O BEM DA VIDA E A VIDA BOA NA TEORIA DE JOHN FINNIS: UMA INTRODUÇÃO

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (36) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elden Borges Souza ◽  
Caroline Figueiredo Lima
Keyword(s):  
John Finnis

O presente artigo investiga a teoria neoclássica, especificamente a tese apresentada por John Finnis, no tocante ao bem humano básico da vida, trabalhado pelo autor em “Lei Natural e Direitos Naturais”. A problemática do tema proposto, incide em pesquisar quais são os parâmetros de alcance do direito à vida, introduzido pelo autor, além de identificar quais são as dimensões da vida boa na teoria analisada. A partir de uma pesquisa bibliográfica da teoria analítica do direito e um diálogo entre os opositores desta tese, tem-se por objetivo central introduzir a teoria finnisiana sobre o bem comum e o florescimento humano, além de expor os aspectos da vida boa dos seres humanos. A hipótese consiste em trabalhar a vida como elemento intrínseco a todos os indivíduos e, consequentemente, como um bem básico independente de positivação pelo Estado.

Germain Grisez and the “New Natural Law”

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Massa
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
John Finnis

This chapter is an extended examination of a revisionist approach to natural law, explored by Germain Grisez and John Finnis. Grisez and Finnis elucidated an entirely new paradigm that they believed to be both sounder intellectually than the paradigms of the neo-scholastics and revisionists and much closer in outline to the paradigm offered by St. Thomas Aquinas. This approach is usually labeled the “new natural law.” The author proposes that the entire “new natural law” project undertaken by Grisez and Finnis could be viewed as being about saving natural law by reestablishing it on distinctly different foundations that avoided any appeal to metaphysical claims, which modern science had long rejected as outdated and unscientific.

Law as Practical Reason

1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Detmold
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
The State ◽  
Strong Sense ◽  
A Priority ◽  
The Law ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
Vast Range

Law is practical. Legal reasoning is practical reasoning. We could make nothing of a judge who having listened to counsel's arguments and reflected about the law governing his case thought that the state of knowledge that he had achieved was the natural termination of his enterprise and submitted his conclusions to the editors of Halsbury's Laws of England rather than performed the action of giving judgment. The parties would be outraged, and rightly. And if the judge continued to do such a thing he would be dismissed. Legal reasoning is practical in the sense that its natural conclusion is an action (in the judge's case the action of giving judgment) rather than a state of knowledge. This is taking “practical” in a strong sense. By this definition thought is practical whose natural conclusion is an action (or decision against action): its strongest contrast is with theoretical thought whose natural conclusion is knowledge. But it also contrasts with hypothetical thought about action (say, my thinking it would be good to play cricket again). I do not call this practical because it does not conclude in an action or decision against action (others do; for example John Finnis in Fundamentals of Ethics; my reasons for differing in this matter will emerge). A judge's practical reasoning towards the action of giving judgment has priority for our understanding of law over that vast range of practically idle things that lawyers do, from the construction of digests like Halsbury to casual reflection about the rule in Shelley's case (of course there is one sort of doing involved in both these, but not legal doing). It is important here to be clear about this priority. It is a priority of practicality, not a priority of judges or lawyers.

The Natural Law in Catholic Ethics

2015 ◽  
pp. 387-402
Author(s):  
Kevin L. Flannery
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Vatican Ii ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Second Vatican Council ◽  
Vatican Council ◽  
Biblical Texts ◽  
Classical Traditions ◽  
John Finnis

This chapter presents Catholic teaching on the natural law as the product of a conversation over millennia. After offering some basic conceptual distinctions, the chapter begins by considering ancient non-Christian sources for Christian reflection on the natural law, especially Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The chapter then considers relevant biblical texts and the teachings of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Attention is particularly played to Thomas’s adaptation of Classical traditions, and his argument concerning the unchangeablness of natural law. The final section of the chapter focuses on discussion of natural law after the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) in the work of Germain Grisez and John Finnis.

scholarly journals Democracia, Direitos Humanos e Direito Natural: crítica à tese de John Finnis sobre o casamento homossexual | Democracy, Human Rights and Natural Law: critique of John Finnis' thesis on homosexual marriage

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-36
Author(s):  
Roger Raupp Rios
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Homosexual Marriage ◽  
John Finnis

Examina-se de modo crítico a teoria da lei natural, de John Finnis, e sua defesa contra a possibilidade jurídica de reconhecimento do direito ao casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo, a partir de dois pontos de vista: a consistência interna da do referencial finnisiano e sua adequação diante do debate sobre direitos humanos. Examinam-se também as alegações associadas à defesa finnisiana, desde a proeminência de uma dita moral majoritária e da ofensa aos sentimentos públicos, até preocupações com a “promoção da homossexualidade”, suas consequências pretensamente prejudiciais aos menores e a fragilização da instituição do casamento. Apontam-se seus limites e sua incompatibilidade em face dos ideais democráticos que suplantaram os projetos nazi-fascistas no século XX, tomando como caso emblemático a decisão da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos no caso “Obergefell vs. Hodges”.

scholarly journals John Finnis y la defensa ética del «Rule of Law». «Natural Law and Natural Rights» y otros escritos posteriores

2020 ◽  
pp. 435-461
Author(s):  
Carlos-I. Massini-Correas
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
John Finnis

En el presente artículo, escrito en homenaje a los 40 años de la aparición de la primera edición de Natural Law and Natural Rights de John Finnis, se estudian varias de las versiones elaboradas por el iusfilósofo australiano para analizar, explicitar, desarrollar y defender la noción de rule of law. Luego de este desarrollo, se efectúa una valoración de las aportaciones de Finnis en este punto, en especial las referidas al carácter principalmente ético de ese instituto, y a la maestría con la que ha sabido integrar la tradición clásico-realista del iusnaturalismo, los planteos metodológicos de la analytical jurisprudence y la reflexión contemporánea sobre la idea del gobierno limitado por el derecho.

scholarly journals The relation between reason and goodness in John Finnis

2020 ◽  
pp. 65-101
Author(s):  
Douglas Flippen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
The Will ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
First Time

John Finnis joins Grisez in providing a new foundation for Thomistic natural law theory. To accomplish this, they closely associate good as perfection with good as to be pursued and have both senses grasped together by the practical intellect independently of the speculative intellect. The practical intellect then presents good to the will and motivates it to act for the first time. Since good as perfection is inherently speculative and since the intellect becomes practical only depending on the will, their notion of the practical intellect is incoherent and their new foundation is deeply flawed.

scholarly journals On what a theory of natural law is supposed to be

2020 ◽  
pp. 167-200
Author(s):  
Michael Pakaluk
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Natural Teleology ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
The Law ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
The Many ◽  
Locus Classicus

A theory may properly be called a theory of natural law, if either it functions as such a theory is expected to function; or it has the expected content; or it is a plausible interpretation of a theory generally acknowledged to be in the tradition of natural law. It functions as such a theory if it supports appeals to natural law intended to ‘contextualize’ human law. It has the expected content, if it adverts to providential, natural teleology as the basis for a law given to us prior to convention. It would clearly be located in the tradition, and rightly accounted as such a theory, if it were a plausible interpretation of Aquinas’ Treatise on Law, which is the locus classicus for the philosophical treatment of natural law. But the ‘New Natural Law,’ first expounded in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) of John Finnis, meets none of these criteria. NLNR seems best construed, then, as a contribution to the «law and morality » debate, not a theory of natural law. It gives merely another ‘method of ethics’ along with the many others put forward in the 20th c. If so, the philosophical work needed for a persuasive, contemporary revival of natural law still remains to be done.

scholarly journals El debate en la prensa sobre libertad académica. El caso Finnis

2021 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 259-267
Author(s):  
Alberto De Lucas Vicente
Keyword(s):  
Redes Sociales ◽  
John Finnis

En el debate acerca de la libertad de expresión en el ámbito académico, el caso Finnis ha sido uno de los más recientes y de los que más repercusión mediática ha recibido. La petición creada por un grupo de alumnos de la Universidad de Oxford para despedir a John Finnis generó múltiples reacciones en prensa y en redes sociales. Al hablar de discursos que hablaban a su vez de otros discursos anteriores, el estudio lingüístico desde la perspectiva de la polifonía y la argumentación en la lengua (Anscombre y Ducrot 1983) se muestra como el más adecuado para el análisis del tratamiento que los medios dieron al debate (Bednarek 2006, 2007, Fairclough 1988, Smirnova 2009). En este trabajo se han analizado las estrategias de (des)legitimación empleadas para introducir discurso ajeno. A continuación, se ha analizado la presencia que cada medio daba a los distintos agentes sociales implicados en el debate.

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