Justice, Impartiality, and Reciprocity a Response to Edwin Hartman

1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia H. Werhane

Readers of Business Ethics Quarterly will be grateful to Professor Hartman for this very fine paper. He has, at last, advanced the dialogue on organizations. Instead of the usual attack on Peter French, et al., Hartman has introduced the notion of the commons as a heuristic device to get at the moral dimension (or lack thereof) or organizations. And unlike much of what goes on in business ethics, he has avoided the usual utilitarian/deontology/Rawlsian approaches. Instead he has depended on work of Frankfurt and Aristotle to introduce the notions of second-order desires, virtue, and community, all of which, at the very least, enriches the notion of an organization and the scope of its moral point of view.I cannot respond to all the arguments in the paper, and I found myself surprisingly in agreement with much of it. However, agreement is not one of the virtues of a commentator. So I shall comment on two points: first on what I shall label Hartman’s communitarian approach, and second, on the notions of exit, voice, and loyalty.In response to what is sometimes called “individualism” in ethics which, Hartman alleges, takes “time-honored moral principles as foundational and try[s] to figure out what communal or organizational arrangements best encourage people to treat one another according to them,” Hartman argues that a more propitious approach in organizational ethics is to “try to say something about what a good community looks like, and then see how a good community requires people to treat each other.” It turns out that a good community is, minimally, one in which “the commons is preserved, and [where] there is enough consensus that people are able to have extended conversations about morality from which moral progress may emerge.”

Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

This chapter identifies a number of developments that are candidates for moral progress: abolition of the Atlantic chattel slavery, improvements in civil rights for minorities, equal rights for women, better treatment of (some) non-human animals, and abolition of the cruellest punishments in most parts of the world. This bottom-up approach is then used to construct a typology of moral progress, including improvements in moral reasoning, recognition of the moral standing or equal basic moral status of beings formerly thought to lack them, improvements in understandings of the domain of justice, the recognition that some behaviors formerly thought to be morally impermissible (such as premarital sex, masturbation, lending money at interest, and refusal to die “for king and country”) can be morally permissible, and improvements in understandings of morality itself. Finally, a distinction is made between improvements from a moral point of view and moral progress in the fullest sense.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-57
Author(s):  
Karen Green ◽  

Can Catharine Macaulay’s enlightenment democratic republicanism be justified from the point of view of contemporary naturalism? Naturalist accounts of political authority tend to be realist and pessimistic, foreclosing the possibility of enlightenment. Macaulay’s utopian political philosophy relies on belief in a good God, whose existence underpins the possibility of moral and political progress. This paper attempts a restoration of her optimistic utopianism in a reconciliation, grounded in a revision of natural law, of naturalist and utopian attitudes to political theory. It is proposed that the coevolution of language, moral law, and conscience (the disposition to judge one’s own actions in the light of moral principles) can be explained as solutions to the kinds of tragedy of the commons situations facing our ancestors. Moral dispositions evolved, but, in the light of its function, law is subject to rational critique. Liberal democracy plausibly offers the best prospect for developing rationally justifiable law.


Author(s):  
Daniel Statman

The recent development of unmanned technology—drones and robots of various types—is transforming the nature of warfare. Instead of fighting against other human beings, combatants will soon be fighting against machines. At present, these machines are operated by human beings, but they are becoming increasingly autonomous. Some people believe that, from a moral point of view, this development is worrisome, especially insofar as fully autonomous offensive systems (‘killer robots’) are concerned. I claim that the arguments that support this belief are pretty weak. Compared with the grand battles of the past, with their shockingly high toll of casualties, drone-centered campaigns seem much more humane. They also enable a better fit between moral responsibility and vulnerability to defensive action. Drones and robots may well be recorded in the annals of warfare as offering real promise for moral progress.


1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin M. Hartman

Abstract:A complex organization is in effect a commons, which supervisory techniques cannot preserve from free riding. A corporate culture strong enough to create the requisite community-minded second-order desires and beliefs may be morally illegitimate. What morality requires is not local enforcement of foundational moral principles—a futile undertaking—but that the organization be a good community in that it permits the disaffected to exit, encourages reflective consideration of morality and the good life, and creates appropriate loyalty.


Author(s):  
Edward James

The clash of cultures, between societies and within societies, with both negative and positive results, is an underlying theme in much of what Bujold has written. This chapter examines this theme primarily as it appears in Bujold's science fiction. It shows that one of the main purposes of the theme of culture clash in Bujold's works is to cast light upon the societies of her readers: satire, in its original and broadest sense, is thus one of Bujold's concerns. Satire invariably has an ethical or moral dimension (the humorous dimension is often there in Bujold, but critics have not seen humor as an indispensible element of satire); and the moral world that Bujold builds is a significant part of her achievement. In most, but not in all, cases, Bujold lets us know clearly whose moral point of view we are supposed to support.


Philosophy ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 48 (186) ◽  
pp. 319-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
William K. Frankena

In Morality and Art Mrs Foot characterizes the formalist position about morality as holding ‘that a man can choose for himself, so long as he meets the formal requirements of generality and consistency, what his ultimate moral principles are to be’, and says, quite rightly in my opinion, that it is indefensible, ‘implying as it does that we might recognize as a moral system some entirely pointless set of prohibitions or taboos, or activities such as clapping one's hands, not even thought as harmful, aggressive, treacherous, cowardly by the community in which the prohibitions exist’. Then she adds:A moral system seems necessarily to be one aimed at removing particular dangers and securing certain benefits, and it would follow that some things do and some do not count as objections to a line of conduct from a moral point of view.


Author(s):  
Angela Dranishnikova

In the article, the author reflects the existing problems of the fight against corruption in the Russian Federation. He focuses on the opacity of the work of state bodies, leading to an increase in bribery and corruption. The topic we have chosen is socially exciting in our days, since its significance is growing on a large scale at all levels of the investigated aspect of our modern life. Democratic institutions are being jeopardized, the difference in the position of social strata of society in society’s access to material goods is growing, and the state of society is suffering from the moral point of view, citizens are losing confidence in the government, and in the top officials of the state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Yong Huang

AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Floris Bernard ◽  
Kristoffel Demoen

This chapter gives an overview of how Byzantines conceptualized “poetry.” It argues that from the Byzantine point of view, poetry only differs from prose in a very formal way, namely that it is written in verse. Both prose and poetry belonged to the category of logoi, the only label that was very frequently used, in contrast to the term “poetry,” which was reserved for the ancient poetry studied at schools. Many authors considered (and exploited) the difference between their own prose texts and poems as a primarily formal one. Nevertheless, poetry did have some functions that set it apart from prose, even if these features are for us less expected. The quality of “bound speech” gained a spiritual dimension, since verse was seen as a restrained form of discourse, also from a moral point of view. Finally, the chapter gives a brief overview of the social contexts for which (learned) poetry was the medium of choice: as an inscription, as paratext in a wide sense, as a piece of personal introspection, as invective, as summaries (often of a didactic nature), and as highly public ceremonial pieces.


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