scholarly journals THE RISE AND FALL OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN SUDAN

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-104
Author(s):  
Sergey V. Kostelyanets
Keyword(s):  
Political Islam ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Effective Instrument ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government

In April 2019, Sudan's long-serving President Omar al-Bashir was deposed in a bloodless military coup d'état, which took place amid a major wave of popular protests in the country. The present paper aims to assess the historic path of Sudanese Islamists toward the seizure of power in the course of the 1989 Salvation Revolution and their role in domestic and foreign policies of the Republic of the Sudan in 1989-2019. It will be argued that by the time of the demise of the regime in 2019 political Islam in Sudan had fully eroded and could no longer serve as an effective instrument of legitimization for the government of al-Bashir and that the return of the Islamists to power is improbable.

External Co-Optation of a Less Developed Country's Policy Making: The Case of Ghana, 1969–1972

1976 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald T. Libby
Keyword(s):  
Public Support ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
Developed Country ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The Government ◽  
Less Developed Country ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

The author advances the thesis that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and creditor countries structured the context in which their client, Ghana—a less developed country—formulated its economic policy between 1969 and 1972. The intergovernmental organizations and creditor countries failed to take Ghana's domestic political situation into account, however. When the country became heavily dependent upon the IGO's and creditors for financial assistance to enable the government to survive a disastrous shortfall in foreign exchange earnings, it was forced to accept extreme and politically dangerous measures in order to secure assistance. The policies that were adopted were catastrophic, and destroyed what remained of the democratic government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'etat.

The Nixon Doctrine and the Yusin Reforms: American Foreign Policy, the Vietnam War, and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Korea, 1968–1973

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 33-34
Author(s):  
Tae Yang Kwak
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
National Reconstruction ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Individual

AbstractPark Chung Hee presided over the Republic of Korea (ROK) longer than any other leader (1961–1979) and he remains the individual most responsible for defining the country's formative features. Having witnessed the worst excesses of Park's later years, many of the early scholars of Korean politics have characterized the whole of Park's long rule as a monolithic dictatorship. One of these pioneering scholars, Sungjoo Han, locates the moment of “the failure of Korean democracy” in 16 May 1961, the very day that Park and his co-conspirators seized control from Prime Minister Chang Myn through a military coup d'état. However, like the man himself, Park's career was complex and highly adaptive. Many historians now distinguish Park's rule into three distinct periods: the first and most tenuous years (1961–63) when he directed the government through a military junta, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction; the middle years (1963–72) of elected presidential rule, referred to as the “Third Republic”; and the final years (1972–79) of dictatorial rule under the Yusin system, the “Fourth Republic.” In his early years, Park had begrudgingly adhered to a minimally democratic framework before finally turning to formal authoritarianism as the American war in Vietnam came to an end.

Sukarno and the Pseudo-Coup of 1965: Ten Years Later

1976 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-135
Author(s):  
Oey Hong Lee
Keyword(s):  
Air Force ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Radio Broadcast ◽  
As If ◽  
The Revolution

The action of the 30 September Movement on 1 October 1965 in Indonesia is sometimes described as an abortive coup d'état. In fact it would be more in accordance with reality to call it a pseudo-coup. It is true that in line with the technique of launching a coup, the movement led by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung from the palace guard quickly occupied strategic and vital points in Jakarta, the capital, such.as the telecommunications centre and the central radio broadcast station. It is also true that Untung on 1 October issued a decree dismissing the Sukarno Cabinet, i.e. the government of the day, and establishing the Revolution Council as ‘the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia’. In reality, however, no action was taken against President Sukarno and his Ministers (apart from the Minister for Defence and Security, General Nasution, and the Minister/Commander of the Army, General Yani) in the form of arrest or other ways of political neutralization. As expressed by the former commander of the air force, Omar Dani, during his trial for his alleged involvement in the 30 September Movement: ‘Why did they (Untung and his associates) act as if they were not serious? There was no concrete takeover of power. The President was still in power, and so were his Ministers and his military commanders’.

Back to the Barracks? Five Years ‘Revo’ in Suriname

1986 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Brana-Shute
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Cultural Exchange ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
State Of Emergency ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Military

On 25 November 1985 the Republic of Suriname celebrated ten years of independent statehood. That decade witnessed a number of unexpected and quite extraordinary events in the former Dutch colony. Since the last free parliamentary elections in 1977, the country has endured: a military coup d'etat (1980) the arbitrary arrest and detainment of leaders of the “old” political parties (1980); the nullification of its constitution and civil rights (1980) and the imposition of a “state of emergency” (1982); the appointment by the military high command of five civilian cabinets (1981,1982,1983,1984, and 1985); a foreign and domestic policy that has swung erratically between far left and center; a cordial relationship with Cuba unceremoniously broken by Suriname following the US-led invasion of Grenada; the tragic and colossally stupid murder of 15 (possibly more) prominent Surinamers opposed to the revolution (1982); the suspension of more than US$1.5 billion dollars of Dutch foreign aid (1982); seven alleged counter-coups, one of which supposedly enjoyed the support of the CIA and several American mercenaries (1980-1984); deteriorating relations with the Netherlands, to the point where there is no ambassador in the Hague; a rather visionary attempt to dismantle the ethnic structure of pre-revo party politics by creating “one national party;” a cozy relationship with Libya under the guise of “cultural exchange;” and the rapid deterioration of a once booming economy. Now in 1986, in the midst of a dialogue with the “old” political parties, there is robust talk of a return to civilian government.

scholarly journals Ethnocracy and Post-Ethnocracy in Fiji

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 115-143
Author(s):  
Sanjay Ramesh
Keyword(s):  
Military Coup ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Ethnic Tensions ◽  
Cyclical Pattern ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Democratic Elections ◽  
The Military ◽  
Alliance Building

Fiji’s history is interspersed with ethnic conflict, military coups, new constitutions and democratic elections. Ethnic tensions started to increase in the 1960s and reached its peak with violent indigenous Fijian ethnic assertion in the form of military coups in 1987. Following the coup, the constitution adopted at independence was abrogated and a constitution that provided indigenous political hegemony was promulgated in 1990. However, by 1993, there were serious and irreparable divisions within the indigenous Fijian community, forcing coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka to spearhead a constitution review. The result of the review was the multiracial 1997 Constitution which failed to resolve deep seated ethnic tensions, resulting in another nationalist coup in 2000 and a mutiny at the military barracks in December of that year. Following the failed mutiny, the Commander of the Republic of the Fiji Military Forces, Voreqe Bainimarama, publicly criticised nationalist policies of the government of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, culminating in another military coup in 2006. The new military government started plans to de-ethnise the Fijian state and promulgated a constitution that promoted ethnic equality.Post independence Fiji is characterised by these conflicts over ethnocracy. The ethnic hegemony of indigenous Fijian chiefs is set against inter-ethnic counter hegemony. While democratic politics encourages inter-ethic alliance-building, the ethnic hegemony of the chiefs has been asserted by force. Latterly, the fragmentation of the ethnic hegemony has reconfigured inter-ethnic alliances, and the military has emerged as a vehicle for de-ethnicisation. The article analyses this cyclical pattern of ethnic hegemony and multiethnic counter hegemony as a struggle over (and against) Fijian ethnocracy. 

The 1964 Military Coup in Brazil

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Roberto Martins Filho
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
The Government ◽  
Getulio Vargas ◽  
The Military

The coup that took place in Brazil on March 31, 1964 can be understood as a typical Cold War event. Supported by civilians, the action was carried out by the armed forces. Its origins hark back to the failed military revolt, headed by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in November of 1935, stirring up strong anticommunist sentiments. The Estado Novo coup, which occurred two years later, was supported by the army (war) and navy ministers. It marked the beginnings of the dictatorial phase of Getúlio Vargas, who had been in power since 1930. At the end of the Second World War, officers who had taken part in the struggle against Nazism in Italy returned to Brazil and overthrew the dictatorial Vargas regime, who nonetheless returned to power through the 1950 presidential elections. In 1954, under pressure from right-wing military forces, he committed suicide, thereby frustrating existing plans for another coup d’état. The Superior War School (ESG), created in 1949, had become both the birthplace of the ideology of National Security and stage where the French doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire was welcomed. During the 1950s, the military came to be divided into pro-American and nationalist factions. The alliance between the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the centrist Social Democratic Party (PSD), which had elected Vargas earlier, now enabled Juscelino Kubitschek’s victory in the 1955 elections, disappointing the conservatives of the National Democratic Union (UDN) and its military allies. The latter were briefly encouraged when the 1960 presidential election put Jânio Quadros at the head of the executive. In August 1961, when Quadros resigned, his military ministers tried to use force to keep Vice-President João Goulart, Vargas’s political heir at the head of the PTB, from taking office. The coup was frustrated by the resistance of the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Yet the Goulart administration was marked by instability, in the midst of intense social struggles and by a sharp economic crisis. The outcome of this drama began to take shape in March 1963, when the government took a leftwards turn. A massive demonstration in downtown Rio de Janeiro on March 13 served as an alert, and the March 25 sailors’ revolt as the match in the powder keg. On March 31, military forces carried out the infamous coup. The Goulart administration collapsed. Social movements were left waiting for orders to resist that never came.

scholarly journals USSR and the 1966 Coup d’État in Ghana: Based on Materials from Russian Archives

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-633
Author(s):  
Sergey Vasilyevich Mazov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
State Control ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Kwame Nkrumah ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

The article investigates the role of Soviet experts and diplomats in conceiving the economic policy of the government of Kwame Nkrumah and in elaborating a seven-year development plan for Ghana (1963-1970). Drawing on extensive documents from Russian archives, the author proved that the USSR Ambassador to Ghana had recommended Soviet economic recipes to President Kwame Nkrumah, ignoring Ghanaian realities and opportunities, - the introduction of a planned economy, the nationalization of large enterprises and banks, the establishment of state control over the main industries, and the creation of collective farms in the countryside. K. Nkrumah believed that with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Ghana would be able to successfully repeat its experience of rapid industrialization. The attempts to implement an unfeasible program have brought the economy of Ghana to the brink of collapse. Soviet economic and financial aid turned out to be ineffective. Most joint ventures remained costly long-term constructions due to errors in planning and supply. The economic collapse and falling living standards of the population ensured the success of the military coup on February 24, 1966 to a large extent. The leadership of the USSR faced a difficult dilemma. In the name of publicly declared values, ideological principles of the Soviet foreign policy, the military-police junta that ousted K. Nkrumah should not be recognized. Pragmatic interests (repayment of loans, retaining profitable bilateral trade, the ability to complete the construction of joint facilities) required the maintaining of relations with the junta. The author found that the reaction of the Soviet Union to the military coup was not consistent. At first, it was decided not to recognize the reactionary, pro-Western regime and to help K. Nkrumah regain power by force of arms. A Soviet ship was sent to the shores of West Africa with a cargo of weapons for his supporters. Soon the ship was recalled, and full-scale relations with the new regime were restored. Pragmatism has become superior over ideology reflecting a change in the Soviet African policy after a series of setbacks there.

Turkish Cypriots - A People Unfairly Treated And Isolated by the International Community

Belleten ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 73 (266) ◽  
pp. 179-200
Author(s):  
Salâhi R. Sonyel
Keyword(s):  
The European Union ◽  
Turkish Republic ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Turkish People ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Republic Of Cyprus ◽  
The Right ◽  
Greek Cypriots

The struggles of the Turkish people of Cyprus for their existence and human rights began immediately after the signing of the Cyprus Agreement, on 4 June 1878, between the Ottoman State and England (Britain), giving the latter the right to occupy Cyprus provisionally. These struggles accelerated following attempts by the Greek Cypriots, pampered by the British, to aspire for enosis (union with Greece), and reached the zenith after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The Greek Cypriots, who believed that the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was provisional, and dreamt of the Megali Idea (Great Ideal), in the fulfilment of Greek imperialism, prepared various secret plans and plots in order to cow down, and eliminate the Turkish Cypriots, which they began to implement in 1964. However, there were splits and divisions among them, which led to the Sampson coup d'etat in 1974. However, there were splits and divisions among them, which led to the Sampson coup d'etat in 1974, thereby causing Turkey to intervene, as one of the guarantor powers, in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek-Cypriot plans to exterminate them. However, Western states and organisations, and particularly the European Union (EU), which admire, and are under the influence of, ancient Hellenes continued, and still continue, to recognise the government of South Cyprus as the 'legal government' of the whole island and refuse to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots have been subjected to isolation, unfairly and contrary to the principles of justice. In this monograph I shall try to reveal as to how and why the EU decided, with the pressure of Greece, to admit South Cyprus to membership contrary to the principles of fairness, justice and legality.

Changes in Ghana Law Since The Military Take-Over

1966 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-111
Author(s):  
U. U. Uche
Keyword(s):  
Coup D'etat ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

On Thursday, February 24th, 1966, there was a military takeover of the Government of Ghana by the Ghana Army. Before the coup, Ghana was a sovereign unitary republic under a one-party régime. The President and the National Assembly made up the Parliament of the Republic. All Cabinet and other Ministers, except the President, were members of the National Assembly. Ministers were appointed by, responsible to and dismissible by the President. The President had veto powers over any Bills passed by the National Assembly and could in any case dissolve the Assembly in the event of a disagreement with the latter. The Chief Justice and other judges were appointed and dismissible by the President. From the above it is easy to see that the President constituted and dominated the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary of the country. What we propose to do here is to spotlight such constitutional and other changes in the law of Ghana as there have been since the coup d'état.

scholarly journals Participation and Its Restriction in Policy-Making Process in Korea -Under the third Republic (1963~1972)-

1988 ◽  
Vol 3 (0) ◽  
pp. 116-133
Author(s):  
Hae-Kyun Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Advisory Committees ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Administrative Culture ◽  
The Social ◽  
Policy Information ◽  
The Government ◽  
Security Regulations

The purposes of this paper are to review the social scientists' participation in government policy-making processes in the 3rd Republic of Korea (1963-1972) after the end of military coup d'etat government (1961~1963) and to find a desirable future relationship between the government and social scientists. In this article, the social scientists' participation is analyzed by focusing on the modes of participation by social scientists (e.g., public administration, political science, economics, sociology, etc.). The modes are classified into two types: direct and indirect. The major institutions analyzed are numerous governmental advisory committees and academic associations for social scientists. The major finding is that the social scientists' participation under the 3rd Republic was very limited, and if any, participation was made mostly by the economists. The participation by other social scientists was merely a means for legitimation of governmental policies, rather than for improvement of the quality of the policies. This was due to the centralized and authoritarian politico-administrative culture and policymaking structure which was dominated by the group of higher bureaucrats equipped with highly sophisticated modern managerial techniques. The mode of other social scientists' participation was mostly indirect. It was very difficult for them to access to policy information due to the severe "task security regulations" harshly enforced by the government.

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