Presidential Address: The Foundations of British Policy

1947 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 47-67
Author(s):  
R. W. Seton-Watson

I fear that my address to-day will inevitably disappoint expectations, for I have no state secrets to offer you, and in the time at my disposal I obviously cannot hope to cover so vast a field. A more modest, and therefore more correct, title would be ‘Some Aspects of Foreign Policy’, planned merely in outline, but capable of evoking and sustaining fuller discussion in parallel fields.

1947 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 167-186
Author(s):  
R. W. Seton-Watson

In my first Address from this chair I chose as my subject ‘The Foundations of British Policy’, in the belief that its study is more than ever incumbent upon ourselves and upon the succeeding generation, and that neglect and incomprehension are among the major causes of the most devastating war in all our history. And if it is an urgent duty, in the interests of future peace, to study and discuss the workings of our own policy, it follows that we must also clear our minds as to the underlying motives of other Powers, both friendly and hostile. The price that we have all had to pay for neglect of German history is even to-day not yet fully understood. But to the plain man Russian policy, with its many shifts of extreme violence, is even more mysterious. Thus the events which brought us together in 1941, in an alliance of twenty years for which there is no precedent, ought to be, nay are, the personal concern of every one of us. These events, the result of Hitler's supreme blunder in invading Russia, represent a rebound from unreasoning isolation and appeasement to a policy first of guarantees, then of increasingly effective intervention, and finally of unswerving ‘jusqu'au-bout-isme’. Are we to assume that that unconventional alliance was merely dictated by passing necessity and is in gradual dissolution, or alternately that it rests upon a solidarity of interests which far outbids ideological aims?


1995 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Simms

ABSTRACTThe essay aims to close a longstanding gap in the political historiography of later Georgian Britain by examining the ‘Hanoverian Crisis’ of 1806. Drawing on a broad range of British, Hanoverian and Prussian records, the essay demonstrates that the British–Prussian conflict of that year was caused not – as conventionally assumed – by the closure of the North Sea ports to British shipping, but by the Prussian occupation of George III's electoral land of Hanover. The essay then shows how the commitment of the British government to its restitution was largely motivated by the desire of Charles James Fox and the incoming Ministry of All the Talents to build bridges to the crown. This stance was in complete contradiction both to the broad thrust of the new ‘maritime’ foreign policy of the Talents and to Fox's previous policy in matters Hanoverian. Subsequently the implications of this for our understanding of Fox's political biography are assessed. Finally, the essay illuminates the existence of a coherent ‘Hanoverian Faction’ in London headed by Count Münster which together with a highly activist George III was often able to tip the balance in the formulation of British policy.


1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gill Bennett

The nature of British interests in the Far East in the 1930s meant that both the Treasury and the Board of Trade were necessarily closely involved with the making of foreign policy. While Foreign Office officials resented this intrusion into their domain, they were themselves disdainful of so-called ‘technical’ considerations connected with tariffs or currency reform, and were willing to leave them to the specialists. Under the dynamic impetus of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, and the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher, the Treasury, encouraged by the apparent abnegation of the Foreign Office, made a bold and aggressive foray between 1933 and 1936 into realms of foreign policy-making hitherto regarded as the exclusive sphere of the professional diplomat.


Author(s):  
А.А. Синдеев

Актуальность статьи определяется востребованностью на нынешнем этапе осмысления опыта современной России исследований, посвященных процессам, явлениям, принципам и подходам, сопровождавшим формирование ее внешней политики. При этом речь идет как об универсальном, так и об индивидуальном (личностном) уровнях. Об актуальности выбранной темы свидетельствуют совпавшие в 2020 году два юбилея — Организации Объединенных Наций, ее Совета Безопасности и юбилей министра иностранных дел России Сергея Викторовича Лаврова. С учетом последнего факта данная статья не носит свойственного юбилейным статьям характера. Ее цель состоит в том, чтобы проанализировать, какие принципы и подходы в конце ХХ — начале XXI века были положены в основу российской внешней политики. Для реализации заявленной цели автор использовал открытые источники — послания Президента РФ В. В. Путина Федеральному собранию с 2000 по 2004 год, а также все протоколы заседаний Совета Безопасности ООН за вышеуказанный хронологический период, и выделил для статьи те из них, которые касались борьбы с терроризмом, поскольку эта проблематика была востребована в 2000–2004 годах и предоставляла хорошие шансы для объединения усилий различных партнеров. Данные материалы потребовали применения системного подхода, историко-генетического, историко-типологического и сравнительно-исторического методов. Результатами проведенного исследования стали систематизация официальных внешнеполитических установок, анализ принципов и подходов, использованных С. В. Лавровым на посту постоянного представителя России в Совбезе ООН. Полученные результаты необходимо воспринимать как предварительные. Работа над проблемой должна быть продолжена. The relevance of the article is accounted for by the necessity to analyze and reassess research works devoted to the processes, phenomena, principles and strategies that have shaped the foreign policy of modern Russia. The article treats the issue on both universal and individual (personal) levels. The relevance of the issue is accounted for by two anniversaries we celebrate in 2020, namely the 20th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council and the 70th birth anniversary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov. It should be noted, however, that the tone of the article is not celebratory. It is aimed at the analysis of principles and strategies of the foreign policy adopted by the Russian Federation in the late 20th — early 21stcenturies. To achieve the aim of the research, the author of the article analyzes open sources, such as Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation given by the Russian president Vladimir Putin in 2000–2004, and all the minutes of meetings of the United Nations Security Council in 2000–2004. The author focuses attention on speeches devoted to the struggle against terrorism, for the issue was highly relevant in 2000–2004 and demanded that partners should coordinate their efforts to combat common challenges. To analyze the abovementioned data, the author of the article employed systemic approach, history and genetic approach, historical-typological approach, comparative-historical approach. The research enabled the author to systematize official guidelines of Russian foreign policy and to analyze the principles and strategies used by S. V. Lavrov as permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Security Council. It should be noted that the findings of the research are preliminary and require further analysis.


1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zara Steiner

Sir Edward Grey entered the Foreign Office at a time when it was being rapidly transformed. A change in the registration system had freed the junior officials from most routine operations and encouraged the senior men to take a more active part in the actual formation of foreign policy. At the same time, a new group of men took over the most important departmental positions and entered the chief European embassies. For the most part, these men were far more conscious of German power than their predecessors and set the tone of British policy during the first years of Grey's Foreign Secretaryship. Charles Hardinge, Louis Mallet, William Tyrrell and Eyre Crowe in London, Francis Bertie, ambassador in Paris, Arthur Nicolson in St Petersburg and, after 1907, Goschen in Berlin were all to play important roles in shaping the new course.


1935 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Lillian M. Penson

“Ce clergyman laïque, obstiné et maladroit”, so Bismarck spoke of Salisbury to the French Ambassador in 1879, contrasting him with Beaconsfield, whom he thought a man of broader outlook; and we have Salisbury's testimony to Bismarck's “extraordinary penetration”. Yet, among the many difficulties that hamper an attempt to analyse the policy of Salisbury, perhaps the greatest is that there are few subjects on which he was consistent. He made almost a principle of inconsistency. “This country”, he said, “which is popularly governed, and cannot therefore be counted on to act on any uniform or consistent system of policy….” This was in April 1878 at the beginning of his first term at the Foreign Office. As so often happens circumstances strengthened his belief. His early tenures of the Foreign Secretaryship were short, and divided by a Liberal administration whose actions materially affected British policy. The whole period was crowded by movements abroad and at home which compelled adjustments of ideas. Twice, at any rate, he had not a free hand, in 1878–80 and again in 1886, for in the first case he had to reckon with Disraeli and in the other with a divided Cabinet.


1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Smith

Irving Janis's work on groupthink has attracted considerable attention from those who seek to explain foreign-policy decision making. The basic argument – that excessiveesprit de corpsand amiability restrict the critical faculties of small decision-making groups, thereby leading to foreign-policy fiascos – is both an appealing and a stimulating one. In addition, it is also an argument that is capable of being tested against empirical evidence. Thus, Frank Heller has suggested that groupthink may be very useful in explaining British policy during the Falklands Crisis. The purpose of this note is to indicate the utility of the notion of groupthink in explaining one recent foreign-policy fiasco, the attempt by the United States to rescue its hostages in Tehran.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 707-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL-JOSEPH MACARTHUR-SEAL

ABSTRACTThe article seeks to establish the significance of intercepted Greek diplomatic messages as both historical source and catalyst in Britain's Near Eastern policy in the crucial years of 1920–2. Specifically, the intercepts reveal how members of the British government, foremost among them the prime minister, covertly supported Greek expansion in Asia Minor even after declaring neutrality in the conflict. Such evidence confirms rumours that were dismissed as fallacious by those implicated and by their defenders in later historiography. Aside from their value as historical sources, the intercepts had an immediate and significant impact which has also been neglected. Intelligence regarding a distant conflict became central to a war at the heart of Westminster and helped mobilize a cross-party, transnational coalition against Lloyd George's foreign policy in the region. Although Lloyd George's opponents, incited by intelligence revelations, eventually succeeded in transforming British policy, this reverse did little to reduce the scale of the resultant catastrophe.


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