scholarly journals Responsibility To Protect: What For?

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Adelaida Rivera
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
The State ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Resolution 1973 ◽  
The Military

On March 17th 2011, the United Nations Security Council approved the Resolution 1973 which authorized the use of force in Libya in order to protect civilians from the attacks performed by the state armed forces. The military action by NATO in Libya has resulted in diverse and divided opinions. The recourse of Responsibility to protect appeared later as a measure intended to be implemented in the ongoing conflict in Syria, but after two failed resolutions, it became clear that some UN Security Council members are not willing to repeat the Libyan scenario. This text aims to examine some basic notions of the R2P concept, its application in Libya and the implications of the results after the Libyan case on its possible application in Syria. Should the discussed objectives behind the application of Responsibility to Protect in the Libyan case and its results be determinant on the decision whether this doctrine can be applied in Syria? Is it possible that the mistakes committed in Libya, the atrocities now experienced in Syria and the non-response by the international community could mark the end of the whole concept of Responsibility to Protect? These questions are intended to be discussed in this paper.

The Status of the “Responsibility to Protect (Rtop)“ Doctrine in Light of the Conflicts in Libya and Syria

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 495
Author(s):  
Petra Perisic
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
World Summit ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Status ◽  
Resolution 1973 ◽  
The One ◽  
Outcome Document

In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty introduced a new doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)”, which signified an obligation of each state to protect its population from mass atrocities occurring in that state, as well as an obligation on the part of international community to offer such protection if the state in question fails to fulfill its duty. The doctrine of RtoP was subsequently endorsed by states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, though it was formulated more restrictively in comparison to the 2001 Report. In 2011 a conflict broke out in Libya between its ruler Muammar Gaddafi and the protesters against his rule. Government forces were brutal in their attempt to quell the protests and it was not long before different international bodies started to report mass violations of human rights. Surprisingly, the UN Security Council was not deadlocked by veto and passed the Resolution 1973, which invoked the RtoP principle and authorized the use of force. Supporters of RtoP hailed such an application of the principle and believed that the case of Libya was just a beginning of a successful bringing RtoP to life. Such predictions turned out to be premature. Not long after the Libyan conflict, the one in Syria began. Although Syrian people was faced with the same humanitarian disaster as Libyan did, the Security Council could not agree on passing of the resolution which would authorize the use of force to halt human rights violations. Two crises are being analyzed, as well as reasons behind such a disparate reaction of the Security Council in very similar circumstances.

scholarly journals United Nations Security Council Practice in Relation to Use of Force in No-Fly Zones and Maritime Exclusion Zones

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob McLaughlin
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Lethal Force ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Law ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines UN Security Council practice with respect to the use of force in no-fly zones and maritime exclusion zones. It considers whether the law governing the zone is based or not based on the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and whether the law on the use of force inside the zone is essentially the same as that outside it. It also assesses the effect of the Security Council’s act of declaring or acquiescing in the zone on the law that is normally applicable in the ocean or airspace enclosed by the zone. The chapter also analyses whether the Security Council can authorize the use of lethal force for the purpose of enforcing a mandate despite the absence of LOAC authorization. It discusses the notion of a ‘third paradigm’ for use of lethal force and the concept of ‘self-defence’ endorsed by the Security Council (and the UN more generally).

THE LEGALITY OF THE NATO BOMBING IN LIBYA

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Ulfstein ◽  
Hege Føsund Christiansen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Human Rights Violations ◽  
Member States ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Resolution 1973 ◽  
Nato Bombing

AbstractOn 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take forceful measures to protect Libyan civilians. Clearly NATO actions to protect civilians were within the mandate. But the authors claim that operations aiming at overthrowing the Qaddafi regime were illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have a negative effect on the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future gross human rights violations.

Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
World Summit ◽  
Significant Progress ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Resolution 1973 ◽  
High Level

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) played an important role in shaping the world's response to actual and threatened atrocities in Libya. Not least, the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the UN Security Council on May 17, 2011, approving a no-fly zone over Libya and calling for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, reflected a change in the Council's attitude toward the use of force for human protection purposes; and the role played by the UN's new Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect points toward the potential for this new capacity to identify threats of mass atrocities and to focus the UN's attention on preventing them. Given the reluctance of both the Security Council and the wider UN membership even to discuss RtoP in the years immediately following the 2005 World Summit—the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly that gave birth to RtoP—these two facts suggest that significant progress has been made thanks to the astute stewardship of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who is personally committed to the principle. Where it was once a term of art employed by a handful of like-minded countries, activists, and scholars, but regarded with suspicion by much of the rest of the world, RtoP has become a commonly accepted frame of reference for preventing and responding to mass atrocities.

Tilting at Windmills? The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect after UNSC Resolution 1973

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Hall
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Indian Government ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Resolution 1973 ◽  
Indian Foreign Policy

India voted for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, but abstained from Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya, subsequently criticizing the NATO campaign. This stance provoked much comment within India and among foreign commentators on Indian foreign policy. Some praised it as morally superior to approving military action, which was portrayed by some as Western ‘neo-colonialism’. Others, however, were critical of India’s unwillingness to back intervention in Libya and the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. For the critics, India’s objections to UNSC 1973 merely demonstrated the continued weakness of the foreign policy establishment and its inability to balance power politics and ethical values. This article evaluates these various positions, but argues that while the Libyan episode stimulated an unprecedented amount of comment in India about R2P, it is unlikely that the Indian government or leading Indian commentators will soon shift their positions.

scholarly journals Why Libya, but not Syria?

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Caruso
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
World War ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Compare And Contrast ◽  
World War Iii

In both Libya and Syria, an uprising of civilians against their rulers resulted in intra-state conflicts. Despite comparable circumstances, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has approached these situations in different ways. The existing literature tends to consider both conflicts in the context of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Rather than compare and contrast the two conflicts in terms of assessing the effectiveness of R2P, the purpose of this paper is to examine why the UNSC authorized a military intervention in Libya, but not in Syria. This question arises out of the notion that similar conditions should elicit the same response. This research will present three main arguments to explain why the UNSC did not authorize the use of force in Syria as they did in Libya. The first is that the variety of actors fighting in Syria makes it difficult for intervention. The second is that the individual interactions between the permanent Security Council members and Syria further complicate intervention. The final argument is that the Security Council is upholding the foundation of the UN in preventing World War III.

11. Use of force

2021 ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Armed Force ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Significant Achievement ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the United Nations Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.

Elected member influence in the United Nations Security Council

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Farrall ◽  
Marie-Eve Loiselle ◽  
Christopher Michaelsen ◽  
Jochen Prantl ◽  
Jeni Whalan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Real Power ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Common Understanding

AbstractThis article reassesses how members of the UN Security Council exercise influence over the Council’s decision-making process, with particular focus on the ten elected members (the E10). A common understanding of Security Council dynamics accords predominance to the five permanent members (the P5), suggesting bleak prospects for the Council as a forum that promotes the voices and representation of the 188 non-permanent members. The assumption is that real power rests with the P5, while the E10 are there to make up the numbers. By articulating a richer account of Council dynamics, this article contests the conventional wisdom that P5 centrality crowds out space for the E10 to influence Council decision-making. It also shows that opportunities for influencing Council decision-making go beyond stints of elected membership. It argues that the assumed centrality of the P5 on the Council thus needs to be qualified and re-evaluated.

scholarly journals Determination of United Nations Security Council Resolutions by States

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 156
Author(s):  
Malihe Behfar ◽  
Hassan Savari
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
The State ◽  
International Peace ◽  
State Action ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
The Way

In United Nations history, the legality of Security Council Resolutions, in many cases, is challenged. Generally these challenges take by states that affected Security Councils decisions. With notice that states are the representative for implementation of Security Council Resolutions, they intervene their determination and interpretation in the way that implement Security Council Decisions. In some cases, domestic and regional courts determine the state action in implementation Security Council Resolutions. Although this cases couldn’t provide direct review on Resolutions but affected by way of implementation. Determination by states is probable and arises some concerns about decrease effectiveness of Security Council in maintenance of international peace and security.

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