What determines citizens’ preferences over alternative decision-making procedures – the personal gain associated with a procedure, or the intrinsic value assigned to it? To answer this question, we present results of a laboratory experiment in which participants select a procedure to decide on the provision of a public good. In the first stage, they choose between majority voting and delegation to a welfare-maximizing algorithm. In the second stage, subjects either vote on the public good provision, or the decision is taken by the algorithm. We define three experimental conditions in which participants receive information about whether a majority in the group faces a positive or negative pay-off from the public good provision, about whether there is a positive group benefit from its provision, or neither kind of information. Findings confirm the importance of instrumental motives in procedural choices. At the same time, however, a significant share of participants chose a procedure that does not maximize their individual benefit. While majority voting seems to be preferred for intrinsic values of fairness and equality, support for delegation to the welfare-maximizing algorithm increases if the group benefit from a public good is known – even in participants who are net payers for its provision.
The Role of the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Public Good and Public Bad Games: Evidence From a tDCS Study