The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 481-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart

A systematic analysis of the relationships between the main electoral system variables (electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure) and electoral outcomes (the degrees of disproportionality and multipartism) in the 20 Western democracies from 1945 to 1985—representing 32 distinct electoral systems (an electoral system being defined as a set of elections held under basically the same rules)—shows that the effects of both formula and magnitude on proportionality are very strong, much stronger than Douglas W. Rae and subsequent researchers have suggested; that on the other hand, their effects on the number of parties participating in elections is surprisingly weak; and that ballot structure affects the degree of multipartism only in single-member district systems. These findings suggest that strategic behavior by politicians and voters plays a less important role in reducing multipartism than is usually assumed.

Author(s):  
Hoolo Nyane

While electoral discontent has been the enduring feature of constitutional democracy in Lesotho since independence, disagreement over electoral system is a fairly recent phenomenon. When the country attained independence in 1966 from Britain, electoral system was not necessarily one of the topical issues of pre-independence constitutional negotiations. The major issues were the powers of the monarch, the office of prime minister, the command of the army and many more.  It was taken for granted that the country would use the British-based plurality electoral system.  This is the system which the country used until early 2000s when the electoral laws were reformed to anchor a new mixed electoral system.  When the new electoral laws were ultimately passed in 2001, the country transitioned from a plurality electoral system to a two-ballot mixed member proportional system. By this time, electoral system had acquired prominence in politico-legal discourse in Lesotho.  In the run-up to 2007 elections, bigger political parties orchestrated the manipulation of electoral laws which culminated in clearly distorted electoral outcomes. The manipulations motivated further reforms in the run-up to 2012 election which resulted in the single-ballot mixed member proportional system. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate how electoral laws have anchored electoral system reforms throughout the various historical epochs in Lesotho since independence. The paper contends that while the country has been courageous, unlike most of its peers, to introduce far-reaching electoral system changes, the reform of electoral laws has not been so helpful in attaining the higher objectives of political inclusivity, constitutionalism and stability in Lesotho.


Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher ◽  
Paul Mitchell

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. This chapter argues that electoral system choice is a highly consequential matter for democratic states and offers a comparative overview of the principal means by which electoral systems vary. What are the essential components of real-world electoral systems? The chapter emphasizes the importance of district magnitude, ballot structure (with three main types: categorical, dividual, and ordinal), “levels” of seat allocation, methods of selecting candidates within parties, and devices for limiting proportionality.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Labbé St-Vincent ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Jean-Benoit Pilet

AbstractCarey and Hix (2011) propose that a proportional electoral system with a moderate number of seats per district offers the best compromise between (1) accurate representation and (2) strong accountability. The argument is that there is a district magnitude (DM) level where the trade-off between proportionality and fragmentation of parties is optimal. This DM is called the sweet spot. We explore this proposition through lab experiments conducted in Brussels and Montreal. We find that the probability of achieving a “good” outcome on both proportionality and the number of parties is slightly higher at moderate DMs. We note, however, that this probability remains low.


2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 557-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Lucardi

How does district magnitude affect electoral outcomes? This article addresses this question by exploiting a combination of two natural experiments in Argentina between 1985 and 2015. Argentine provinces elect half of their congressional delegation every two years, and thus districts with an odd number of representatives have varying magnitudes in different election years. Furthermore, whether a province elects more representatives in midterm or concurrent years was decided by lottery in 1983. I find that district magnitude (a) increases electoral support for small parties, (b) increases the (effective) number of parties that gain seats and (c) reduces electoral disproportionality. The last two results are driven by the mechanical rather than the psychological effect of electoral rules.


Author(s):  
Bernard Grofman

This article looks at the impact of electoral laws on political parties. It focuses on empirical research, rather than on the implicitly normative foundations of different voting rules or on formal modeling results. The discussion presents comparisons of a limited number of polar electoral system types. The article lists forms of proportional election methods and plurality elections, which are considered to be two of the most important methods of voting. Finally, the article serves to report the results of one of the four main concerns of the field by observing the electoral system effects on the number of parties, etc.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 149-156
Author(s):  
Boštjan Rogelj ◽  
Marko Krevs

Electoral districts are an important component of the electoral system, as they have a significant impact on election results. Due to the uneven spatial distribution of electoral support political parties receive, district magnitude and the geography of electoral districts can have a decisive influence on the electoral viability of individual parties and candidates. Districting and redistricting are not a simple bureaucratic process but a politically very sensitive process with outcomes that can have far-reaching political consequences. Geoinformation tools can have a very important role in electoral district planning. In this article we aim to present the key advantages and disadvantages of their use. The presented results are derived from practical experience gained over the course of developing a new system of electoral districts in Slovenia.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold J. Jansen

Abstract. The alternative vote (AV) is an increasingly popular proposal for electoral reform, largely due to Australia's success with it. This article considers the experiences of Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia with AV in past provincial elections. AV had little impact on proportionality and voter turnout, but did contribute to significantly higher rates of ballot rejection. AV was associated with an increase in the number of parties competing in elections, but this is more likely due to a changing social structure than electoral system change. AV facilitated coalitions where incentives to cooperate already existed, as in British Columbia, but it did little to encourage or induce coalitions in Alberta and Manitoba. On balance, it differed little from the single member plurality system.Résumé. Le vote préférentiel (PV) est une proposition de plus en plus populaire de réforme électorale. Son attrait s'explique en grande partie par son succès en Australie. Cet article étudie les expériences de VP lors d'élections provinciales au Manitoba, en Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique. Le VP a eu peu de répercussions sur la proportionnalité et sur la participation électorale, mais a contribué à augmenter considérablement le nombre de bulletins de vote rejetés. On observe, en association avec le VP, une augmentation du nombre des partis en présence, mais ceci était vraisemblablement dû à l'évolution des structures sociales plus qu'au changement du système électoral. Le VP a facilité les coalitions lorsque des raisons de coopérer existaient déjà, comme en Colombie-Britannique, mais n'a guère encouragé ni provoqué de coalitions en Alberta ni au Manitoba. En définitive, la différence avec le système majoritaire uninominal a été négligeable.


2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lublin

Taking into proper account the geographic distribution of ethnic groups and the operation of electoral systems within individual countries reveals that the impact of ethnic diversity and electoral systems on the number of parties has been underestimated. Contrary to earlier findings, this study reveals that ethnic diversity spurs party proliferation in countries with both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, though the effect is stronger in the latter. The insights gained here provide a theoretically derived measure of ethnic diversity that is useful for estimating its effect on specifically political phenomena and generating an improved holistic measure of the impact of electoral systems. More crucially, the results indicate that electoral system designers have a greater capacity to structure electoral outcomes. The results rely on multivariate models created using a new database with election results from 1990 through 2011 in sixty-five free democracies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-353
Author(s):  
Rostislav Turovsky ◽  
Marina Sukhova

Abstract This article examines the differences between Russian voting at federal elections and regional legislature elections, both combined and conducted independently. The authors analyse these differences, their character and their dynamics as an important characteristic of the nationalisation of the party system. They also test hypotheses about a higher level of oppositional voting and competitiveness in subnational elections, in accordance with the theory of second-order elections, as well as the strategic nature of voting at federal elections, by contrast with expressive voting during subnational campaigns. The empirical study is based on calculating the differences in votes for leading Russian parties at subnational elections and at federal elections (simultaneous, preceding and following) from 2003, when mandatory voting on party lists was widespread among the regions, to 2019. The level of competitiveness is measured in a similar way, by calculating the effective number of parties. The study indicates a low level of autonomy of regional party systems, in many ways caused by the fact that the law made it impossible to create regional parties, and then also by the 2005 ban on creation of regional blocs. The strong connection between federal and regional elections in Russia clearly underlines the fluid and asynchronic nature of its electoral dynamics, where subnational elections typically predetermine the results of the following federal campaigns. At the same time, the formal success of the nationalisation of the party system, achieved by increasing the homogeneity of voting at the 2016 and 2018 federal elections, is not reflected by the opposing process of desynchronisation between federal and regional elections after Putin’s third-term election. There is also a clear rise in the scale of the differences between the two. At the same time, the study demonstrates the potential presence in Russia of features common to subnational elections in many countries: their greater support for the opposition and presence of affective voting. However, there is a clear exception to this trend during the period of maximum mobilisation of the loyal electorate at the subnational elections immediately following the accession of Crimea in 2014–2015, and such tendencies are generally restrained by the conditions of electoral authoritarianism.


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