scholarly journals Acerca de la distinción entre la capacidad de juzgar determinante y reflexionante en Kant

1999 ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
Carlos Mendiola
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Judgment ◽  
Central Thesis ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility

The central thesis is that already in the Critique of Pure Reason does the need for the distinction between determining and reflecting uses of Judgment arise, although its nominal formulation appears only later in the second introduction to the Critique of Judgment. The interpretative importance of this thesis lies in that, contrary to most interpretations, which claim that the distinction lies in the nature of such judgments, the author thinks of it as differentiated exercises of an identical capacity of judgment, and even as a difference that must be appreciated in the products of such capacity. Thus, any judgment of objects may at once be determining and reflecting, according to the kind of application of the concepts involved in each case. In brief, although reflection does not properly belong in the conditions of possibility of objective judgment, it is indispensable to fix the conceptual place of the particular in judgment

Kant and the Art of Schematism

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Matherne
Keyword(s):  
Valuable Insight ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Judgment ◽  
The Third ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractIn theCritique of Pure Reason, Kant describes schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180–1). While most commentators treat this as Kant's metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant's clue and treat schematism literally asKunst. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant's theoretically exact ways of using the termKunstin theCritique of Judgmentwe gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its connection to Kant's concerns in the thirdCritique.

scholarly journals LA ANGUSTIA, MÁS ACÁ DEL CONOCIMIENTO

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (30) ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
Maximiliano Ariel Maximiliano
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Lacan ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Object A ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility

ResumenEn el presente artículo nos proponemos abordar un aspecto escasamente trabajado en la bibliografía lacaniana, a saber, la recepción de la Crítica de la razón pura –especialmente, “La estética trascendental”-– en el seminario La angustia de Jacques Lacan. Efectivamente, los comentadores de la obra de Lacan se han centrado casi de manera exclusiva en la recepción de la filosofía práctica de Kant que ha realizado el psicoanalista francés, dejando de lado la importancia de la Crítica de la razón pura para delimitar al objeto a. En este punto, será necesario evocar la distinción fundamental entre objetividad y objetalidad para distinguir, así, el deseo a la base de las condiciones de posibilidad del conocimiento al deseo.Palabras claves: objetividad, objetalidad, epistemología, Kant, objeto a. AbstractThis paper aims at addressing one aspect barely studied of the Lacanian bibliography, i.e., the reception of the Critique of Pure Reason –especially, the “Transcendental Aesthetic”– in Jacques Lacan's seminary on Anxiety. Indeed, commentators of Lacan's work have almost exclusively focused on his reception of Kant's practical philosophy, putting aside the importance of the Critique of Pure Reason to delimit the object a. In this point, it will be necessary to recall the fundamental difference between objectivity and objectality in order to distinguish the desire on the base of the conditions of possibility from knowledge to desire.Keywords: objectivity, objectality, epistemology, Kant, object a. Résumé Cet article aborde un aspect peu étudié de l'œuvre lacanienne, à savoir, la réception de la Critique de la raison pure - notamment “L'esthétique transcendantale "– dans le séminaire L'angoisse de Jacques Lacan. En effet, les commentateurs de l'œuvre de Lacan se sont focalisés presque exclusivement sur la réception de la philosophie pratique de Kant de la part du psychanalyste français, en oubliant l'importance de la Critique de la raison pure pour délimiter l'objet a. Sur ce point, il est nécessaire d'évoquer la distinction fondamentale entre objectivité et objectalité, pour différencier ainsi le désir à la base des conditions de possibilité de la connaissance au désir.Mots-clés : objectivité, objectalité, épistémologie, Kant, objet a. 

From “Possible Worlds” to “Possible Experience”. Real Possibility in Leibniz and Kant

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Osvaldo Ottaviani
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Short Account ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
The Real ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility ◽  
Metaphysics Of Modality

AbstractThis paper moves from a disagreement with those interpreters who explain Kant’s doctrine of real possibility in terms of possible worlds. It seems to me that a possible world framework is too much indebted to the Leibnizian metaphysics of modality and, therefore, cannot serve to make sense of Kant’s theses. Leibniz’s theory of possibility, indeed, has been deeply criticized in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). Interestingly enough, however, Kant’s principal argument for rejecting that the field of what is possible is greater than the field of what is real was already anticipated by Leibniz. However, Leibniz employed it to demonstrate that there cannot be more than one actual world only (the others being purely possible ones). Moving from this fact, I argue that there is a certain tension between what Leibniz says about the actual world and his commitment to a plurality of possible worlds conceived as ideas in God’s mind. The first part of my paper is devoted to show that such a tension can be traced back to Leibniz’s claims about the relation between the possible and the real. In the second part, then, I maintain that Kant’s theory of real possibility grows from a dissatisfaction with (and a rejection of) Leibniz’s attempted solution to the problem of characterizing a kind of possibility narrower than the merely logical one and, nonetheless, not identical with existence. Finally, I present a short account of Kant’s theory of real possibility, based on the notion of transcendental conditions as conditions of possibility of experience, showing how it works in the case of the forms of intuition.

scholarly journals Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (44) ◽  
pp. 459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Omar Perez
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Position ◽  
Work Program ◽  
The Core ◽  
Fundamental Part ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility

The aim of this paper is to present the core of Kant´s critique of traditional metaphysics and ontology as a transcendental semantics that allows reformulating the problem about the objects and their reality. In order to achieve this purpose, we propound a paper divided in two parts: 1. A brief justification of Kant’s semantics interpretation; 2. A work program based on a semantics comprehended as a fundamental part of a method of resolution of philosophical problems. Basically, we can state that the critical position against traditional metaphysics and ontology leads to the question upon: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? This question leads to its conditions of possibility, that is: sensible representations; intellectual representations; syntactic rules; semantic rules (or referential rules, on the relation between intellectual representations and some sort of sensibility or affection); the operator of the syntactic and semantic rules (subject, man, human nature, gender, people etc.). This is what we call the core of Kant’s critique and with which we may begin to solve philosophical problems even beyond those presented by our philosopher. As such, we are briefly going to observe the following steps: 1. From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects; 2. A critique of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics; 3. Criticism as semantics; 4. The semantic project and the kinds of judgments; 5. Human nature and the theory of judgment; 6. The work program within Kant’s own work; 7. Subsequent results of Kant’s project

scholarly journals Reflections on Kant’s View of the Imagination

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (157) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
Tugba Ayas Onol
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Judgment ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
And Performance

<p>The paper elaborates the theory of imagination in Immanuel Kant’s <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em> and <em>Critique of Judgment</em>. From the first <em>Critique</em> to the third <em>Critique</em>, the imagination emerges under different titles such as reproductive, productive or transcendental imagination. The paper shall try to decide whether its <em>functions</em> suggested in the first <em>Critique</em> and its performance in the third <em>Critique</em> are <em>contradictory or developmental</em> with respect to Kant’s critical philosophy. Thus, it will examine of the power and the scope of the imagination in the first<em> Critique</em> and of its status and performance in the third <em>Critique. </em></p><p> </p>

scholarly journals Canguilhem’s Critique of Kant: Bringing Rationality Back to Life

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-46
Author(s):  
Marina Brilman
Keyword(s):  
Blind Spot ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Judgment

Canguilhem’s contemporary relevance lies in how he critiques the relation between knowledge and life that underlies Kantian rationality. The latter’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment represent life in the form of an exception: life is simultaneously included and excluded from understanding. Canguilhem’s critique can be grouped into three main strands of argument. First, his reference to concepts as preserved problems breaks with Kant’s idea of concepts regarding the living as a ‘unification of the manifold’. Second, Canguilhem’s vital normativity represents life as the potential to resist normative orders that judge the living, relegating Kant’s ‘lawfulness of the contingent’ to a ‘mediocre regularity’. Third, Canguilhem’s introduction of the environment as a ‘category of contemporary thought’ decentres the living/knowing subject and introduces contingency. His idea of the ‘knowledge of life’ leads to the conclusion that life is the condition of possibility of rationality, rather than rationality’s ‘blind spot’.

Kants kritische Psychologie als Aufklärung

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-273
Author(s):  
Hyeongjoo Kim ◽  
Carina Pape
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Complete Rejection ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation.

Kant’s Material Condition of Real Possibility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
Rational Theology ◽  
Material Condition

In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document