scholarly journals USSR and the 1966 Coup d’État in Ghana: Based on Materials from Russian Archives

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-633
Author(s):  
Sergey Vasilyevich Mazov

The article investigates the role of Soviet experts and diplomats in conceiving the economic policy of the government of Kwame Nkrumah and in elaborating a seven-year development plan for Ghana (1963-1970). Drawing on extensive documents from Russian archives, the author proved that the USSR Ambassador to Ghana had recommended Soviet economic recipes to President Kwame Nkrumah, ignoring Ghanaian realities and opportunities, - the introduction of a planned economy, the nationalization of large enterprises and banks, the establishment of state control over the main industries, and the creation of collective farms in the countryside. K. Nkrumah believed that with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Ghana would be able to successfully repeat its experience of rapid industrialization. The attempts to implement an unfeasible program have brought the economy of Ghana to the brink of collapse. Soviet economic and financial aid turned out to be ineffective. Most joint ventures remained costly long-term constructions due to errors in planning and supply. The economic collapse and falling living standards of the population ensured the success of the military coup on February 24, 1966 to a large extent. The leadership of the USSR faced a difficult dilemma. In the name of publicly declared values, ideological principles of the Soviet foreign policy, the military-police junta that ousted K. Nkrumah should not be recognized. Pragmatic interests (repayment of loans, retaining profitable bilateral trade, the ability to complete the construction of joint facilities) required the maintaining of relations with the junta. The author found that the reaction of the Soviet Union to the military coup was not consistent. At first, it was decided not to recognize the reactionary, pro-Western regime and to help K. Nkrumah regain power by force of arms. A Soviet ship was sent to the shores of West Africa with a cargo of weapons for his supporters. Soon the ship was recalled, and full-scale relations with the new regime were restored. Pragmatism has become superior over ideology reflecting a change in the Soviet African policy after a series of setbacks there.

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-25
Author(s):  
Natalia Telepneva

On 24 February 1966, Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown in a coup d’état. The coup rekindled a debate within the Soviet bloc about the prospects of socialism in Africa and about the appropriateness of certain policies. Soviet officials concluded that they would have to focus on establishing close relations with the armies and internal security forces of African countries. This article explores how Nkrumah's loyalists in exile and their sympathizers in Ghana attempted to launch a leftwing counter-coup in Accra in 1968 and the involvement of Warsaw Pact countries—notably the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—in those events. The article sheds new light on “Operation ALEX,” a botched attempt by the Czechoslovak intelligence service to support Nkrumah loyalists in their plans for a countercoup. The article reexamines the late 1960s as an important period for the militarization of the Cold War in Africa and highlights the crucial role that African politicians themselves played in this process.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 178-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Kramer

The largely peaceful collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 reflected the profound changes that Mikhail Gorbachev had carried out in Soviet foreign policy. Successful though the process was in Eastern Europe, it had destabilizing repercussions within the Soviet Union. The effects were both direct and indirect. The first part of this two-part article looks at Gorbachev's policy toward Eastern Europe, the collapse of Communism in the region, and the direct “spillover” from Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union. The second part of the article, to be published in the next issue of the journal, discusses the indirect spillover into the Soviet Union and the fierce debate that emerged within the Soviet political elite about the “loss” of the Eastern bloc—a debate that helped spur the leaders of the attempted hardline coup d'état in August 1991.


Author(s):  
João Roberto Martins Filho

The coup that took place in Brazil on March 31, 1964 can be understood as a typical Cold War event. Supported by civilians, the action was carried out by the armed forces. Its origins hark back to the failed military revolt, headed by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in November of 1935, stirring up strong anticommunist sentiments. The Estado Novo coup, which occurred two years later, was supported by the army (war) and navy ministers. It marked the beginnings of the dictatorial phase of Getúlio Vargas, who had been in power since 1930. At the end of the Second World War, officers who had taken part in the struggle against Nazism in Italy returned to Brazil and overthrew the dictatorial Vargas regime, who nonetheless returned to power through the 1950 presidential elections. In 1954, under pressure from right-wing military forces, he committed suicide, thereby frustrating existing plans for another coup d’état. The Superior War School (ESG), created in 1949, had become both the birthplace of the ideology of National Security and stage where the French doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire was welcomed. During the 1950s, the military came to be divided into pro-American and nationalist factions. The alliance between the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the centrist Social Democratic Party (PSD), which had elected Vargas earlier, now enabled Juscelino Kubitschek’s victory in the 1955 elections, disappointing the conservatives of the National Democratic Union (UDN) and its military allies. The latter were briefly encouraged when the 1960 presidential election put Jânio Quadros at the head of the executive. In August 1961, when Quadros resigned, his military ministers tried to use force to keep Vice-President João Goulart, Vargas’s political heir at the head of the PTB, from taking office. The coup was frustrated by the resistance of the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Yet the Goulart administration was marked by instability, in the midst of intense social struggles and by a sharp economic crisis. The outcome of this drama began to take shape in March 1963, when the government took a leftwards turn. A massive demonstration in downtown Rio de Janeiro on March 13 served as an alert, and the March 25 sailors’ revolt as the match in the powder keg. On March 31, military forces carried out the infamous coup. The Goulart administration collapsed. Social movements were left waiting for orders to resist that never came.


2021 ◽  
pp. 100-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandr V. Zaytsev

The journal Slavyane was created by the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as an organ of internal and external political propaganda aimed at Russian-speaking Slavs. It reflected the pullback of Soviet foreign policy from proletarian internationalism. The policy of its editorial board towards Yugoslavia repeated the one of the Party, but sensitive subjects were avoided or covered with a delay on the pages of the journal. Josip Broz Tito as spokesman for the aspirations of Yugoslav peoples was extolle since 1943 while D. Mihajlović’s activities had not been covered until his condemnation in October 1943. The journal supported the government of the People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until early 1948, condemned it since late 1949 to early 1953, kept silence on Yugoslavia for several months in 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958. Each time such deliberate silence had been caused by the aggravation or, on the contrary, by attempts to break ice in relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) / the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia / the Union of Yugoslavian Communists. The only exception from the rule seems to be Issue 5/1953 of the journal which contains anti-Tito insults but they may be due to struggle on top of the Soviet government. Overall, the policy of the editorial board was marked by more caution and desire to cover up problems than the policy of Party newspapers.


Author(s):  
Igor Asmarov

These four decades gave the USSR new discoveries in the sphere of cultural creativity and the growth of the military and economic power of the country, including the Soviet Union republics of the USSR. The social and cultural process in the USSR in 1950-1980 proceeded under the strong influence of ideology and the ideological and political conjuncture. Nevertheless, creative thought in the sphere of culture and art in the USSR was alive and even fruitfully developed. The peculiarities of the culture of the USSR of this period consisted in the struggle of the government against deviations from the “tasks of social construction”. The pressure and control from the party were so great that they oppressed the freedom of artists and science. Mass discussions in various branches of science of this time had a negative effect on their participants. The development of culture in the 1960-80s was extremely controversial. Despite the fact that the funds for the development of culture constantly increased, the achievements in culture did not correspond to the financial costs. During this period, the leadership of the USSR began to pay great attention to public education and science.


1984 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 287-304
Author(s):  
Anthony Farrar-Hockley

On the night 13/14th October 1950 soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the Yalu river from north-east China into Korea. In the 10 weeks of operations that followed, these men, with others crowding in behind them, threw back the powerful divisions of the United Nations Command, ejecting them from the territory of North Korea and, further, seemed capable of driving them from the whole Korean peninsular. No doubt the government in Beijing believed for a time that its soldiers were once more about to deliver an immense political prize to Party and state. They were wrong. If the intervention of the PLA changed the course of the Korean war initially much as Mao Zedong intended, it changed also the outlook of the PLA, led to factionalism among the military leadership, which persists and, arguably, accelerated the subsequent rift between China and the Soviet Union.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-3) ◽  
pp. 258-263
Author(s):  
Argyrios Tasoulas

This article studies the development of Soviet-Cypriot trade relations in 1960-63, based on research at the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). Concurrently, a historical analysis follows the events after the creation of the new Cypriot state and the two major Cold War crises (the building of the Berlin wall and the Cuban missile crisis). The efforts made by both governments to develop bilateral trade, the aftermath of the two major international crises and the results of the two governments’ policies have been identified and analyzed.


1978 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 847
Author(s):  
Marvin Goldwert ◽  
John Samuel Fitch

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 55-62
Author(s):  
Dilshod P. Komolov ◽  

Using the example of the Uzbek SSR, this article reveals the process of militarization of enterprises and institutions on the eve of the attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, restrictions on the constitutional right of citizens to freely choose a profession and work, cruel exploitation of the population and the use of tens of thousands of prisoners aslabor by the despotic Soviet regime. The article also highlights the emergence of judges as victims of repression, the strengthening of party and state control over the judicial system based on archival sources.Index Terms:People's Commissariat of Justice, Supreme Court of the Uzbek SSR, people's Court, judge, investigation, sentence, prison, correctional labor, fine, working week, labor discipline, prisoner, military enterprises, decree


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