scholarly journals The Orwellian Reality of Counter-Terrorism Measures Under The ECHR

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Thyroff-Kohl

This paper seeks to analyze the impact of terrorism on the enjoyment of civil liberties guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The paper profoundly assesses case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in order to assess how the Court manages to guarantee that rights are still respected and upheld, even when weighed against the most severe circumstances, namely terrorism. In doing so, the counter-terrorism legal system of one of the most controversial parties to the ECHR, the United Kingdom, is assessed to identify issues which arise when combating terrorism. Surveillance and stop-and-search are archetypical anti-terrorism measures that are limited through the ECtHR in order to not excessively infringe upon human rights, in accordance with Lloyd’s notion of imposing sufficient safeguards if new measures are enacted. Although the ECtHR can be considered an essential guarantor for human rights through its judicial dialogues and influences on domestic courts and governments, the issue of refoulment in torture cases must be readdressed in upcoming case-law. Moreover, grave privacy infringements are permitted to a terrifying extent, and the longer the ECtHR takes to take a solid stance against States abusing the aim of national security, the more severe it will naturally become, due to society’s incremental progression towards a digital life. Ultimately, terrorism tests democratic governments in a unique way, as imposing draconian measures would be an easy way to ensure safety. Nonetheless, fighting with one hand behind one’s back is necessary to uphold the status of a rights-respecting democracy. Only time will tell whether the ECtHR will evolve to give proactive verdicts to ensure human rights prior to their breach.

Author(s):  
Nadja Braun Binder ◽  
Ardita Driza Maurer

This chapter is dedicated to exploring the impact on Swiss administrative law of the pan-European general principles of good administration developed within the framework of the Council of Europe (CoE). The chapter claims that the standards stemming from the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have been adopted in an exemplary way by Swiss authorities. The influence was especially strong in the 1980s and 1990s. The same cannot be said regarding other documents of the CoE, whose impact remains disparate because many aspects of the pan-European general principles of good administration were already part of the national written law. The chapter concludes that despite the exemplary integration of CoE instruments heated debates on the content of these instruments are not excluded from Switzerland.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thym

AbstractApplying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to immigration cases has always been a balancing exercise between the effective protection of human rights and the Contracting States' autonomy to regulate migration flows. In its recent case law, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) has considerably extended the protective scope of Article 8 ECHR by granting autonomous human rights protection to the long-term resident status independent of the existence of family bonds under the heading of ‘private life’. This has important repercussions for the status of legal and illegal immigrants across Europe, since the new case law widens the reach of human rights law to the legal conditions for leave to remain, effectively granting several applicants a human right to regularize their illegal stay. The contribution analyses the new case law and develops general criteria guiding the application of the ECHR to national immigration laws and the new EU harmonization measures adopted in recent years.


Author(s):  
Lara Redondo Saceda

El presente trabajo pretende analizar el sistema de restricciones al ejercicio de los derechos previsto en los artículos 8 a 11 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Así, el objetivo principal es reflexionar sobre la incidencia de estas cláusulas de restricción, su desarrollo jurisprudencial por parte del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y su significado en la construcción del sistema de derechos humanos del Consejo de Europa.This paper is intended to analyse the system of restrictions on the exercise of rights provided by articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, the principal aim is reflecting on the impact of these restriction clauses, their case-law development by the European Court of Human Rights and their meaning on the construction of the Council of Europe Human Rights System.


Author(s):  
Başak Çalı

This article undertakes a survey of the changes in the structure of the interpretive doctrines of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) over time in an exploration of the aging of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) on its 70th anniversary. It argues that the Court’s interpretive doctrines that seek to give due deference to national rights traditions, canons and institutions have become increasingly pervasive in the Court’s procedural and substantive case law in the last two decades. This, in particular, has come at a loss for interpretative doctrines that interpret the Convention as a practical and effective living pan-European instrument. This argument is built in four parts. First it offers a defence of why a study of the interpretive doctrines of the Court over time is a good proxy for studying the ECHR’s ageing process. In the second part, it discusses the rich doctrinal forms of due deference and effective interpretation in the case law of the Court – both young and mature. Part three explains how the judicialisation and expansion of the European human rights system in late 1990 s transitioned to a more heightened and sophisticated focus on due deference doctrines in the Court’s case law. Finally, part four examines whether the recent judicial innovations under the Court’s Article 18 case law and the widely celebrated success of increased ownership of the Convention by domestic courts can act as counter points to the argument that the effective interpretation principle has suffered a loss as the Convention has aged, concluding that none of this may offset the fact that the Convention at 70 is more conservative in spirit than its younger self.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Spano

In its landmark 2013 judgment of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that a life sentence which is not de jure and de facto reducible amounts to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment, as enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author, a judge of the Strasbourg Court, analyses the Vinter judgment both as it stands alone as well as how it fits into and, now, influences the Court’s case-law on Article 3 and 5 of the Convention, before reviewing the procedural requirements laid down by the Court for a ‘Vinter review’ of life sentences. In doing so, the author examines the underlying tensions between the conception of penal policy as falling within the exclusive domain of domestic decision-making and the individualistic and dignitarian notion of human rights in which the Convention system is firmly grounded. The article is based on the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice which the author gave on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen. 


Author(s):  
Andrew Yu. KLYUCHNIKOV

The 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is an instrument for the dynamic development of the human rights system in the member states of the European Council. Such an active formation of the latter is due to the activities of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the case-law of the court is not always accepted in national jurisdictions, especially when it comes to the most sensitive areas of life in modern societies. As the goal of the research, the author sets out the identification of the current approach of this international court to the problem of social rights of convicts, especially in the context of ensuring their social rights. The material for the research was the case-law of the ECHR on the social rights of citizens - with special attention to the rights of persons in places of isolation from society, the legal positions of domestic researchers on the problem posed. The author uses traditional research methods - general scientific and special, with an emphasis on historical, social and legal methods. The paper describes the stages of the international soft law sources formation on penitentiary rules and the impact on this of the ECHR practice in the context of the discrimination standarts prohibition regarding the right of ownership and violation of the forced (compulsory) labor prohibition. A common European standard “the right of a convicted person to retire” has not yet been developed, which has been confirmed in the practice of the ECHR. This decision is due to the need to maintain the effectiveness of the entire convention system, the policy of compromises with states. Through the dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, this right is recognized as an element of the convention rights protection, the convict should be granted an increasing amount of social rights.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 381-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Spielmann

AbstractThe doctrine of the national margin of appreciation is well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In applying this essentially judge-made doctrine, the Court imposes self-restraint on its power of review, accepting that domestic authorities are best placed to settle a dispute. The areas in which the doctrine has most often been applied will be presented here, looking at various examples from case law. After a brief overview of the doctrine’s origin, the analysis will focus on the situations in which the margin has been allowed or denied. Does it relate merely to factual and domestic-law aspects of a case? What is the scope of the margin of appreciation when it comes to interpreting provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights? What impact does an interference (whether disproportionate or not) with a guaranteed right have on the margin allowed? Is there a second-degree or ‘reverse’ margin of appreciation, whereby discretionary powers can be distributed between executive and judicial authorities at domestic level? Lastly it is noteworthy that Protocol No 14, now ratified by all Council of Europe Member States, enshrines in Article 12—at least to some extent—an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation. One essential question remains: by allowing any margin of a certain width, is the European Court simply waiving its power of review or is it attributing responsibility to the domestic courts in the interest of a healthy subsidiarity?


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
EIRIK BJORGE

AbstractThe way in which the courts in the United Kingdom have interpreted and applied the Ullah principle has created problems in the national application of the European Convention on Human Rights. As is evident particularly in Ambrose, this is partly because Lord Bingham's approach in Ullah has been misunderstood. The article analyses these issues in relation to the notion of binding precedent, finding that judicial authority belongs to principles. The national courts ought not, though that is what the Ullah–Ambrose approach enjoins, to expend their energies seeking to align the case before them with the least dissimilar of the reported cases. Rather they should stand back from the case law of the European Court, and apply the broad principles upon which the jurisprudence is founded.


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