Naming the Reality of Chinese Criticism

1979 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. Wang

The philosophical reflections on literary art produced in traditional China cannot be accurately described as literary criticism or literary theory. A scholar or writer set forth his ideas about the nature of literature in general, the value and function of imaginative writing in different genres, or the merits and flaws of specific works, but did not really criticize literature in the sense we do today, to evaluate it for those not trained to judge it. He did not claim such authority, and seldom supported his opinions with solid proofs or reasoned arguments, as literary critics are now expected to do. Having read through Ts'ao Chih's poetry, for example, Chung Hung could judge that it originated in the Kuo-feng, a class of Shih Ching poetry, and exclaim: “Alas, the status of Ts'ao Chih in literature is comparable to that of the Duke of Chou and Confucius in ethics!” but he could not expect his audience to agree with him automatically. He expressed his knowledge and taste, in other words, and the way of expressing them was so uniquely his own, so difficult for others to share, that it was what we may call a private revelation of his ideas. Chung Hung was, therefore, not offering any critical or theoretical defense of Ts'ao Chih's poetry, which does not need any promotion among the learned and does not mean anything to the uncultured. He expressed his personal enthusiasm for Ts'ao Chih's poetry, and so defined his taste and knowledge. He had added another dimension to his own personality, the dimension reflected in Ts'ao Chih's great poetry. He had, in other words, moved a step further toward the definition of his philosophy of life, which he could express in his comments and judgments on nature, on political and ethical institutions, and on literature as artistic rendition of life. What Chung Hung formulated was a private philosophy of literature; it was not literary criticism or theory in the modern sense.

Author(s):  
Clara Rübner Jørgensen

On the basis of data collected during fieldwork in the city of León, Nicaragua, this article discusses the paradox of many Nicaraguan parents describing their children’s school as being free of charge despite the fact that they are frequently asked to pay for it. The article shows that, in spite of the constitutional definition of education as free and equal for all Nicaraguans, parents are often asked for economic contributions. By analysing the values surrounding the school I suggest that values of responsibility and solidarity influence the way that parents conceptualize their school expenditures and, in relation to this, confirm the status of the school as free. Furthermore, the article describes how Nicaraguan parents often compare the school to their home and describe the relation between teacher and students by using family terms. Inspired by the theory of the American sociologist James Carrier, I argue that this comparison, in addition to the values of responsibility and solidarity, further influences the way Nicaraguan parents and children experience their economic contributions. Finally, I argue that even though the users of the school describe it as free of charge, it remains necessary to recognize its economic aspects, since a lack of recognition can turn out to have important individual and social consequences for the people involved, especially, for the most economically marginalized families.  


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 45-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irène Fenoglio

Abstract: Very little research has been devoted to the way in which the textual genetics approaches the manuscripts in the text processing. However the future of the genetics depends, partly, on the interest which one can carry to this new materiality of the manuscript. The notion of text, the concept of what text is, have they been changed, or at least modified by the use of text processing? To write a text is to elaborate a discourse in the form of an utterance and to record it. The order of the discourse, in other words, the semiotic (the linguistic recognizable) / semantic (the meaning expressed (uttered) in the discourse) ratio should in no way be modified by the use of text processing. What changes, on the other hand, it is the materialization of the paper support of the text and consequently the status of this materialization.


Author(s):  
Patrick Colm Hogan

Like writers elsewhere, literary theorists in North America have drawn on philosophical, psychological, political, and other writings to understand the nature and function of literature. Indeed, American literary theory is in some ways best thought of as reworking—selecting, hierarchizing, interpreting, and above all synthesizing—a particular body of such precursor texts in order to produce ideas and practices that have value for literary study in an American context. To understand the precise nature of this re-fashioning of theory, we need to begin with an understanding of just what literary theory is, what topics it addresses, what varieties it comprises. Though often seen as a unitary field, literary theory may be normative or descriptive and explanatory; it may address individual works or groups of works. In short, it has many varieties. Next, it is important to consider the context in which theory and criticism are produced. Specifically, we need to understand the professional and institutional structures in which theory is articulated and applied, in particular the ways it enters into teaching and publication practices. There are also ideological or cultural influences on the nature and development of literary theory in America, including issues of national self-concept. These bear especially on the ways in which theorists address political concerns or take up political rhetoric. Of course, to understand American literary theories, one must consider not only the institutional, professional, and cultural backgrounds, but the theories themselves. These theories may be broadly organized into global and local or topical theories, theories that provide a general basis for theoretical reflection and theories that focus on specific topics, such as LGBT literature or African American literature. American literary theory has tended to be of the latter sort. In connection with this, American theory has tended to draw on a few global theories and a few “master theorists,” as we might call them. The most common way of treating these global theories and theorists in topical theories is to intertwine them syncretistically, producing mixed or eclectic theories. Finally, one might distinguish canonical and non-canonical theories, which is to say, theories that are widely recognized and taught as theories and theories that are advocated by a more limited group of partisans. This division is often consequential for the development of intellectual trends as the challenges and opportunities posed by non-canonical theories, theories that offer alternatives to the status quo, may affect the historical trajectory of literary theory, changing its course. That redirection of theory may be particularly likely in the current social context, where the humanities are threatened both politically and institutionally (e.g., in university funding).


2017 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Van Eck

Marcus Borg, one of the most prominent New Testament scholars in the past four decades, is considered by many in the Netherdutch Reformed Church of Africa as a liberal scholar. His understanding of the origin of the Bible, the way he interprets the Bible, and what he sees as the status and function of the Bible, should therefore be dismissed. A comparison of Borg’s point of view on these topics with that of the points of view of the Netherdutch Reformed Church of Africa, however, indicates that Borg’s understanding of these matters differs not even marginally from that of the Netherdutch Reformed Church of Africa. In a certain sense, Borg could therefore be described as a theologian who fits the mould of what is understood in the Netherdutch Reformed Church of Africa as a responsible approach to and interpretation of the Bible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olof Hallonsten

Research Infrastructures (RIs) are tools for scientific research that have received increased attention in science policy in Europe in recent years, including the launch of specific governance bodies and a structured process of prioritization and organization of RI projects in the making. But there is no commonly accepted definition of what RIs are, and the category is both very varied and lacks historical roots. This article provides a historical contextualization of this policy area and discusses, in some detail, different ways of categorizing the 60 RIs identified by EU-level governance bodies as strategically important for Europe as a whole. Showing that the concept of RIs is a political construct with little analytical value for assessing the role and function of RIs in science and innovation systems, the article paves the way for more conceptually and analytically stringent studies of the politics of RIs in Europe.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-126
Author(s):  
Thomas Petraschka

Abstract This essay asks whether the attribution of unreliability to the narrator of a literary text is always dependent upon interpretation. The bulk of narratological research answers with »yes«. Yet the content of the term »interpretation-dependent« is understood in radically different ways. As a minimal consensus, it is commonly accepted that the attribution of unreliability cannot be described as »interpretation-neutral«, in the way that, for instance, the statement »The narrator in text T is a homodiegetic narrator« is interpretation-neutral. Following a few preliminary explanatory remarks on terminology, I propose two arguments for why this majority opinion is false. I argue that the statement »Text T is unreliably narrated« is not always interpretation-dependent. Within the framework of the first argument, I attempt to show that the criterion of »interpretation neutrality« depends upon some meta-theoretical assumptions. If one assumes that basic linguistic characteristics are valid independent of their interpretation and argues that a sentence such as »Call me Ishmael« establishes a homodiegetic narrator because the word »me« signals that he belongs to the narrated story, then one implicitly excludes as inadequate certain idiosyncratic theories of meaning that would ascribe a different meaning to »me«. That is not problematic in and of itself. But it shows that there are conditions of adequacy for theories of meaning that are fundamentally negotiable. And the set of statements which can be attributed the attribute of being »interpretation-neutral« can vary depending upon how these conditions of adequacy are defined. In a corresponding adaptation of the conditions of adequacy for theories of meaning and interpretation, it is therefore inherently possible that even statements about the reliability of a narrator could be granted the status of being interpretation-neutral. The second argument focuses on the praxis of interpretation. I seek to reconstruct how exactly the qualification of a narrator as homodiegetic (an attribute that is usually considered as interpretation-neutral) and as unreliable (an attribute that is usually not considered as interpretation-neutral) can come about in a process of interpretation. There appear to be cases in which criteria commonly cited to qualify a statement as an interpretation-neutral description of a text are also applicable for the attribution of narrative unreliability. Such cases are literary texts like Agatha Christie’s The Murder of Roger Ackroyd or Ambrose Bierce’s An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge, in which the unreliability of the narrator is apparent. The knowledge that the narrators in these texts at least temporarily withhold facts relevant to the plot, tell lies, make mistakes, hallucinate, etc. can just as much be attained on the basis of an unreflective understanding of the linguistic meanings of words as can the knowledge that the narrators are part of the stories they tell. If one wishes to not relinquish the interpretation-neutral status of statements about the ontology of a narrator (the qualification, that is, of a narrator as homo- or heterodiegetic) to a relativism that includes linguistic interpretations, then one is forced in principle to also retain the status of interpretation neutrality for statements about the reliability of a narrator. Both arguments lead me to conclude that the universal quantification that all determinations of the reliability of a narrator are dependent upon interpretation is false. I propose that we limit ourselves to more modest existential quantifications and that we do not attribute the attributes »interpretation-dependent« and »interpretation-neutral« to entire literary categories or types of statements in general, but rather to individual statements. Moreover, I give a short and tentative definition of the criterion »interpretation neutrality« that follows from these considerations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 664-669
Author(s):  
Ercüment Yaşar

Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads, with Pastoral and Other Poems (1802) is both a revolutionary manifesto and a kind of foundational text in the context of the canon of Romantic poetry because of its normative analysis on the nature of poetry and its basic constituent parts although when compared to the systematic approaches in the twentieth century literary theory, Wordsworth does not present an autonomous critical method capable of providing universally valid principles in evaluation of the text. This paper mainly aims to discuss Wordsworth’s contribution to canon of literary criticism on the theoretical level by giving concrete examples from Preface to Lyrical Ballads, with Pastoral and Other Poems (1802) as well as scrutinizing Wordsworth’s definition of poetry and the poet, his ideas on the origin of poetry, the subject matter of poetry, and the language of poetry respectively in order to show that it is revolutionary in terms of prescribing some principles in evaluation of a literary work.    


2018 ◽  
pp. 45-64
Author(s):  
Šukrija Ramić

The work on iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ explores the theoretical interpretations of Ḥanafi scholars in relation to the necessarily assumed meaning of the legislative text (iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ) and the consequences of such an interpretation on the regulations to which the Ḥanafis came in their legal reasoning (ijtihād). At the beginning of the paper, the linguistic and terminological definition of the concept of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the Ḥanafi Law School is considered. Through the examples of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ it is explained that the Ḥanafis used iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the argumentation of legal regulations. Furthermore, the status of iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ in the Ḥanafi Law School, and the way of giving preference in the case of contradiction between iqtiḍāun-naṣṣ and other indications are clarified. At the end of this paper, the basic results of this research are presented.


Author(s):  
Stephen Cohen

From the Platonic ur-antiformalism, the reaction to which gave shape and purpose to classical and early modern literary theory, to the agon between form and history that dominated 20th-century literary criticism and pedagogy, the concept of form and the methodologies of its study (formalism) have at once grounded and challenged our understanding of literature. Is form an ornament or supplement to literature’s essential content, a component of literature’s meaning and function, or the very defining essence of the literary? Does form inhere in the macro-structures of literary mode and genre, the micro-structures of figure, style, and prosody, or the unique shape of the individual text? Does form stand apart and insulated from the vicissitudes of history and the pressures of ideology, is it the object (or agent) of historical and ideological determination, or does it provide us a vantage from which to understand and perhaps resist them? These questions and the variety of answers they have generated have shaped and continue to shape both the practice of literary studies and its status as an academic discipline.


Author(s):  
Roger Copeland

On screen, inanimate objects can be made to “dance” as surely as human dancers can be reduced to the status of objects. This is one way screendance redefines dance and establishes its uniqueness as a genre, differentiating itself from every conceivable form of live, theatrical dancing. For example, in David Hinton and Yolanda Snaith’s Birds, the only “dancers” are finches, owls and bluebirds; creative editing of “found” documentary footage imbues the birds’ movements with “dance-like” qualities. But in so doing, it inadvertently blurs essential distinctions between dance-for-screen and countless other screen-based “dance-like” experience, for example, the harrowing bullet-riddled final moments of Bonnie and Clyde in Arthur Penn’s film, often described as a “dance of death.” But no one proposes that films like Bonnie and Clyde are screendance works. This essay examines the contradictions that arise when we define screendance in ways that de-emphasize the prominence of human dancers.


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