scholarly journals Imitation and Ability to Form Social Experience Based on a Mental Model in Preschoolers

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 751-762
Author(s):  
Ya. K. Smirnova

The article features basic violations and absence of “mental model” as an ability to identify with another person’s actions in the process of imitation. 124 preschoolers were studied to compare the development of mental model and imitation. They were divided into three contrasting groups: normally developing children, children with special needs, and children with delayed speech development. The study revealed imitation differences in relation to the level of the mental model. The obtained data complement the understanding of the innate foundations of social cognition. Violations associated with imitation can explain the cognitive aspects of the mental development deficit in preschool children. They can be a universal symptom that disrupts early social interaction and ultimately leads to various social and communication deficits. For a productive implementation of simulation schemes, it is necessary to understand and recognize the mental states of the interlocutor and their organization into mental models (single, situational, or extra-narrative). Imitation arises when the children are able to integrate information about themselves and about others and can combine their own intentions and the intentions of others in relation to an external object (triadic relations).

2020 ◽  
pp. 96-123
Author(s):  
Yana K. Smirnova

Relevance. The article discusses the relationship between the development of joint (shared) attention of a child with an adult, and the social and cognitive development of the child. Based on previous studies of typically developing children that demonstrate their participation and responsiveness to fundamental social characteristics, it is significant to identify manifestations of atypical joint attention when a child does not register which object (event) or which aspects of this object (event) are the focus of an interlocutor’s attention. The question of which aspects of joint attention are related to the normative development of the child makes this relevant for comparing groups with different forms of atypical development. For the study, the main indicator of understanding the intentions of the other in the direction of view was used, as one of the aspects of joint attention. Objective. To compare the development of social cognition and joint attention among typically developing children and children with various forms of atypical development in order to identify the correlation between the theory of mind and cognitive lesion. Methods. In a sample of preschool children with typical development and of those with mental retardation, hearing impairment, speech impairment, or visual impairment (N = 90), the following methods were used to evaluate the children’s understanding of the intentions, desires, and interests of others by their behavioral manifestations: “Test for Erroneous Opinion”, “Sally-Ann”; the “What does Charlie want?” task, and others. The task was also used to assess the child’s ability to use the direction of a character’s gaze in a picture to determine the person’s intentions. Results. We identified the “primary psychological” characteristics of the atypical development of the child, which prioritize violations of social communication. Several variations of the violation of joint attention were singled out by determining a person’s intentions by the direction of their gaze. It was shown that determining intentions by the direction of gaze is associated with the normative age formation of the child. Symptoms of deficiency in this skill vary depending on the specifics of the child’s atypical development. Conclusions. Secondary deviations in the development of social cognition are specific to a particular primary defect. The limited inflow of information in the event of a violation of the analyzer creates unusual conditions in the children’s accumulation of the experience of social interaction that is necessary to form a mental model.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ya.K. Smirnova ◽  
A. Makashova ◽  
M. Kharitonova

The article deals with the problem of the ability to use ideas about other’s knowledge and the ways of changing it, the ability to de-center thinking in the process of communication in the example of understanding deception in typically developing preschoolers and preschoolers with mental retardation. The recognition of deception is considered as a cognitive function, taking into account the specific techniques of the implementation of the mental model. Empirical sample of research: 72 children of pre-school age from 5 to 6 years. Contrast samples show the specificity of the lack of social interaction tools based on the mental model. Analyzed that in a game with deceit, a child is required to use signs to anticipate events that made it known about the nascent action of another person. In children with mental retardation in a game with deceptive action, shown a situational mode of action without taking into account the model of a mental interaction partner due to the lack of ability to decentration. The data reflects the relationship between the cognitive level of development and the level of the mental model in the process of forming the basis of social cognition and social experience in the early stages of ontogenesis.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 125-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah E. Gaither ◽  
Jessica D. Remedios ◽  
Jennifer R. Schultz ◽  
Keith B. Maddox ◽  
Samuel R. Sommers

Abstract. Research shows that I-sharing, or sharing subjective experiences with an outgroup member, positively shapes attitudes toward that outgroup member. We investigated whether this type of social experience would also promote a positive interracial interaction with a novel outgroup member. Results showed that White and Black participants who I-shared with a racial outgroup member (vs. I-sharing with a racial ingroup member) expressed more liking toward that outgroup member. However, I-sharing with an outgroup member did not reduce anxious behavior in a future social interaction with a novel racial outgroup member. Therefore, although sharing subjective experiences may increase liking toward one individual from a racial outgroup, it remains to be seen whether this positive experience can influence behaviors in future interactions with other racial outgroup members. Future directions are discussed.


1976 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ileana Recagno-Puente ◽  
Maria Rosa de Orantes

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Figà Talamanca

Abstract Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.


1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur C. Graesser

Researchers in the field of discourse processing have investigated how mental models are constructed when adults comprehend stories. They have explored the process of encoding various classes of inferences “on-line” when these mental microworlds are constructed during comprehension. This commentary addresses the extent to which these inferences and mental microworlds are “embodied.”


2000 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-141
Author(s):  
Sally Beveridge ◽  
Sue Pearson

The three articles from Volume 14 that are reviewed here are linked by a common theme: the social interactions of children with special educational needs. The countries involved, the target group of pupils and the methodology vary but each one draws attention to the complexities of the social dimension of inclusion and suggest that physical proximity alone does not ensure positive social interaction.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162095377
Author(s):  
Lisa J. Stephenson ◽  
S. Gareth Edwards ◽  
Andrew P. Bayliss

When two people look at the same object in the environment and are aware of each other’s attentional state, they find themselves in a shared-attention episode. This can occur through intentional or incidental signaling and, in either case, causes an exchange of information between the two parties about the environment and each other’s mental states. In this article, we give an overview of what is known about the building blocks of shared attention (gaze perception and joint attention) and focus on bringing to bear new findings on the initiation of shared attention that complement knowledge about gaze following and incorporate new insights from research into the sense of agency. We also present a neurocognitive model, incorporating first-, second-, and third-order social cognitive processes (the shared-attention system, or SAS), building on previous models and approaches. The SAS model aims to encompass perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes that contribute to and follow on from the establishment of shared attention. These processes include fundamental components of social cognition such as reward, affective evaluation, agency, empathy, and theory of mind.


Author(s):  
Yosef S. Razin ◽  
Jack Gale ◽  
Jiaojiao Fan ◽  
Jaznae’ Smith ◽  
Karen M. Feigh

This paper evaluates Banks et al.’s Human-AI Shared Mental Model theory by examining how a self-driving vehicle’s hazard assessment facilitates shared mental models. Participants were asked to affirm the vehicle’s assessment of road objects as either hazards or mistakes in real-time as behavioral and subjective measures were collected. The baseline performance of the AI was purposefully low (<50%) to examine how the human’s shared mental model might lead to inappropriate compliance. Results indicated that while the participant true positive rate was high, overall performance was reduced by the large false positive rate, indicating that participants were indeed being influenced by the Al’s faulty assessments, despite full transparency as to the ground-truth. Both performance and compliance were directly affected by frustration, mental, and even physical demands. Dispositional factors such as faith in other people’s cooperativeness and in technology companies were also significant. Thus, our findings strongly supported the theory that shared mental models play a measurable role in performance and compliance, in a complex interplay with trust.


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