scholarly journals FREEDOM, LOW AND IMAGINATION THE LECTURES OF F.W.J. SCHELLING IN 1800-1810s

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
P V Rezvykh
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Specific Character ◽  
Main Principle ◽  
Theological Interpretation ◽  
Unpublished Manuscript ◽  
Direct Continuation ◽  
The Law

The gives the detailed analysis of the ratio of freedom and imagination in an unpublished manuscript written by F.V.Y. Schelling, which contains the materials for the lecture course read at Erlangen University in 1820-1821. The author focuses on the question of imagination as a condition for the possibility to unfold the modal differences that provide the hierarchy of predicative definitions. The article shows that both the draft philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation are a direct continuation of the transcendentalist program given by Kant.Those projects bases on the thesis that the consciousness of freedom and consciousness of the law, justified in the “Critique of Practical Reason”, are related one another. Schelling following Kant’s theory, points to the law and to the unconditional imperative of freedom as the main principle which is not only theoretical or practical, but determines the separation of ontological and deontological modalities. At the same time, the formal structure of an imperative as a command has the specific character of “hiden opening”: what is themed in an imperative is not opened as a meaningful opportunity, it is only opened as theopportunity in its difference from necessity. I show in this article that interpreting the Schelling possibility relies on the teachings of I. Kant in his transcendental idealconception, connected with Kant's interpretation of the imagination’s productive ability. In the middle of Schelling’s theological interpretation of Kant's consciousness of lawdoctrine as the “fact of mind” lies the analogy between peacemaking and the ancestral sin of the first people. This concept is the main source of the theory of potency as ontological modalities, developed by Schelling in the 1830s - 1840s in lectures on the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation.

Property Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and the Control of Assets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aruna Nair
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Legal Power ◽  
The Law ◽  
Fiduciary Relationships ◽  
Relationship Of

This chapter examines the law governing the availability of claims to traceable proceeds. It argues that the language used in the case law—which uses the terminology of property rights and of fiduciary relationships—cannot fully explain the law, since such claims are often available in the absence of fiduciary duties and are not available to holders of many types of property right. It argues that such claims instead presuppose a relationship of ‘control of assets’: where the defendant has a legal power to deal with some asset, correlating to a vulnerability to a loss of rights in that asset on the part of the claimant, and coupled with a duty not to exercise the power. It argues that relationships that have this formal structure also share normative characteristics that justify the subordination of defendant autonomy that has been shown to be at the heart of the tracing concept.

Law as Practical Reason

1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Detmold
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
The State ◽  
Strong Sense ◽  
A Priority ◽  
The Law ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
Vast Range

Law is practical. Legal reasoning is practical reasoning. We could make nothing of a judge who having listened to counsel's arguments and reflected about the law governing his case thought that the state of knowledge that he had achieved was the natural termination of his enterprise and submitted his conclusions to the editors of Halsbury's Laws of England rather than performed the action of giving judgment. The parties would be outraged, and rightly. And if the judge continued to do such a thing he would be dismissed. Legal reasoning is practical in the sense that its natural conclusion is an action (in the judge's case the action of giving judgment) rather than a state of knowledge. This is taking “practical” in a strong sense. By this definition thought is practical whose natural conclusion is an action (or decision against action): its strongest contrast is with theoretical thought whose natural conclusion is knowledge. But it also contrasts with hypothetical thought about action (say, my thinking it would be good to play cricket again). I do not call this practical because it does not conclude in an action or decision against action (others do; for example John Finnis in Fundamentals of Ethics; my reasons for differing in this matter will emerge). A judge's practical reasoning towards the action of giving judgment has priority for our understanding of law over that vast range of practically idle things that lawyers do, from the construction of digests like Halsbury to casual reflection about the rule in Shelley's case (of course there is one sort of doing involved in both these, but not legal doing). It is important here to be clear about this priority. It is a priority of practicality, not a priority of judges or lawyers.

scholarly journals Privacy, Corrective Justice, and Incrementalism: Legal Imagination and the Recognition of a Privacy Tort in Ontario

2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas DC Bennett
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Corrective Justice ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Incremental Development ◽  
Privacy Laws ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This article considers the nature of common law development as exemplified by the recent privacy case of Jones v. Tsige. The author focuses on Jones, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the novel privacy tort of “intrusion upon seclusion”. Using a detailed analysis of the case as its basis, the article explores issues which have much wider significance for the judicial development of privacy laws: the process of incremental elaboration of the law, the moral impulses at work within it, and the relevance of imagination to its operations. By drawing out these discrete issues and analyzing the role that each plays in Jones, the article offers a framework for examining such questions in future privacy cases. Moreover, this article argues that the judgment in Jones brings valuable clarity to the analysis of the process of common law development. In particular, the essay concludes that the novel privacy tort recognized in Jones is the result of a legitimate incremental development rather than an instance of undue judicial activism.

The Right to Return: The Biblical Law of Theft

2010 ◽  
pp. 28-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliakim Katz ◽  
Jacob Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Economic Model ◽  
Jewish Law ◽  
Biblical Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

This article focuses on the law surrounding the biblical law of theft. According to Jewish Law, a thief who is caught and found guilty must return the stolen article and, in addition, pay the owner a fine equal to the value of the article. The thief can avoid this fine by admitting to the theft on his own initiative in a court and returning the stolen article to its owner. This article refers to such canceling of a fine as a pardon. The pardon is explained in the Talmud by the legal dictum “Mode BeKnass Patur,” that is “he who confesses in a fine is exempt”. This article carefully explains economic model with the help of various graphs. This article also explains two issues which require consideration in assessing whether Eliezer acted properly as an agent according to Jewish law. A detailed analysis of concepts of duty in Judaism concludes this article.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Carlton F.W. Larson
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
American Revolution ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Declaration Of Independence ◽  
The Law

The Introduction opens with a vignette of James Wilson, prominent attorney and signer of the Declaration of Independence, fighting for his life against members of the Philadelphia militia in the “Fort Wilson” incident of 1779. It then turns to the primary themes of the book: treason and juries. Treason was a central issue of the American Revolution, shaping the early debates over the legality of British actions, the treatment of British adherents, and eventually the suppression of internal rebellions. Juries played a critical role in this process, and this book provides the most detailed analysis of eighteenth-century American jurors yet written. The book focuses on Pennsylvania, as this was the most critical jurisdiction for the law of treason.

16. Non-fatal offences against the person

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Bodily Harm ◽  
Grievous Bodily Harm ◽  
The Law ◽  
Prevention Of Crime ◽  
Assault And Battery

This chapter focuses on non-fatal offences against the person, including assault and battery, wounding and inflicting grievous bodily harm, poisoning offences, kidnapping, harassment, possession and use of offensive weapons. The chapter also discusses defences to assault and battery including consent, and lawful chastisement, in addition to the Law Commission’s Report on reforming offences against the person. The discussion includes a detailed analysis of the relevant statutory offences including the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. It also considers racially or religiously aggravated versions of the relevant offences.

Pearce & Stevens' Trusts and Equitable Obligations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Pearce ◽  
Warren Barr
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations provides a detailed and contextualized account of the law of equity and trusts. The text gives detailed analysis of all key decisions, statutes, and current academic debates related to the law of equity and trusts, giving a grounding in the subject. This new edition, which includes an additional chapter on the three certainties, brings this subject together coherently, clarifying the discussion of the consequences of uncertainty. The text has been updated with recent cases and developments in the area, including Marr v Collie [2017] on resulting and constructive trusts, Patel v Mirza [2016] on illegality, Prest v Petrodel [2013] on resulting trusts and equitable proprietary remedies, and the Law Commission’s consultation on the making of wills.

Metus Parthicus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kit Morrell
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the lex Pompeia de provinciis of 52. The law should be seen as the product of collaboration between Pompey and Cato in the first half of 52. Cato had been instrumental in creating Pompey’s sole consulship and his role in Milo’s trial shows that their cooperation continued; moreover, Pompey’s law gave effect to a senatus consultum passed the previous year probably with Cato’s backing. Although Cassius Dio presents the law as an attempt to control electoral competition, the lex Pompeia was also a far-sighted provincial reform which transformed the way in which provincial commands were created and conceptualized. Besides requiring an interval between magistracy and promagistracy, the law gave the senate much greater control over provincial appointments and thus provided the framework for a policy of provincial governance closely associated with Cato.

scholarly journals Law’s Autonomy and Moral Reason

Laws ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 6
Author(s):  
Jack Clayton Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Legal Positivist ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Concept Of Law

This paper intends to set out an argument to Legal Idealism and a thesis that holds law and morality as necessarily connected. My focus is on deconstructing the Positivist argument to the Autonomy Thesis and beginning to reconstruct it through the application of morality to law’s autonomous authority. My aim, ultimately, is to demonstrate how, through the concept of law, practical reason might explain the related (and overlapping) notions of legitimacy, authority, and the obligation to obey through the necessary connection of law and morality. That is, I intend to demonstrate that morality both survives and remains identifiable (transparently) following the process of metamorphosis into institutionalised practical reasoning. If this is so, the authority of and obligation to law is simultaneously a form of morally rational obligation. In the response to the Positivist argument that moral values are incommensurate, I will show that this commensurability can be determined ‘artificially’ by a system of institutionalised reasoning (i.e., the law); this is to say, if I can show that the Legal Positivist argument is left incomplete without some explanation of moral values underpinning it, I need not to show that a specific, defensible moral truth or principle is required, but that an artificial weighting of abstract moral principles is sufficient

Joule's 1840 manuscript on the production of heat by voltaic electricity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto de Andrade Martins
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Royal Society ◽  
Detailed Comparison ◽  
Electric Currents ◽  
Full Paper ◽  
Unpublished Manuscript ◽  
Philosophical Magazine ◽  
First Time

In 1840, James Prescott Joule submitted to the Royal Society a paper describing experimental research on the heat produced by electric currents in metallic conductors, and inferring that the effect was proportional to the resistance of the conductors and to the square of the intensity of the current. Only an abstract of this paper was published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society , although a full paper with a similar title was printed in the Philosophical Magazine in 1841. Several authors have assumed that the content of the 1841 publication was the same as the rejected 1840 paper; however, the unpublished manuscript has been found within the archives of the Royal Society and is published here for the first time, along with a detailed analysis and comparison with the 1841 paper. The unpublished version is much shorter, and is different in certain respects from the published article. A detailed comparison throws light on several shortcomings of the unpublished version. The present work also studies the assessment of Joule's paper by the Royal Society, and elucidates the roles of Peter Roget and Samuel Christie in this connection.

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