offs in 2019, intended to reduce wildfire ignition risks. We use a geographically targeted survey to compare residents living within outage zones to matched residents in similar neighborhoods who retained their electricity. Outage experience increased respondent intentions to purchase gas or diesel generators and home battery systems, but reduced intentions to purchase electric vehicles. Respondents blamed outages on their utility, not local, state, or federal governments. However, outages did not change climate policy preferences, including willingness-to-pay for either wildfire or climate-mitigating reforms. Our findings show that, in reaction to some climate-linked disruptions, individuals may undertake adaptive responses that, collectively, could exacerbate future climate risks.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip J. Ehret ◽  
Leaf Van Boven ◽  
David K. Sherman

Everyday partisans evaluate policies partly by following partisan cues, fomenting polarization. However, there is debate over the influence of partisan cues in “real-world,” nonlaboratory contexts. An experiment with a real climate change initiative in the 2016 Washington State election tested whether partisan cues influenced climate policy polarization. In a primary study, 504 prospective voters were randomly assigned to view veridical policy endorsements by partisan elites; this study was followed by a preregistered conceptual replication ( N = 1,178). Democrats supported the climate policy more than Republicans. But this difference was greater when Democrats endorsed the policy (with Republican opposition) than when Republicans endorsed the policy (with Democratic opposition). Neither knowledge nor belief in climate change reduced these polarizing effects, and greater policy knowledge was associated with increased polarization. Further, the effect of partisan cues on normative perceptions mediated the effect of partisan cues on policy support.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
ADRIAN RINSCHEID ◽  
SILVIA PIANTA ◽  
ELKE U. WEBER

Abstract What are the roles of bottom-up and top-down signals in the formation of climate change policy preferences? Using a large sample of American residents (n = 1520) and combining an experimental manipulation of descriptive social norms with two choice experiments, we investigate the effects of descriptive norms and policy endorsements by key political actors on climate policy support. We study these questions in two areas considered to be central in a number of decarbonization pathways: the phase-out of fossil fuel-powered cars and the deployment of carbon capture and storage. Our study provides two important results. First, social norm interventions may be no silver bullet for increasing citizens’ support for ambitious climate policies. In fact, we not only find that climate policy support is unaffected by norm messages communicating an increased diffusion of pro-environmental behaviors, but also that norm messages communicating the prevalence of non-sustainable behaviors decrease policy support. Second, in the presence of policy endorsements by political parties, citizens’ trust in these parties influences their support for climate policies. This study contributes to research in behavioral climate policy by examining the impact of descriptive norms and elite cues on climate policy support.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 492-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leaf Van Boven ◽  
Phillip J. Ehret ◽  
David K. Sherman

Psychological scientists have the expertise—and arguably an obligation—to help understand the political polarization that impedes enactment of climate policy. Many explanations emphasize Republican skepticism about climate change. Yet results from national panel studies in 2014 and 2016 indicate that most Republicans believe in climate change, if not as strongly as Democrats. Political polarization over climate policy does not simply reflect that Democrats and Republicans disagree about climate change but that Democrats and Republicans disagree with each other. The results of a national panel experiment and of in-depth interviews with four former members of Congress suggest that Democrats and Republicans—both ordinary citizens and policymakers—support policies from their own party and reactively devalue policies from the opposing party. These partisan evaluations occur both for policies historically associated with liberal principles and politicians (cap-and-trade) and for policies associated with conservative principles and politicians (revenue-neutral carbon tax). People also exaggerate how much other Democrats and Republicans are swayed by partisanship. This foments false norms of partisan opposition that, in turn, influence people’s personal policy support. Correcting misperceived norms of opposition and decoupling policy evaluation from identity concerns would help overcome these seemingly insurmountable barriers to bipartisan support for climate policy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
MATTHEW H. GOLDBERG ◽  
ABEL GUSTAFSON ◽  
MATTHEW T. BALLEW ◽  
SETH A. ROSENTHAL ◽  
ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ

Abstract Reducing global warming will require enacting strong climate policies, which is unlikely to happen without public support. While prior research has identified varied predictors of climate change policy support, it is unclear which predictors are strongest for the American electorate as a whole, and which predictors are strongest for Democrats and Republicans. In a nationally representative sample of registered voters (n = 2063), we use relative weight analysis to identify the strongest predictors of public climate policy support. We find that, among registered voters in the USA, the five most important predictors of climate policy support are: worry about global warming; risk perceptions; certainty that global warming is happening; belief that global warming is human-caused; and general affect toward global warming. Collectively, these five variables account for 51% of the variance in policy support. Results split by political party indicate that pro-climate injunctive norms and global warming risk perceptions are the variables that differ most between Republicans and Democrats, accounting for significantly more variance in policy support among Republicans. These findings can inform policymakers and advocates seeking to build public support for climate action.


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