Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems under Asymmetric Information

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick W. Schmitz
ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).


2010 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 630-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fohlin

Investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced low spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market. Stock issuing companies paid substantial fees to underwriting banks, and these costs increased with the underwriter's market share. Bank's faced lower issuing costs than did nonfinancial firms. These patterns are consistent with a situation in which underwriters exploited their access to better information (agency problems) and had market power, but do not support the supposed lemons problems that motivated the imposition of stringent regulations in 1896.


Author(s):  
Anthony May ◽  
Rodney Boehme

A nascent literature in finance and accounting on tail risk in individual stock returns concludes that bad news hoarding by corporate managers engenders sudden, extreme crashes in a firm’s stock price when the bad news is eventually made public. This literature finds that firm-specific crash risk is higher among firms with more severe asymmetric information and agency problems. A hitherto disjointed literature spanning the fields of international business, finance, and accounting suggests that geographic dispersion in a firm’s operations, and especially dispersion across different countries, gives rise to organizational complexities and greater costs of monitoring that can exacerbate asymmetric information and agency problems. Motivated by the confluence of arguments and findings from these two strands of literature, this paper examines whether stock price crash risk is higher among multinational firms than domestic firms. Using a large sample of U.S. headquartered firms during 1987-2011, we find robust evidence that multinational firms are significantly more likely to crash than domestic firms. Moreover, we show that the difference in crash risk between multinational and domestic firms is most acute among firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms, including weaker shareholder rights, less independent boards, and less stable institutional ownership. Our analysis indicates that stronger monitoring from each of these three governance mechanisms significantly attenuates the positive relation between crash risk and multinationality. Our findings are robust to the use of alternative measures of crash risk and to controlling for known determinants of crash risk identified in prior studies. Our study offers new insights that should hold value for scholars and market participants interested in understanding the implications of heighted agency problems that multinational firms are likely to encounter and scholars and market participants interested in developing models that more accurately predict tail risk in the equity returns of individual firms.


Author(s):  
Ramana Nanda ◽  
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects. It has largely abstracted away from the fact that a start-up typically does not have just one investor, but several venture capital investors that come together in a syndicate to finance a venture. This chapter therefore argues for an expansion of the standard perspective to also include frictions within venture capital syndicates. Put differently, what are the frictions that arise from the fact that there is not just one investor for each venture, but several investors with different incentives, objectives, and cash flow rights who nevertheless need to collaborate to help make the venture a success? The chapter outlines the ways in which these coordination frictions manifest themselves, describes the underlying drivers, and documents several contractual solutions used by venture capital firms to mitigate their effects. The chapter’s broader perspective provides several promising avenues for future research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-182
Author(s):  
S. Martono ◽  
Arief Yulianto ◽  
Angga Pandu Wijaya

Abstract Inter-industry has various capital structures to take advantage of growth opportunities due to agency differences and information asymmetric problems. This research aims to analyze: (1) the differences in leverage between industries and (2) the impact of shareholders–debtholders conflict and information asymmetric on growth opportunities. The firm-level data used is extracted from Indonesia Stock Exchange's annual reports from 2008 to 2019. Authors used the analysis of variance (ANOVA). The findings show differences in leverage between industries. However, they are relatively stable and not excessive for assets to prevent conflicts between managers and shareholders with debtholders. Equity is also not used to utilize growth to reduce the discretionary power (dilution) of shareholders. As a result, the use of opportunities and growth is limited. This study identifies agency problems and asymmetric information that determines independent companies' decisions in exploiting growth opportunities.


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