Unemployment Insurance and the Reservation Wage of the Unemployed

1982 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond P. H. Fishe
Risks ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
Jason S. Anquandah ◽  
Leonid V. Bogachev

Managing unemployment is one of the key issues in social policies. Unemployment insurance schemes are designed to cushion the financial and morale blow of loss of job but also to encourage the unemployed to seek new jobs more proactively due to the continuous reduction of benefit payments. In the present paper, a simple model of unemployment insurance is proposed with a focus on optimality of the individual’s entry to the scheme. The corresponding optimal stopping problem is solved, and its similarity and differences with the perpetual American call option are discussed. Beyond a purely financial point of view, we argue that in the actuarial context the optimal decisions should take into account other possible preferences through a suitable utility function. Some examples in this direction are worked out.


Author(s):  
Magnus Paulsen Hansen

Chapter 4 presents the reform process of the so-called PARE (‘aid plan for the return to employment’) of the French unemployment insurance system in 2000. The instruments of PARE included an individual contract that would oblige the unemployed to engage in ‘personalised’ job seeking activities while getting access to support such as training courses. Further, PARE strengthened requirements to accept job offers from the job exchange service as well as sanctions upon refusals and contractual infringements. The trade unions were divided in their stance towards this, causing intense debate, especially on the use of sanctions. The reform illustrates how the addition of a rather simple instrument radically changed the moral status of the unemployed.


2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 592-611
Author(s):  
Carole Tuchszirer

The aim of this article is to analyse a specific set of support instruments for the unemployed, namely those introduced in 1986 by the bipartite French unemployment insurance fund (UNEDIC) for those in casual employment. Under the new scheme, unemployed people were able to combine a limited income from casual employment with a part of their unemployment benefit, for a period of up to 18 months. Based on the dubious assumption that even precarious employment is better than full-time unemployment, this opportunity was designed to induce the unemployed to take up employment of any kind. The article considers in detail the economic and social context prevailing prior to the introduction of these measures, concluding that precarious, casual employment far from serves as a springboard to permanent employment, but that, on the contrary, it may lead an increasing number of people into underemployment and low-pay traps.


Author(s):  
Faruk Andaç

In the absence of unemployment insurance, unemployment descends over like a nightmare on the personnel in business life and constitutes his/her utmost anxiety. Particularly in underdeveloped countries where population increase is rapid whereas speed of industrialization is back, unemployment introduces with itself a good number of adverse effects as well. On accounts of these reasons there is a substantial need for Unemployment Insurance which is a state-enforced social security in order to meet maintenance and living expenses of the dependant personnel whose active business life has been, due to socio-economic accounts, terminated against their will. Indeed, Unemployment Insurance not only provides fiscal support to the worker but it also guarantees future employment and gains collective bargaining power to the person. By means of an effective job-oriented training and effective operating job-placement system the insurance system also offers a chance of obtaining a new job to the unemployed. In other terms “it provides the power and opportunity to acquire in better conditions a new job with appropriate payment answering to the competency and skill of the unemployed”. Unemployment insurance that is desperately needed to make people live happy under the security of job must be, as it is the case for the rest of other countries as well, established in underdeveloped states as well.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 1302-1340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ofer Setty

Abstract Unemployment accounts are mandatory individual savings accounts that can be used only during unemployment or retirement. Unlike unemployment insurance, unemployment accounts solve the moral hazard problem but provide no public insurance to workers. I study a hybrid system that borrows from concepts of both unemployment insurance and unemployment accounts, in which workers are mandated to save when employed and can withdraw from the account when unemployed. Once the account is exhausted, the unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits. This hybrid policy provides insurance to workers more efficiently than an unemployment insurance system because it provides government benefits selectively. As a consequence, young workers can reduce their precautionary savings and better smooth their consumption over the life cycle. Calibrating the model to the US economy, I find that, relative to an optimal unemployment insurance system, the optimal hybrid policy leads to a welfare gain of 2.4%, measured as consumption equivalent variation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-777 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes F. Schmieder ◽  
Till von Wachter ◽  
Stefan Bender

We estimate that unemployment insurance (UI) extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in UI eligibility in Germany. We show this effect combines two key policy parameters: the effect of UI on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers. Our framework implies if UI extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration, then reservation wages do not bind. We derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects. The effect of UI on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects. (JEL J31, J64, J65)


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Gaabriel Tavits

Ensuring social protection for people having lost their jobs is an important part of the social protection system. Although health insurance and pension insurance have traditionally been the most important social protection systems, then social guarantees (both passive and active measures) for the unemployed cannot be underestimated in the changed forms of employment. New forms of work necessitate attention to whether and how people working under new forms of employment, e.g. platform workers, can register as unemployed and whether short-term employment may worsen their standing compared to other unemployed. This article analyses the Estonian social protection system for the unemployed and the planned changes in connection with platform work.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146801812110496
Author(s):  
Herbert Obinger ◽  
Carina Schmitt

Until 1945, Western countries were the only ones to have introduced unemployment insurance programs. Since their adoption was extremely controversial, almost all Western nations introduced income support for the unemployed only in the wake of national emergencies such as war and economic depression. This article examines the determinants of program adoption in the Global South, which commenced after the Second World War. With the exception of military conflict, we find that the introduction of unemployment insurance was shaped by factors deviating from the driving forces of program adoption in the Western world. More specifically, we provide evidence that international factors such as war, the activities of the ILO and policy diffusion were more important than domestic factors.


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