scholarly journals The role of institutional shareholders in the relationship between unconditional conservatism and earnings management

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-104
Author(s):  
Raffaela Casciello ◽  
Marco Maffei ◽  
Fiorenza Meucci
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Conditional Conservatism ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This study investigates whether and how institutional shareholders affect the relation between unconditional conservatism and earnings management. We analyze the relation between unconditional conservatism and accrual-based earnings management and the relation between unconditional conservatism and real earnings management, focusing on the role of the institutional shareholders variable in these two relations. First, we find evidence of positive (negative) relations between unconditional conservatism and accrual-based (real) earnings management. Second, we demonstrate that the presence of institutional shareholders has a mitigating (amplifying) impact on the relation between unconditional conservatism and accrual-based (real) earnings management. This study contributes to enrich the previous literature in two ways. First, it extends the strand of research on the relation between accounting conservatism and earnings management (Garcìa Lara, García Osma, & Penalva, 2020; Chen, Hemmer, & Zhang, 2007; Gao, 2013), focusing on unconditional conservatism since it is less prevalent than conditional conservatism in previous literature (Ruch & Taylor, 2015). Second, it extends the strand of research on the impact of institutional ownership on accounting practices (Farooq & El Jai, 2012; Sakaki, Jackson, & Jory, 2017), highlighting the role of the institutional shareholders in the relation between unconditional conservatism and earnings management

scholarly journals Ownership structures and risk of financial misreporting: Evidence from China

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-344
Author(s):  
Jung-wha Lee ◽  
Lianhua Jin
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Financial Misreporting ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

This study examines the association between the role of ownership structures and the risk of misreporting (earnings management and fraud) using a sample of 2,170 firm-years listed on the Shanghai A stock market between the years of 2004 and 2006. We used three different ownership structures (i.e., institutional, state and tradable ownership) and two earnings management methods (i.e., accruals-based and real earnings management) to investigate whether firms with various ownership structures will choose earnings management methods that damages the actual values the least, lowers earnings management and whether this lowers the risk of financial misreporting fraud. The major findings are as follows. First, we find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with earning management and lowers the risk of financial misreporting. Institutional ownership can prevent listed companies from real activities earnings management, and it negatively affects accruals-based earnings management in low state share firms but not in high state share firms. Second, we find that state ownership is positively associated with earnings management but lowers the risk of financial misreporting. Third, tradable shares are negatively but not significantly related to accruals-based earnings management but increase the risk of financial misreporting. According to our findings, state ownership has great impact on listed companies; it also impedes the active role of other shareholders in invested companies. This study supports calls for restructuring and strengthening the role of governance by institutional shareholders, reinforcing and transforming the function of state-owned asset supervision and administration commission of the state council (SASAC, an agent organisation of state shares) from inefficient state investors to efficient institutional investors.

scholarly journals Unconditional Accounting Conservatism and Real Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Li
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Robustness Analysis ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Operation Costs ◽  
Abnormal Operation ◽  
The Relationship

This research examines the relationship between unconditional accounting conservatism and real earnings management in China’s corporations. Using the regression models, the real earnings management proxies are found by the abnormal cash flow of operations, the abnormal operation costs and the abnormal discretionary expenses and the aggregated measures. The research sheds light on the negative relationship between unconditional accounting conservatism and real earnings management after controlling internal control quality and audit risk. The results of these inferences remain the same after dealing with the robustness analysis and the endogeneity concerns.

scholarly journals The impact of ownership type on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management: An empirical study

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Ahmed Boghdady
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Type ◽  
Moderation Effect ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Privately Owned

This study investigates the effect of ownership type on the relation between corporate governance and earnings management. While previous literature has mainly examined the relationship between corporate governance and both accrual and real earnings management, no study to date, to the researcher’s best knowledge, focused on the moderation effect of ownership type on this relationship. Three proxies for measuring accrual and real earnings management, namely discretionary accruals (DA), abnormal cash flows (ACFO), and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX) are employed. Three empirical models (i.e. DA, ACFO, and ADISX) are developed in which the earnings management proxies represent the dependent variables and are tested using a sample of non-financial companies containing state-owned and privately owned companies over the period from 2010 to 2017, with 1030 firm-year observations. The results show a positive relationship between ownership type and both accruals manipulation and sales manipulation. In general, the results suggest that the ownership type moderates the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The results suggest also that corporate governance mechanisms may not play an almost the same role in monitoring and mitigating real earnings management (REM) practices as they do for accrual earnings management (AEM) in Egypt. Moreover, no evidence is found supportive of the trade-off effect which means that managers in Egyptian firms use both types of earnings management jointly to reach the target levels of earnings

scholarly journals Auditor report and earnings management: Evidence from FTSE 350 companies in the UK

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 334-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between audit report and real-based and accrual-based earnings management based on a UK sample. Prior research has mostly focused on US data and examined the relationship between auditor report (qualified vs. non-qualified) and earnings management (proxied by discretionary accruals), and found evidence that qualified audit report is positively associated with the level of discretionary accruals. Despite the importance of the role of audit firms to constrain the use of earnings management, there is no research to date has examined the relationship between auditor reports and real earnings management activities based on UK sample. This paper therefore fills this gap in the literature by providing the first evidence for UK FTSE 350 companies that auditor report is positively associated with real and accrual earnings management. The paper also provide evidence that firms received qualified audit report share different characteristics as compared to firms received un-qualified audit report.

Political stability, political rights and earnings management: some international evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tesfaye Taddese Lemma ◽  
Ayalew Lulseged ◽  
Mthokozisi Mlilo ◽  
Minga Negash
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Political Forces ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to examine the impact of political stability and political rights on firm-level earnings (both accrual-based and real) management. Design/methodology/approach The authors develop models that link political stability, political rights, and the interplay between the two and earnings (both accrual-based and real) management. The authors analyze 63,872 firm-year observations of publicly listed, non-financial, firms drawn from 39 countries, for the period 1995 to 2016. Findings The authors find that political stability (political rights) attenuates (accentuates) accrual-based earnings management; political rights (political stability) accentuates (have no effect on) real earnings management; and the association between political rights and real earnings management is more pronounced in countries with better political stability. Practical implications The findings imply that users of financial statements should take cognizance of a country’s ambient political environment in assessing the potential for earnings management by firms. Originality/value No prior research examined the role of political forces in shaping firm-level earnings management behavior in a cross-country setting.

Whose cash compensation has more influence on real earnings management, CEOs or CFOs?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Radwan Alkebsee ◽  
Adeeb A. Alhebry ◽  
Gaoliang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Least Squares ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeScholars have investigated the association between executives' incentives and earnings management. Most of the extant literature focuses on equity executives' incentives, while most of the earnings management literature focuses on accrual earnings management (AEM), not real earnings management (REM). This paper investigates the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs) and chief financial officer (CFOs) cash compensation and REM and explores who has more influence on REM, the CEO or the CFO.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the data of all listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from 2009 to 2017 and ordinary least squares regression as a baseline model and the Chow test to capture whether the CEO's or the CFO's cash compensation has more influence on REM. To address potential endogeneity issues, the authors use a firm-fixed effect technique and two-stage least squares regression.FindingsThe authors find that CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation is significantly associated with REM, suggesting that paying non-equity compensation to the CEO and CFO is negatively associated with REM. The authors also find that the CFO's cash compensation has a more significant influence on REM than the CEO's cash compensation, suggesting that the CFO's accounting and financial knowledge strengthens his or her power on the quality of financial reporting.Practical implicationsThe study contributes to the literature of agency and contract theories by using cash-based compensation to provide strong evidence that CEO's and CFO's compensation is associated with REM. It also contributes to the earnings management literature by examining the effect of CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation on earnings management using proxies for REM-related activities. The study also contributes to the institutional theory by providing empirical evidence on the governance role of executives' cash compensation in deterring REM. Finally, it is the first to examine the relationship between CEO's and CFO's cash compensation and REM, and the first to explore who is more influential regarding REM in emerging markets, the CEO or the CFO.Originality/valueAs a response to the call for investigations of the role of non-equity-based compensation in earnings management and the call to consider non-developed institutional contexts in governance research, this study extends prior studies by providing novel evidence on the relationship between CEOs' and CFOs' non-equity compensation and REM in China's emerging market. The study documents that the CFO has a greater influence on REM than the CEO does.

The effect of managerial overconfidence on the conditional conservatism and real earnings management

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 708-720
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahmoud Lari DashtBayaz ◽  
Somayeh Hassanpour ◽  
Hossein Tarighi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Problems ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Conditional Conservatism ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to investigate the effects of managerial overconfidence on conditional conservatism and real earnings management among companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the authors used the model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) for measuring the effect of moderating overconfident management on conditional conservatism in accounting; moreover, the model of Roychowdhury (2006) is used for evaluating the relationship between managerial overconfidence and real earnings management. The study population consists of 1,144 observations and 143 firms listed on TSE over an eight-year period between 2008 and 2015. The statistical model used in this paper is a multivariate regression model; besides, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses is panel data. Findings Consistent with the expectations, the results showed that there is a negative relationship between managerial overconfidence and conditional conservatism. Furthermore, the findings suggest that managerial overconfidence is negatively connected with real earnings management. This implies that when Iranian managers have many financial problems, they do not engage in real earnings management, as the real earnings management does not increase the value of the companies in the long run and even it cause damage to them. Originality/value This is one of the most important research that simultaneously surveys the impact of managerial overconfidence on conditional conservatism and real earnings management in a developing market called Iran. What really sets this study apart from other papers is that most Iranian firms between 2008 and 2015 because of economic sanctions faced severe financial problems. From this perspective, this study contributes to the research literature by expanding the knowledge of conservatism in the emerging economies.

scholarly journals The Role Of Board Characteristics In Mitigating Management Opportunism: The Case Of Real Earnings Management

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorra Talbi ◽  
Mohamed Ali Omri ◽  
Khaled Guesmi ◽  
Zied Ftiti
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Impact

<p>This study seeks to provide empirical evidence of the efficacy of board characteristics in constraining management opportunism, measured by real earnings management. The paper uses regression analysis to document empirical evidence regarding the impact of the independence of boards of directors and the independence of committees on real earnings management in 7,481 US firms over the period 2000 to 2009. This study contributes to empirical studies on the role of corporate governance in financial reporting quality by demonstrating the role of the independence of boards of directors and the independence of committees in constraining real earnings management. These results should contribute to providing an orientation for future regulators regarding possible amendments, especially in the wake of the current financial crisis.</p>

scholarly journals Do Earnings Management Leads to Sub-optimal Investments by Firms? Empirical Evidence From the Textile Sector of Pakistan

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-19
Author(s):  
Umair Saeed Bhutta ◽  
Zhang Youtang ◽  
Ali Raza
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Information Quality ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Optimal Investments ◽  
Adverse Selection Problem ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Moderating Role ◽  
Textile Sector

This study empirically investigates the impact of earnings management on investments of the firm. In this study, we also check the moderating role of audit quality between the above said relationship. We hypothesize that audit quality will not only weakens the relationship between earnings management and inefficient investments but also help the firm to invest reduction in over and under investments by the firm. Textile sector of Pakistan is selected for the study as it is one of the most important sectors of the country. The role of audit quality cannot be ignored to improve the information quality which ultimately helps the firm to make optimal decisions for the firm shareholders. The earning management activities are performed by firm managers due to moral hazard and adverse selection problem which leads to sub-optimal investments.

scholarly journals FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN INDONESIA: THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONERS

2021 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vania Agatha Rusci ◽  
◽  
Setyarini Santosa ◽  
Vita Elisa Fitriana ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Panel Regression ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract: This research aims to find out whether the presence of independent commissioner can restrict the manipulation of earnings by management in financially distressed companies. Earning management used in this research is accrual as well as real earning management. This research employs quantitative method with data panel regression model. The sample used in this study is secondary data obtained from consumer goods industry listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period of 2015 until 2019. The result of this study revealed that both accrual earnings management and real earnings management are significantly influenced by financial distress. However, independent commissioner fails to moderate the relationship of financial distress with both accrual earnings management and real earnings management. This research gives an insight and input to the management as the evaluation material, so that the earnings manipulation could be reduced or even not carried out. Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah keberadaan komisaris independen dapat membatasi manipulasi laba oleh manajemen pada perusahaan yang mengalami financial distress. Manajemen laba yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah manajemen laba akrual dan manajemen laba riil. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kuantitatif dengan model regresi data panel. Sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah data sekunder yang diperoleh dari industri barang konsumsi yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama periode 2015 hingga 2019. Hasil penelitian ini mengungkapkan bahwa baik manajemen laba akrual maupun manajemen laba riil dipengaruhi secara signifikan oleh financial distress. Namun, komisaris independen gagal memoderasi hubungan financial distress dengan manajemen laba akrual dan manajemen laba riil. Penelitian ini memberikan wawasan dan masukan kepada pihak manajemen sebagai bahan evaluasi, sehingga manipulasi laba dapat dikurangi atau bahkan tidak dilakukan.

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