Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945–70 and What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense

1971 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-391
Author(s):  
Roger Carey
2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Detlev F. Vagts

The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the conventions they produced, opened the doors—just barely—to the era of arms control. But they did so in a way that would not have been expected. Arms control can be understood as having two main branches—the quantitative and the qualitative. “Quantitative”refers to controls that permit a given category of weapons—such as batdeships, nuclear warheads, and andballistic missile systems—but restrict the number that each of the participating powers may hold. “Qualitative” refers to prohibitions on the use of specified items—such as explosive bullets, poison gas, and bacteriological weapons. Curiously, it was the matter of quantitative control—the desire to check the costs of the arms race—that led to the calling of the Hague Conferences, but their only arms control outcome concerned qualitative limitations. One can trace influences of the Hague experience in this regard on both sides of the arms control movement after World War I and more faintly after World War II, though its descent is less clear than that of the prisoner-of-war conventions and other law of war rules. The inclination of scholars and policymakers to neglect the arms control efforts made between the two world wars has tended to obscure the indirect influence of the Hague Conferences.


Author(s):  
Stanislav Polnar

Since the end of World War II, the investigation of anti-state delinquency of military personnel was realised by the military intelligence. It originated with Czechoslovak military units in the USSR and were influenced by Soviet security authorities. After 1945 and 1948 these bodies remained in the structure of the Ministry of National Defense, but from the beginning of the 1951 they moved to the structure of the Ministry of the Interior following the Soviet model. The legal status of these bodies was always unclear and did not correspond to the legal regulation. Another important article in the investigation of the political delinquency of soldiers was the military prosecutor’s office as part of the socialist-type prosecutor’s office, which was subjected to general trends in the regulation of criminal proceedings.


Author(s):  
Joseph M. Siracusa

Did the nuclear revolution contribute to an era of peace? ‘Nuclear deterrence and arms control’ looks at the post-World War II stalemate and Cold War détente. The concept of deterrence did not come up until the second decade of the nuclear age. The introduction of thermonuclear weapons and nuclear-tipped, long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles turned foreign policy on its head. Mutual deterrence was less of a policy than a reality. With the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow mounted a show of defiance at a moment when it was relatively weak. The Carter and Reagan administrations were beset by external and internal disagreements, but prudence and luck prevailed.


Worldview ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 5-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
John E. Becker

Modern physicists have penetrated far beyond vision into an ultimate pantheon of mesons and muons and other demiurges of matter. We have managed to turn their poetic penetration into the physical threats of Three Mile Island and a nuclear arms race. American statesmen after World War II, with uncommon and far-reaching vision, set about restoring a devastated world. The world they produced, a world of free, interdependent, and disputatious nations, seems to many Americans and myopic political leaders a source of embarrassment rather than the fruit of our own farsighted statesmanship.


Author(s):  
Richard Griffiths

In 1950, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries started talks that would culminate in a treaty for a European Defence Community (EDC), a treaty that was signed but never ratified. The initiative for a common European army was the French response to the American demand for a rearmed Germany. Against the background of the North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950 and the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional ground forces on the European continent, US President Truman wanted to see the major increase in US defense capacity in Europe compensated by an equivalent effort in Europe, including a rearmament of Germany. For France, such rearmament, only five years after the end of World War II, was politically unacceptable. With the support of Jean Monnet, Prime Minister René Pléven proposed a scheme for a European army operating within the framework of a single political and military authority. The plan included a European defense minister, appointed by national governments and responsible to a Council of Ministers and a European Assembly. While each state would retain national defense and command structures, there would be no German defense ministry or army. The German troops would be recruited directly into the European army. The Treaty creating a European Defence Community was signed in Paris on May 27, 1952, by all six negotiation parties (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and Germany), but was not ratified by France, the initiator of the initiative. On August 30, 1954, the French Assembly decided not to put the EDC treaty to a vote, meaning that it in effect rejected the proposal for a European army. The problem of German rearmament was ultimately addressed by admitting West Germany into the Western Union, which was renamed the Western European Union, and by welcoming it as a member of NATO.


2008 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Zwicker

This paper examines the role of safety within the Manhattan Project, the Allied effort to build an atomic bomb during World War II. As an integral component of the American national defense strategy, the atomic bomb project was afforded tremendous resources and incorporated the expertise of the country's top scientists, engineers, government officials, and military personnel. As a result, considerable Scientific and technological achievement was realized The Manhattan Project marked an important point in the ascendancy of science and technology throughout the twentieth century. However, the largely political and military goals of the project had consequences. Insufficient knowledge was gained regarding radiation hazards as a result of a preoccupation with speedy and secretive nuclear weapons development and the difficulty scientists had conducting health-related research. This paper argues that safety concerns were secondary to speed and secrecy in the search for the world's first atomic bomb.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Powell

At the end of World War II, Japan, as well as the rest of the world, was thrust into a new age of unbelievably destructive possibilities: the first use of nuclear weapons against human beings. Not only could such a bomb flatten an entire city, it could do so in only an instant. The poorly understood scars that were left showed a new level of war that the world needs to come to terms with. By considering the many medical effects of the atomic bomb on the victims of Hiroshima City, which encompasses the initial blast, radiation, and traumatic effects, we can gain a better understanding of the terrible costs of human health in nuclear war.


Author(s):  
Stephanie Trombley Averill

This chapter looks at how, in the former Axis powers of Japan and Germany, the United States occupation authorities initially pursued policies that treated democratization and demilitarization as virtually synonymous. They believed a democracy could not flourish in either Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany until the military traditions had been purged from their national character and consciousness. The former aggressors faced total disarmament. Initial plans—embodied most drastically by the Morgenthau Plan to turn Germany into a pastoral country—were severe and uncompromising. However, once the Soviet Union had successfully acquired the atomic bomb, the United States concluded that measured rearmament in both countries was essential for the defense of democracy and the free world.


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