Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law upon Traditional Anglo-American Legal Theories and Practices

1932 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 875-894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Grove Haines

The development of Anglo-American law has been greatly influenced by certain theories and doctrines which have directed and conditioned the evolution of administrative law. Foremost among these are the political and legal theory of the separation of governmental powers and a juridical doctrine relating to the nature and scope of law itself. Briefly, the theory of the separation of powers, which is commonly announced as a fundamental principle of American constitutional law, and is implicit in some phases of English law, is to the effect that laws are made by the legislature, executed by the executive, and interpreted and applied by the courts. As a correlative of this doctrine, it is understood as essential that none of these departments may delegate powers which properly belong to it to either of the other departments, in order that, as the Massachusetts constitution expresses it, “there shall be a government of laws and not of men.”

Author(s):  
Michael Lobban

The Anglo-American law of obligations was profoundly reshaped in the two centuries after 1800, driven by social and economic changes, and changes in legal institutions and doctrines. In contract law, nineteenth-century jurists increasingly sought to put the rules of law into a coherent rational framework (inspired by continental models resting on will theory), though they soon found that this theory could not explain many contractual doctrines. In tort law, jurists were also divided over whether unifying principles underlying tort could be uncovered, with formalist efforts to find such principles being challenged by Realists who argued that tort was in effect ‘public law in disguise’. The quest for underlying principles was also pursued by scholars of unjust enrichment, first in the United States and subsequently in England; though as in the other areas of obligations, by the end of the twentieth century, there was no consensus on whether this was possible.


Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Forrest Maltzman

Justices have considerable latitude to pursue either their personal preferences or their personal visions of the law. The danger is that the Court gets so far out of line from the rest of the political system that we see fundamental institutional showdowns that threaten the independence of the judiciary, such as the Court-packing controversy in the 1930s. If the elected branches influence justices, however, they can keep the Court in check, thereby attenuating such risks. This chapter tests whether the Court systematically yields to the elected branches. In particular, it examines whether individual justices vote differently when the constraints imposed by the executive and legislative branches are likely to be at their strongest. It focuses on the two versions in the literature: one in which the Court is constrained only on statutory cases and the other in which the constraint extends to all cases, including constitutional cases.


Author(s):  
Margit Cohn

This chapter provides the basis of the model advanced in the book. Based on the internal tension model, governing constitutionalism-at-large, the chapter submits that the executive is best viewed as straddling the line between subjection to law and dominance beyond law. This is no ‘paradox:’ embodying one of the tensions ingrained in constitutional law, the executive draws on an irresolvable tension between its role as executor of law, under the separation of powers ideal, and its function as manager, or dominant decision-maker in the political sphere, in which it acts above and beyond the law. Under the internal tension model, normative theory can be better expounded, and the extent of required constraints over excessive power can be better addressed. The chapter discusses, and rejects, three models of the executive branch, all of which are based on hierarchical and dichotomous thinking. The subservient executive model connotes full supremacy of the constitution and legislation over the executive; the imperial executive model draws on a vision of executive supremacy; and the third, bipolar model offers a vision of alternating modes of operation. All are set aside in favour of a model that recognizes the internal tension which underlies executive action.


Author(s):  
Emilios Christodoulidis ◽  
Johan van der Walt

This chapter traces the tradition of critical theory in Europe in the way it has informed and framed legal thought. A key, and distinctive, element of this legal tradition is that it characteristically connects to the state as constitutive reference; in other words it understands the institution of law as that which organizes and mediates the relation of the state to civil society. The other constitutive reference is political economy, a reference that typically grounds this tradition of thinking about the law in the materiality of the practices of social production and reproduction. It is in these connections, of the institution of law to the domains of the state and of the political economy, that critical legal theory locates the function of law, and the emancipatory potentially it affords on the one hand, and the obstacles to emancipation it imposes, on the other.


1922 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 432-443
Author(s):  
Nathan Isaacs

Legal history teaches two doctrines, which seem at first glance diametrically opposed to each other, with reference to the current agitation concerning the dangers of federal encroachment. First, that the agitation, in so far as it is called out by a temporary accidental state of affairs due to the war, is ephemeral. On the other hand, the essential facts involved are of a type that are always with us. In other words, federal encroachment, when stripped of the mask and guise that temporarily makes it seem dreadful, is a perfectly natural phenomenon quite familiar to students of Anglo-American law, and, for that matter, of other legal systems.


Percurso ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (28) ◽  
pp. 341
Author(s):  
Fabiana CARICAT ◽  
Clayton REIS

RESUMO O presente trabalho faz uma análise sobre as condutas éticas e a responsabilidade civil do advogado, caracterizada como sendo subjetiva, contratual e sua obrigação de meio. Analisando a responsabilidade pré-contratual, contratual e pós-contratual do advogado, consoante a normativa civil e o Código de Ética e Disciplina da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil é possível identificar o que se espera do profissional, no exercício desta atividade indispensável à Justiça, ao Direito e a sociedade, como também identificará várias condutas do advogado que pode fazer nascer a obrigação de reparar o dano causado. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Advogado; Contrato; Ética; Responsabilidade; Dano. ABSTRACT The present work analyzes the Theory of Separation of Powers and the System of Brakes and Counterweights, as a way of preserving the autonomy and independence of each of the powers and allowing mutual control and control, avoiding mismanagement and abuse. This classic theory, structured by the Baron de Montesquieu, has now been severely mitigated by the strengthening of the judiciary over the others, called to analyze causes of the most varied themes, alleging inefficiency of the legislature and executive and the need to rights and guarantees. In addition, it was found that, instead of the Judiciary, it endeavored to combat the crisis of parliamentary representation and disenchantment with the political system set up, bearing in mind the conception of harmony and independence between the three powers, which in fact occurred was the supremacy of the Judiciary over the other powers. KEYWORDS: Lawyer; Contract; Ethics; Responsibility; Harm.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-58
Author(s):  
Mikhail Gal'perin

Author is pointing out the problem of interaction between the political nature of the dispute concerned and the competence of international tribunals. To assess such legal interaction the “justiciability” concept is used. This concept, well known from the US and the UK jurisprudence, allow national courts, for the purpose of stable state administration, to exercise “prudency” in invalidating executive acts, guarantee the operation of the principle of separation of powers, preserve the legitimacy of an unelected judicial branch allowing it, at the same time, to participate in a dialogue with the other branches and the public. Despite the fact that the concept initially appeared in the national law, it became equally important for the international dispute resolution system. Using some remarkable recent cases from the supreme national and international tribunals’ practice author concludes that international tribunals are increasingly expanding their own competence to cover issues traditionally reserved for national authorities and/or lying exclusively in the diplomatic realm. The “evolutive” interpretation of provisions of international law adapted by some international tribunals (and other international organs) contradicts their literal meaning as originally intended by the states, is becoming a persistent trend. This entails a natural reaction of national legal systems represented by higher courts: on the one hand, they avoid direct confrontation through maintaining the classical paradigm of respect to international law, and, on the other hand, draw “border lines” designed to limit the jurisdiction of international courts and arbitration tribunals. The politicization of international arbitration is a question that should not be embarrassingly swept under the carpet or considered marginal. Otherwise, there is a risk that it would destroy the international dispute resolution system and, as a consequence, undermine the mechanisms of international law. At the same time, no peaceful resolution of the conflict of jurisdictions is possible without understanding the problem in the legal plane, without joint determination of which cases are justiciable in the international process, and which questions should be considered “political”. Author made the attempt to give a legal definition of the “political question” in the international procedure and formulate legal tests which could help international judges and arbitrators to define, whether they are ready to and whether they should consider the particular case, related to the “political question”, on the merits (and not to recognise it inadmissible on procedural grounds).


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 565-581
Author(s):  
Tomaz Kerestes ◽  
Martina Repas

Analogy means that one or more statutory provisions are stripped of their non-essential parts, and in this purified form are applied to cases which are different, but not essentially different from the cases regulated in the statute. This is an important legal method. In Anglo-American law it is relevant for the analysis of case law applicability. In Civilian legal tradition it is the predominant form of gap-filling. This method is of highest importance in the civil law and significantly curtailed in the criminal and administrative criminal law. The open question is the application of various forms of analogy in administrative law. Authors analyze the legal framework for application of analogy in administrative law and the methods of its application. Special problem of analogy in administrative law are the limits of application.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document