Completeness in the theory of types

1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon Henkin
Keyword(s):  
Functional Calculus ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Second Order ◽  
True Proposition ◽  
Arbitrary Domain ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Positive Integers

The first order functional calculus was proved complete by Gödel in 1930. Roughly speaking, this proof demonstrates that each formula of the calculus is a formal theorem which becomes a true sentence under every one of a certain intended class of interpretations of the formal system.For the functional calculus of second order, in which predicate variables may be bound, a very different kind of result is known: no matter what (recursive) set of axioms are chosen, the system will contain a formula which is valid but not a formal theorem. This follows from results of Gödel concerning systems containing a theory of natural numbers, because a finite categorical set of axioms for the positive integers can be formulated within a second order calculus to which a functional constant has been added.By a valid formula of the second order calculus is meant one which expresses a true proposition whenever the individual variables are interpreted as ranging over an (arbitrary) domain of elements while the functional variables of degree n range over all sets of ordered n-tuples of individuals. Under this definition of validity, we must conclude from Gödel's results that the calculus is essentially incomplete.It happens, however, that there is a wider class of models which furnish an interpretation for the symbolism of the calculus consistent with the usual axioms and formal rules of inference. Roughly, these models consist of an arbitrary domain of individuals, as before, but now an arbitrary class of sets of ordered n-tuples of individuals as the range for functional variables of degree n. If we redefine the notion of valid formula to mean one which expresses a true proposition with respect to every one of these models, we can then prove that the usual axiom system for the second order calculus is complete: a formula is valid if and only if it is a formal theorem.

A model theoretic approach to Malcev conditions

1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Baldwin ◽  
Joel Berman
Keyword(s):  
Extensive Study ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Easy Consequence ◽  
First Order ◽  
Congruence Relations ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

A varietyV(equational class of algebras) satisfies a strong Malcev condition ∃f1,…, ∃fnθ(f1, …,fn,x1, …,xm) where θ is a conjunction of equations in the function variablesf1, …,fnand the individual variablesx1, …,xm, if there are polynomial symbolsp1, …,pnin the language ofVsuch that ∀x1, …,xmθ(p1…,pn,x1, …,xm) is a law ofV. Thus a strong Malcev condition involves restricted second order quantification of a strange sort. The quantification is restricted to functions which are “polynomially definable”. This notion was introduced by Malcev [6] who used it to describe those varieties all of whose members have permutable congruence relations. The general formal definition of Malcev conditions is due to Grätzer [1]. Since then and especially since Jónsson's [3] characterization of varieties with distributive congruences there has been extensive study of strong Malcev conditions and the related concepts: Malcev conditions and weak Malcev conditions.In [9], Taylor gives necessary and sufficient semantic conditions for a class of varieties to be defined by a (strong) Malcev condition. A key to the proof is the translation of the restricted second order concepts into first order concepts in a certain many sorted language. In this paper we show that, given this translation, Taylor's theorem is an easy consequence of a result of Tarski [8] and the standard preservation theorems of first order logic.

A note on the Entscheidungsproblem

1936 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alonzo Church
Keyword(s):  
Present Note ◽  
Arithmetic Function ◽  
Arithmetic Functions ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Recursive Definition ◽  
System L ◽  
Preceding Paragraph ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Positive Integers

In a recent paper the author has proposed a definition of the commonly used term “effectively calculable” and has shown on the basis of this definition that the general case of the Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable in any system of symbolic logic which is adequate to a certain portion of arithmetic and is ω-consistent. The purpose of the present note is to outline an extension of this result to the engere Funktionenkalkul of Hilbert and Ackermann.In the author's cited paper it is pointed out that there can be associated recursively with every well-formed formula a recursive enumeration of the formulas into which it is convertible. This means the existence of a recursively defined function a of two positive integers such that, if y is the Gödel representation of a well-formed formula Y then a(x, y) is the Gödel representation of the xth formula in the enumeration of the formulas into which Y is convertible.Consider the system L of symbolic logic which arises from the engere Funktionenkalkül by adding to it: as additional undefined symbols, a symbol 1 for the number 1 (regarded as an individual), a symbol = for the propositional function = (equality of individuals), a symbol s for the arithmetic function x+1, a symbol a for the arithmetic function a described in the preceding paragraph, and symbols b1, b2, …, bk for the auxiliary arithmetic functions which are employed in the recursive definition of a; and as additional axioms, the recursion equations for the functions a, b1, b2, …, bk (expressed with free individual variables, the class of individuals being taken as identical with the class of positive integers), and two axioms of equality, x = x, and x = y →[F(x)→F(y)].

A relative consistency proof

1954 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Shoenfield
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Functional Calculus ◽  
Direct Method ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Similar Process ◽  
Consistency Proof ◽  
First Order ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
A Direct Method ◽  
Exact Definition

LetCbe an axiom system formalized within the first order functional calculus, and letC′ be related toCas the Bernays-Gödel set theory is related to the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. (An exact definition ofC′ will be given later.) Ilse Novak [5] and Mostowski [8] have shown that, ifCis consistent, thenC′ is consistent. (The converse is obvious.) Mostowski has also proved the stronger result that any theorem ofC′ which can be formalized inCis a theorem ofC.The proofs of Novak and Mostowski do not provide a direct method for obtaining a contradiction inCfrom a contradiction inC′. We could, of course, obtain such a contradiction by proving the theorems ofCone by one; the above result assures us that we must eventually obtain a contradiction. A similar process is necessary to obtain the proof of a theorem inCfrom its proof inC′. The purpose of this paper is to give a new proof of these theorems which provides a direct method of obtaining the desired contradiction or proof.The advantage of the proof may be stated more specifically by arithmetizing the syntax ofCandC′.

A generalization of the concept of ω-consistency

1954 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon Henkin
Keyword(s):  
Functional Calculus ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
Deductive Systems ◽  
Individual Variable ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
Use Of Models

In this paper we consider certain formal properties of deductive systems which, in special cases, reduce to the property of ω-consistency; and we then seek to understand the significance of these properties by relating them to the use of models in providing interpretations of the deductive systems.The notion of ω-consistency arises in connection with deductive systems of arithmetic. For definiteness, let us suppose that the system is a functional calculus whose domain of individuals is construed as the set of natural numbers, and that the system possesses individual constants ν0, ν1, ν2, … such that νi functions as a name for the number i. Such a system is called ω-consistent, if there is no well-formed formula A(x) (in which x is the only free variable) such that A(ν0), A(ν1), A(ν2), … and ∼(x)A(x) are all formal theorems of the system, where A(νi) is the formula resulting from A(x) by substituting the constant νi for each free occurrence of the individual variable x.Now consider an arbitrary applied functional calculus F, and let Γ be any non-empty set of its individual constants. In imitation of the definition of ω-consistency, we may say that the system F is Γ-consistent, if it contains no formula A(x) (in which x is the only free variable) such that ⊦ A (α) for every constant α in Γ, and also ⊦ ∼(x)A(x) (where an occurrence of “⊦” indicates that the formula which it precedes is a formal theorem). We easily see that the condition of Γ-consistency is equivalent to the condition that the system F contain no formula B(x) such that ⊦ ∼ B(α) for each α in Γ, and also ⊦ (∃x)B(x).

On the definition of ‘formal deduction’

1956 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Montague ◽  
Leon Henkin
Keyword(s):  
Functional Calculus ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Axiom Schema ◽  
First Order ◽  
Individual Variable ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Formal Rules

The following remarks apply to many functional calculi, each of which can be variously axiomatized, but for clarity of exposition we shall confine our attention to one particular system Σ. This system is to have the usual primitive symbols and formation rules of the pure first-order functional calculus, and the following formal axiom schemata and formal rules of inference.Axiom schema 1. Any tautologous wff (well-formed formula).Axiom schema 2. (a) A ⊃ B, where A is any wff, a and b are any individual variables, and B arises from A by replacing all free occurrences of a by free occurrences of b.Axiom schema 3. (a)(A ⊃ B)⊃(A⊃ (a)B). where A and B are any wffs, and a is any individual variable not free in A.Rule of Modus Ponens: applies to wffs A and A ⊃ B, and yields B.Rule of Generalization: applies to a wff A and yields (a)A, where a is any individual variable.A formal proof in Σ is a finite column of wffs each of whose lines is a formal axiom or arises from two preceding lines by the Rule of Modus Ponens or arises from a single preceding line by the Rule of Generalization. A formal theorem of Σ is a wff which occurs as the last line of some formal proof.

A note on direct products

1958 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Novak Gál
Keyword(s):  
Binary Relation ◽  
Direct Product ◽  
Functional Calculus ◽  
Ordered Set ◽  
Infinite Sequence ◽  
Direct Products ◽  
First Order ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Infinite Sequences

By an algebra is meant an ordered set Γ = 〈V,R1, …, Rn, O1, …, Om〉, where V is a class, Ri (1 ≤ i ≤, n) is a relation on nj elements of V (i.e. Ri ⊆ Vni), and Oj (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is an operation on elements of V such that Oj(x1, … xmj) ∈ V) for all x1, …, xmj ∈ V). A sentence S of the first-order functional calculus is valid in Γ, if it contains just individual variables x1, x2, …, relation variables ϱ1, …,ϱn, where ϱi,- is nj-ary (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and operation variables σ1, …, σm, where σj is mj-ary (1 ≤, j ≤ m), and S holds if the individual variables are interpreted as ranging over V, ϱi is interpreted as Ri, and σi as Oj. If {Γi}i≤α is a (finite or infinite) sequence of algebras Γi, where Γi = 〈Vi, Ri〉 and Ri, is a binary relation, then by the direct productΓ = Πi<αΓi is meant the algebra Γ = 〈V, R〉, where V consists of all (finite or infinite) sequences x = 〈x1, x2, …, xi, …〉 with Xi ∈ Vi and where R is a binary relation such that two elements x and y of V are in the relation R if and only if xi and yi- are in the relation Ri for each i < α.

On the definition of an infinitely-many-valued predicate calculus

1960 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph D. Rutledge
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Extended System ◽  
Index Set ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

This paper presents a class of plausible definitions for validity of formulas in the infinitely-many-valued extension of the Łukasiewicz predicate calculus, and shows that all of them are equivalent. This extended system is discussed in some form in [3] and [4]; the questions discussed here are raised rather briefly in the latter.We first describe the formal framework for the validity definition. The symbols to be used are the following: the connectives + and ‐, which are the strong disjunction B of [2] and negation respectively; the predicate variables Pi for i ∈ I, where I may be taken as the integers; the existential quantifiers E(J), where J⊆I, and I may be thought of as the index set on the individual variables, which however do not appear explicitly in this formulation.

On the rules of proof in the pure functional calculus of the first order

1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Mostowski
Keyword(s):  
Functional Calculus ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
Propositional Function ◽  
Cartesian Power ◽  
First Order ◽  
A Value ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
Definition Of

We consider here the pure functional calculus of first order as formulated by Church.Church, l.c., p. 79, gives the definition of the validity of a formula in a given set I of individuals and shows that a formula is provable in if and only if it is valid in every non-empty set I. The definition of validity is preceded by the definition of a value of a formula; the notion of a value is the basic “semantical” notion in terms of which all other semantical notions are definable.The notion of a value of a formula retains its meaning also in the case when the set I is empty. We have only to remember that if I is empty, then an m-ary propositional function (i.e. a function from the m-th cartesian power Im to the set {f, t}) is the empty set. It then follows easily that the value of each well-formed formula with free individual variables is the empty set. The values of wffs without free variables are on the contrary either f or t. Indeed, if B has the unique free variable c and ϕ is the value of B, then the value of (c)B according to the definition given by Church is the propositional constant f or t according as ϕ(j) is f for at least one j in I or not. Since, however, there is no j in I, the condition ϕ(j) = t for all j in I is vacuously satisfied and hence the value of (c)B is t.

Development of a German-Language Questionnaire to Measure Collective Orientation as an Individual Attitude

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera Hagemann
Keyword(s):  
Team Performance ◽  
Reliability And Validity ◽  
Future Research ◽  
German Language ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Collective Orientation ◽  
Team Research ◽  
German Speaking ◽  
Individual Variables ◽  
The Individual

Abstract. The individual attitudes of every single team member are important for team performance. Studies show that each team member’s collective orientation – that is, propensity to work in a collective manner in team settings – enhances the team’s interdependent teamwork. In the German-speaking countries, there was previously no instrument to measure collective orientation. So, I developed and validated a German-language instrument to measure collective orientation. In three studies (N = 1028), I tested the validity of the instrument in terms of its internal structure and relationships with other variables. The results confirm the reliability and validity of the instrument. The instrument also predicts team performance in terms of interdependent teamwork. I discuss differences in established individual variables in team research and the role of collective orientation in teams. In future research, the instrument can be applied to diagnose teamwork deficiencies and evaluate interventions for developing team members’ collective orientation.

The Autobiographical Subject and the Death Penalty

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187
Author(s):  
E. S. Burt
Keyword(s):  
Death Penalty ◽  
First Person ◽  
Philosophical Investigation ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Individual

Why does writing of the death penalty demand the first-person treatment that it also excludes? The article investigates the role played by the autobiographical subject in Derrida's The Death Penalty, Volume I, where the confessing ‘I’ doubly supplements the philosophical investigation into what Derrida sees as a trend toward the worldwide abolition of the death penalty: first, to bring out the harmonies or discrepancies between the individual subject's beliefs, anxieties, desires and interests with respect to the death penalty and the state's exercise of its sovereignty in applying it; and second, to provide a new definition of the subject as haunted, as one that has been, but is no longer, subject to the death penalty, in the light of the worldwide abolition currently underway.

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