scholarly journals Fiscal performance in monetary unions: How much austerity should be allowed?

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Díaz-Roldán

The effectiveness of fiscal policy becomes particularly relevant in the case of the member countries of a monetary union facing a sovereign debt crisis. In that environment, fiscal policy is constrained by the need to carry out fiscal consolidation and reduce debt levels. For that reason and with the purpose of anchoring fiscal discipline, the adoption of fiscal rules has become a central issue. In this paper we will analyse the management of fiscal policies in monetary unions, when the central bank and the fiscal authorities follow policy rules. The results are related to the conservativeness of the central bank, the degree of austerity of the fiscal authorities and the initial level of public debt.

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 276-276
Author(s):  

Abstract Following the COVID-19 outbreak in Europe this spring and subsequent measures to contain the pandemic, the European Commission drastically revised its economic and fiscal forecasts. The Summer 2020 Economic Forecast projects that the euro area economy will contract by 8.7% in 2020. The coronavirus crisis is expected to push the general government deficit to about 8.5% of GDP this year. Even in an optimistic V-shaped recovery scenario with a GDP growth rate of 6.1% in 2021 due to the temporary nature of lockdown measures taken in 2020, the headline deficit is expected to decrease to about 3.5% of GDP. Furthermore, both the downturn and the rebound of economic activity are expected to be asymmetric across member states, exposing entrenched divergences. The recent outlook highlights the problem of pro-cyclical revisions of potential output and output gap estimates. Some economists warn that the current fiscal framework may lead to pro-cyclical and thus destabilising fiscal policies, a problem encountered in Southern Europe during the European sovereign debt crisis that has implications for the entire European Union. In order to avoid repeating past mistakes, the debate on how to reform European fiscal policy should be settled before the rules are re-enacted when the coronavirus crisis has passed.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Bremer ◽  
Reto Bürgisser

In the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis, governments across the continent adopted austerity. Existing research claims that fiscally conservative citizens support such fiscal policies. However, this literature largely ignores that fiscal consolidation carries substantial trade-offs. In hard times, governments have to cut spending or raise taxes to reduce government debt. We account for these budgetary trade-offs by using a split-sample and conjoint survey experiment conducted in four European countries. The results show that fiscal consolidation is not a priority for citizens: When forced to make a choice, support for reducing debt at the cost of lower spending or higher taxes is much smaller than in an unconstrained setting. Revenue-based consolidations are especially unpopular, but expenditure-based consolidations are also contested. Moreover, the public has clear budgetary priorities: People do not favor lower debt and taxes, but they support more progressive taxes to pay for higher government spending.


2020 ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Evsey T. Gurvich ◽  
Natalia A. Krasnopeeva

We study the tax-spend nexus for Russian regional budgets. Causal relationship running from taxing to spending is found, thus supporting the concept “tax and spend” suggested by M. Friedman. Next, elasticity of expenditure by revenue is estimated for a panel of 80 regional budgets basing on data for 2000—2017. Estimates are in the range of 0.72 to 0.78 (depending on the econometric technique), which exceeds elasticity for the federal budget more than twice. This evidences that fiscal policy at the sub-federal (as distinct from the federal) level has clear pro-cyclical nature. Besides, the largest sensitivity of expenditure to revenue shocks is found for the item “national economy”, implying marked adverse implications for economic growth. We suggest to mitigate this effect by modifying fiscal rules for sub-federal budgets. They are currently aimed primarily at enhancing fiscal discipline, with less emphasis on countercyclical policy, insulating economy from fiscal shocks.


2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Rodríguez ◽  
Carlos Carrasco

The paper analyses the monetary policy responses of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Our goals are on the one hand to explain chronologically the main measures in conventional and unconventional policies adopted by the ECB and on the other hand to analyse their effects on key interest rates, monetary aggregates and the money multiplier. The assessment is that the ECB?s monetary policy responses to the crisis have been ?too little, too late?, constrained by the institutional framework, which prevents the ECB from acting as a true central bank with the role of lender of last resort.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Carlos Lopes ◽  
João Ferreira do Amaral

The great recession of 2008/2009 had a huge impact on unemployment and public finances in most advanced countries, and these impacts were magnified in the southern Euro area by the sovereign debt crisis of 2010/2011. The fiscal consolidation imposed by the European Union on highly indebted countries was based on the assumptions of so-called expansionary austerity. However, the reality so far provides proof to the contrary, and the results outlined in this article support the opposing view of a self-defeating austerity. Based on a model of the input–output relations of the productive system, an unemployment rate/budget balance trade-off equation is derived, as well as the impact of a strong fiscal consolidation based on social transfers and the notion of a neutral budget balance. An application to the Portuguese case confirms the huge costs of a strong fiscal consolidation, both in terms of unemployment and social policy regress. The conclusion is that too much consolidation in anyone year makes consolidation more difficult in the following year.


Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only central bank governed by supranational constitutional law. As such, it is not only the most important institution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also marks a new stage in the history of central banking in general. Historically, the tasks and functions of the ECB have reflected the different stages of development of the EMU. The basic principles governing its function were set out in Maastricht, reflecting the interests and ideas about Europe’s economic constitution prevailing at that time. The sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in 2010 was the second defining moment for the ECB after Maastricht. It posited the ECB–like the rest of the EMU–to challenges that some of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had not fully anticipated. These new challenges led to the adoption of novel instruments and the further clarification of fundamental rules and principles. Most important of these developments was the entrustment of the ECB with a new task, banking supervision, and the adoption of unconventional measures, which proved necessary to fulfil its monetary-policy mandate. Ultimately, not only did the ECB withstand the crisis but it emerged as a protagonist in securing the unity and integrity of the EMU.


2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 563-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A Sims

Drastic changes in central bank operations and monetary institutions in recent years have made previously standard approaches to explaining the determination of the price level obsolete. Recent expansions of central bank balance sheets and of the levels of richcountry sovereign debt, as well as the evolving political economy of the European Monetary Union, have made it clear that fiscal policy and monetary policy are intertwined. Our thinking and teaching about inflation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy should be based on models that recognize fiscal-monetary policy interactions. (JEL E31, E52, E58, E62, H63)


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