External Co-Optation of a Less Developed Country's Policy Making: The Case of Ghana, 1969–1972

1976 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald T. Libby
Keyword(s):  
Public Support ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
Developed Country ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The Government ◽  
Less Developed Country ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

The author advances the thesis that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and creditor countries structured the context in which their client, Ghana—a less developed country—formulated its economic policy between 1969 and 1972. The intergovernmental organizations and creditor countries failed to take Ghana's domestic political situation into account, however. When the country became heavily dependent upon the IGO's and creditors for financial assistance to enable the government to survive a disastrous shortfall in foreign exchange earnings, it was forced to accept extreme and politically dangerous measures in order to secure assistance. The policies that were adopted were catastrophic, and destroyed what remained of the democratic government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'etat.

Epilogue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Sopranzetti
Keyword(s):  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
Taxi Drivers ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Motorcycle Taxi

This epilogue follows the life of the motorcycle taxi drivers and the political situation in Thailand since the 2014 military coup. In particular, it explores how the government of Prayth Cha-o-cha is attempting to cement the cracks that the Red Shirts mobilization revealed in 2010. Once again, the chapter argues, these plans will not be completely successful and will create unintended consequences that will expose new fragility in the power of state forces.

scholarly journals Myanmar Political Instability: A Threat to Southeast Asia Stability

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendra Manurung
Keyword(s):  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Political Instability ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
Aung San Suu Kyi ◽  
The Military ◽  
Government Authority

This research aims to explain current Myanmar political instability due to the recent military coup d’état on February 1, 2021 led by General Senior Min Aung Hlaing follow with Aung San Suu Kyi and other pro-democracy elite leaders arrests. Domestically, up to present time, after the military coup, most Burmese supporters of Myanmar's democratization such medical doctors, teachers, traders, civilian political leaders, and university students balked and staged massive demonstrations against the military coup and demanded the return of civilian government authority by the military junta government. This research revealed that this unexpected Myanmar phenomenal political situation has impact on Southeast Asia regional security and ASEAN Unity.

scholarly journals Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne Republiki Białoruś w dobie kryzysu polityczno-gospodarczego lat 2020-połowa 2021

2021 ◽  
Vol 13(49) (3) ◽  
pp. 41-59
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Kosowska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Security ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
International Environment ◽  
National Bank ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
Source Materials

Republic of Belarus begins the third decade of the 21st century with numerous problems, which include the unstable socio-political situation, broken dialogue and relations with the international environment, and Western sanctions. All these factors have caused a lot of turbulence in the Belarusian economy. This article is an attempt to examine the economic security of Belarus in the period of the depletion of the current economic model, the reduction of Russian energy subsidies, the Covid-19 pandemic and the political crisis resulting from the rigged presidential elections in August 2020. Data from the Belarusian Bielstat database, the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and rating agencies will be used as source materials.

The 1964 Military Coup in Brazil

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Roberto Martins Filho
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
The Government ◽  
Getulio Vargas ◽  
The Military

The coup that took place in Brazil on March 31, 1964 can be understood as a typical Cold War event. Supported by civilians, the action was carried out by the armed forces. Its origins hark back to the failed military revolt, headed by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in November of 1935, stirring up strong anticommunist sentiments. The Estado Novo coup, which occurred two years later, was supported by the army (war) and navy ministers. It marked the beginnings of the dictatorial phase of Getúlio Vargas, who had been in power since 1930. At the end of the Second World War, officers who had taken part in the struggle against Nazism in Italy returned to Brazil and overthrew the dictatorial Vargas regime, who nonetheless returned to power through the 1950 presidential elections. In 1954, under pressure from right-wing military forces, he committed suicide, thereby frustrating existing plans for another coup d’état. The Superior War School (ESG), created in 1949, had become both the birthplace of the ideology of National Security and stage where the French doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire was welcomed. During the 1950s, the military came to be divided into pro-American and nationalist factions. The alliance between the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the centrist Social Democratic Party (PSD), which had elected Vargas earlier, now enabled Juscelino Kubitschek’s victory in the 1955 elections, disappointing the conservatives of the National Democratic Union (UDN) and its military allies. The latter were briefly encouraged when the 1960 presidential election put Jânio Quadros at the head of the executive. In August 1961, when Quadros resigned, his military ministers tried to use force to keep Vice-President João Goulart, Vargas’s political heir at the head of the PTB, from taking office. The coup was frustrated by the resistance of the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Yet the Goulart administration was marked by instability, in the midst of intense social struggles and by a sharp economic crisis. The outcome of this drama began to take shape in March 1963, when the government took a leftwards turn. A massive demonstration in downtown Rio de Janeiro on March 13 served as an alert, and the March 25 sailors’ revolt as the match in the powder keg. On March 31, military forces carried out the infamous coup. The Goulart administration collapsed. Social movements were left waiting for orders to resist that never came.

Egypt import controls will not prevent devaluation

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Foreign Currency ◽  
Development Bank ◽  
Foreign Reserves ◽  
Tariff Protection ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
African Development Bank ◽  
The Government ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Significance British Airways stopped selling tickets in Egyptian pounds because it could not convert earnings into dollars. At end of February, Egypt's foreign reserves stood 16.53 billion dollars -- down from 36.04 billion dollars at end-2010. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) and the government have introduced measures to curb imports to reduce the import bill, and have provided tariff protection to local industries, in order to address the chronic shortage of foreign exchange. Impacts The government will resort to more creative measures to ease its foreign currency problems. This will include requiring suppliers to agree to deferred payment, and holding up shipments by applying intrusive inspection criteria. Recent financing agreements with the World Bank, the African Development Bank, Saudi Arabia and China have given Egypt some leeway. However, if it finally accepts the case for devaluation it may seek support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Guinea-Bissau deadlock will threaten fragile growth

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Instability ◽  
Cape Verde ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
Court Action ◽  
The Government ◽  
Ruling Party

Significance A month previously, the ECOWAS had reiterated its displeasure over the lack of progress in resolving the ongoing political impasse and issued an ultimatum to political actors to implement the 2016 Conakry Agreement or face sanctions. The UN has also threatened to initiate punitive measures if the political situation deteriorates further between President Jose Mario Vaz and his ruling party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Impacts Given the risk of a military coup, ECOWAS is likely to retain some of its troops until after the 2018 legislative election. A court action by two banks against the government could endanger IMF loans and donors' budgetary support. Ongoing political instability could lead to increased activities by organised criminal and terrorist networks.

scholarly journals IGOs in Crisis? Or New Opportunities to Demonstrate Responsibility?

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Marceau
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
World Health ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
Common Elements ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Institutional Responses ◽  
The World ◽  
Health Organization ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
Law Making

AbstractThis editorial seeks to explore the creative reactions of intergovernmental organizations ('IGOs') in times of global crisis. With emphasis on recent health and economic crises and the response of IGOs including the World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, the editorial shows that crises have strengthened the institutional and law-making power of the IGOs that are forced to deal with them. Certain common elements emerge from this discussion, including the more prominent role that the leadership and Secretariats of IGOs regularly play in crises, the wider range of institutions and groups with which IGOs are prepared to closely collaborate in order to deal with new issues, and the increased prevalence of creative and informal law-making by IGOs as part of their institutional responses to challenges.

scholarly journals Friends or foes? Brazil, the IMF and the World Bank, 1961–1967

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Carlo Edoardo Altamura ◽  
Claudia Kedar
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Military ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
The Imf

Between June 1959 and March 1964, the democratic governments of Brazilian presidents Juscelino Kubitschek (January 1956 – January 1961), Janio Quadros (January–August 1961), Ranieri Mazzilli (August–September 1961) and João ‘Jango’ Goulart (September 1961 – April 1964) received no support from the World Bank (WB), which refused to fund even a single new project during this period. During this same period, and, more specifically, between July 1958 and January 1965, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WB's twin institution, granted financial assistance to Brazil only twice: a controversial and highly conditional Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) signed in May 1961; and a non-conditional and automatically approved Compensatory Financial Facility (CFF), granted in May 1963 to compensate Brazil for the decrease in coffee prices on the international market. This attitude towards Brazil changed significantly following the military coup of March 1964. Money flowed into the country and by 1970 Brazil had become the largest receiver of WB funds and a chronic borrower from the IMF, signing two SBAs in 1965, and one per year between 1966 and 1972. We use recently disclosed material from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank archives to analyse the relationship of these two institutions with Brazil and to foster the debate on their political neutrality, arguing that the difference in the IMF's and especially the WB's relations with the military regime reflected, more than anything else, the existence of an ideological affinity between the parties with regards to the ‘right’ economic policy.

scholarly journals THE RISE AND FALL OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN SUDAN

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-104
Author(s):  
Sergey V. Kostelyanets
Keyword(s):  
Political Islam ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Effective Instrument ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government

In April 2019, Sudan's long-serving President Omar al-Bashir was deposed in a bloodless military coup d'état, which took place amid a major wave of popular protests in the country. The present paper aims to assess the historic path of Sudanese Islamists toward the seizure of power in the course of the 1989 Salvation Revolution and their role in domestic and foreign policies of the Republic of the Sudan in 1989-2019. It will be argued that by the time of the demise of the regime in 2019 political Islam in Sudan had fully eroded and could no longer serve as an effective instrument of legitimization for the government of al-Bashir and that the return of the Islamists to power is improbable.

scholarly journals USSR and the 1966 Coup d’État in Ghana: Based on Materials from Russian Archives

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-633
Author(s):  
Sergey Vasilyevich Mazov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
State Control ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Kwame Nkrumah ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

The article investigates the role of Soviet experts and diplomats in conceiving the economic policy of the government of Kwame Nkrumah and in elaborating a seven-year development plan for Ghana (1963-1970). Drawing on extensive documents from Russian archives, the author proved that the USSR Ambassador to Ghana had recommended Soviet economic recipes to President Kwame Nkrumah, ignoring Ghanaian realities and opportunities, - the introduction of a planned economy, the nationalization of large enterprises and banks, the establishment of state control over the main industries, and the creation of collective farms in the countryside. K. Nkrumah believed that with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Ghana would be able to successfully repeat its experience of rapid industrialization. The attempts to implement an unfeasible program have brought the economy of Ghana to the brink of collapse. Soviet economic and financial aid turned out to be ineffective. Most joint ventures remained costly long-term constructions due to errors in planning and supply. The economic collapse and falling living standards of the population ensured the success of the military coup on February 24, 1966 to a large extent. The leadership of the USSR faced a difficult dilemma. In the name of publicly declared values, ideological principles of the Soviet foreign policy, the military-police junta that ousted K. Nkrumah should not be recognized. Pragmatic interests (repayment of loans, retaining profitable bilateral trade, the ability to complete the construction of joint facilities) required the maintaining of relations with the junta. The author found that the reaction of the Soviet Union to the military coup was not consistent. At first, it was decided not to recognize the reactionary, pro-Western regime and to help K. Nkrumah regain power by force of arms. A Soviet ship was sent to the shores of West Africa with a cargo of weapons for his supporters. Soon the ship was recalled, and full-scale relations with the new regime were restored. Pragmatism has become superior over ideology reflecting a change in the Soviet African policy after a series of setbacks there.

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