The Military in American Politics

The Forum ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Byron E. Shafer ◽  
Raymond J. La Raja
Keyword(s):  
American Politics ◽  
National Guard ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
History Of ◽  
Base Closings ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

This issue of The Forum is focused on the military in American politics. It begins by reprinting the classic overview piece from Samuel Huntington. Damon Colletta then unpacks the state of our attention since Huntington, while John Griswold follows the evolution of Huntington’s organizing focus, the National Guard. Irving Louis Horowitz considers many of these same issues in light of the current role of the U.S. in the wider world. Beth Bailey introduces the biggest piece of civilmilitary involvement, in the form of the volunteer (and predecessor conscription) armed forces. Donald Downs raises the aspect of this politics that most closely touches the university, through ROTC. Lilly Goren considers the aspect that often absorbs the greatest number of congressmen, involving base closings. Matthew Holden and Gene Giannotta think about further, fresh ways to study civil-military relations, most especially between Presidents and their generals. And Jason Dempsey and Bradley Cooper introduce the newest program aimed at a crucial aspect of the military in American life, through “Joining Forces”, the military families initiative. Three book reviews close this issue of the journal: Kenneth Mayer on Jason K. Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations; David Parker on David R. Mayhew, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don’t Kill the U.S. Constitutional System; and Frances Lee on Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate.

Thailand: Camouflaged Khakistocracy in Civil–Military Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Chambers
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The history of civil–military relations in Thailand has paralleled the gradual post-1980 primacy of monarchical power over the country. Until 1932, the monarchy ruled absolute across Siam (Thailand). From 1932 until 1980, the military held more clout than the monarchy (though the palace slowly increased its influence after 1957). Since 1980, monarchy and military have dominated the country with the military as junior partner. The two form a khakistocracy: the military’s uniform color of khaki combined with the aristocracy (monarchy). Though there have been brief instances of elected civilian governments, all were overthrown by the military. In fact, Thailand likely holds the record for the highest number of military putsches in the world. Since the death of King Bhumipol Adulyadej in 2016, the clout of the armed forces has become more centralized under his successor and son King Maha Vajiralongkorn. At the same time, post-2019 Prime Minister (and post-2014 junta leader) General Prayuth Chanocha has sought to entrench military power across Thailand. As a result, in 2021, the monarchy and military continue to enhance authoritarian rule as a khakistocracy camouflaged behind the guise of a charade form of democracy. Civil–military relations represent exclusively a partnership between the monarch and the armed forces.

scholarly journals Introduction to the Armed Forces & Society Forum on Military Reserves in the “New Wars”

2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2199622
Author(s):  
Sergio Catignani ◽  
Nir Gazit ◽  
Eyal Ben-Ari
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Models ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
New Wars ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Critical Perspectives

This Armed Forces & Society forum is dedicated to exploring recent trends in the characteristics of military reserves and of the changing character of reserve forces within the armed forces within the military, the civilian sphere, and in between them. To bring new and critical perspectives to the study of reserve forces and civil–military relations, this introduction and the five articles that follow draw on two organizing conceptual models: The first portrays reservists as transmigrants and focuses on the plural membership of reservists in the military and in civilian society and the “travel” between them. The second model focuses on the multiple formal and informal compacts (contracts, agreements, or pacts) between reservists and the military.

Civil–Military Relations and Russia’s Post-Soviet Military Culture: A Belief System Analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110629
Author(s):  
Kirill Shamiev
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
System Analysis ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Culture ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’ self-serving bias, critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium” in Russian civil–military relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.

Rwanda: Civil–Military Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Jowell
Keyword(s):  
Central Africa ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Mass Violence ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Practical Experiences ◽  
The One ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The army has been a central part of Rwanda’s political system from the precolonial period until the early 21st century and is intrinsically part of the construction and politics of the state. Civil–military relations in Rwanda demonstrate not only the central features of transitioning a rebel group to a national defense sector but also how some states construct their armed forces after a period of mass violence. Since the civil war and genocide in the early 1990s, the Rwandan military has been the primary actor in politics, the economy, and state building as well as in regional wars in central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Practical experiences of guerrilla insurgency and conflict in Uganda and Rwanda, postconflict military integration, and the intertwining of political and economic agendas with the ruling party have shaped civil–military relations in Rwanda and have been central to how the Rwandan defense sector functions. Contemporary Rwandan civil–military relations center around the two elements of service delivery and control, which has resulted in the development of an effective and technocratic military in terms of remit and responsibilities on the one hand, and the creation of a politicized force of coercion on the other hand. The military in Rwanda therefore reflects the pressures and dynamics of the wider state and cannot be separated from it. The Rwandan army is thus a “political army” and is part and parcel of the political structures that oversee and govern the Rwandan state.

scholarly journals The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

The Role of Defence in National Cybersecurity

2021 ◽  
pp. 446-462
Author(s):  
Mika Kerttunen
Keyword(s):  
Information And Communication Technologies ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Communication Technologies ◽  
Industrial Complex ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Policy And Strategy ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
Defence Sector ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Essential to states organizing and regulating civil-military relations, the author analyses the actual and potential role and tasks that the defence sector and armed forces can take up in national cybersecurity policy and strategy. After identifying competences and capabilities that the defence sector could employ for national cybersecurity, the chapter identifies generic roles, from being an independent actor to being another integrated stakeholder, for the defence sector and the armed forces. The author notices how inclusion of the defence sector into national cybersecurity updates the concerns of the ‘military-industrial complex’ influencing not only cybersecurity policy but also how information and communication technologies are to be used in a society. Therefore, the chapter ultimately encourages states to implement strong political control in order to avoid unnecessary securitization and militarization of information technology and cyber development policies, misuse of public mandate and funds, and, ultimately, abuses of power by any elite.

normally only gradually, and this situation is not universally the case. There is growing understanding of the need for security arrangements which underpin the economic and political co-operation whose value is so clear to most decision-makers. Those who wish to see greater co-operation from the Latin American states in the non-proliferation and arms control fields should attempt to understand these phenomena and make a greater effort to bring the Latin Americans along. The North can help a great deal in educating key members of the civilian elites in these countries about defence matters. This would go a long way to easing some of the issues of civil-military relations mentioned. Showing more transparency ourselves in the working of arms control groupings can help to reduce concerns in these countries about their ability to resist excessive northern pressures if they accept the objectives sought by those countries in such groups. Working with nascent but interested elements of civil society, from universities and research centres for example can help to build the constituency for these objectives in key countries. And efforts to show the military that collaboration does not necessarily mean the end of a legitimate degree of armed forces influence in the security area and more widely in foreign policy, and that arms control does not necessarily imply ruin for them and their families, need to be made and indeed should be more closely studied in order to address these real concerns. There is thus a good deal which can be done. But culture remains formative and vital to states and individuals. These societies are the result of a lived historic experience and only an understanding of the very real security concerns they have will allow us to obtain more support from them in security fields which are, as in the past, still offering great challenges globally and regionally.

2012 ◽  
pp. 193-196
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The North ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Research Centres

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
The Face ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

The Best of Intentions

2019 ◽  
pp. 222-249
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
History Of ◽  
Conceptual Discussion ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Defense Planning

This chapter examines defense planning in the Indian military. It begins with a conceptual discussion on the role of civilians in defense planning, mainly by examining the experience of other democracies. Next, it describes the history of defense planning in India, focusing on the formulation and implementation of five-year defense plans. There are three main arguments in this chapter. First, effective defense planning requires a close partnership between civilians and the military. Second, defense planning in India is marked by a lack of civilian guidance and institutional discordance, creating friction in civil–military relations. To an extent, this is because of a lack of expertise, on the part of civilians, and an institutional design that creates strong civil–military silos. Third, notwithstanding the above, there have been periodic attempts at reforming defense-planning structures. Progress has been achieved in some sectors, but much remains to be done.

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