Restoring Catharine Macaulay’s Enlightenment Republicanism?

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-57
Author(s):  
Karen Green ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Commons

Can Catharine Macaulay’s enlightenment democratic republicanism be justified from the point of view of contemporary naturalism? Naturalist accounts of political authority tend to be realist and pessimistic, foreclosing the possibility of enlightenment. Macaulay’s utopian political philosophy relies on belief in a good God, whose existence underpins the possibility of moral and political progress. This paper attempts a restoration of her optimistic utopianism in a reconciliation, grounded in a revision of natural law, of naturalist and utopian attitudes to political theory. It is proposed that the coevolution of language, moral law, and conscience (the disposition to judge one’s own actions in the light of moral principles) can be explained as solutions to the kinds of tragedy of the commons situations facing our ancestors. Moral dispositions evolved, but, in the light of its function, law is subject to rational critique. Liberal democracy plausibly offers the best prospect for developing rationally justifiable law.

Justice as a Personal Virtue and Justice as an Institutional Virtue: Mencius’s Confucian Virtue Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Yong Huang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Affirmative Answer ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Social Policies ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Government

AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

Oppenheim's Defense of Noncognitivism

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105-1114
Author(s):  
Donald VanDeVeer
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Logical Status ◽  
Attractive Candidate ◽  
History Of ◽  
Positive Support

In his recent book, Moral Principles in Political Philosophy, Felix Oppenheim provides a useful examination of the assumptions of well known figures in the history of political philosophy concerning the logical status of moral principles. Classifying them as cognitivists (if they view fundamental moral principles as either true or false) or noncognitivists (if they view moral principles as neither true nor false), Oppenheim attempts to exhibit the inadequacy of the cognitivist point of view and, importantly, the adequacy of the noncognitivist position. My critique aims at demonstrating the inconclusiveness of Oppenheim’s arguments against cognitivism. Oppenheim presupposes the availability of a plausible and workable criterion for determining when a sentence counts as a statement (statements are for Oppenheim entities which are true or false and, thus, “cognitively meaningful”), but he fails to provide any attractive candidate for that position. Further critical discussion revolves around the following related questions: Is there adequate positive support for the noncognitivist view? Does it allow for the rationality of fundamental moral commitments? And can Oppenheim really justify his case that, far from being irrational or pernicious, noncognitivism is naturally associated with certain humanistic ideals, such as toleration of those of differing moral and political viewpoint?

Locke, toleration and natural law: A reassessment

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-121
Author(s):  
John William Tate
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theological Interpretation ◽  
Governing Principle

There is an increasingly prevalent view among some contemporary Locke scholars that Locke's political philosophy is thoroughly subordinate to theological imperatives, centered on natural law. This article challenges this point of view by critically evaluating this interpretation of Locke as advanced by some of its leading proponents. This interpretation perceives natural law as the governing principle of Locke's political philosophy, and the primary source of transition and reconciliation within it. This article advances a very different reading of Locke's political philosophy, perceiving within it competing imperatives that cannot be subsumed by natural law, and are, in some respects, at odds with it. In this way, the article shows how the “theological” interpretation of Locke's political philosophy, centred on natural law, fails to account for some of that philosophy's fundamental features, and is unable to explain some of its key outcomes, with the result that this interpretation falls short of its critical ambitions.

Deliberation and Deconstruction: Two Views on the Space of a Post-National Democracy

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 763-790 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Morris
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Jacques Derrida ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Space ◽  
Political Sphere ◽  
Democratic Experience ◽  
Promising Development ◽  
Theory Of Democracy

Theorists of deliberation and deconstruction each claim commitments to a more open and legitimate democracy than existing liberal democracy. Eschewing traditional foundations such as natural law, historical inheritance, or the constitutive formation of the nation, they seek to develop a theory of democracy that is more inclusive in conditions of social diversity and complexity. This article investigates the meaning of the open political space that fosters the democratic experience under such conditions. First, a sociologically informed political theory, such as Jürgen Habermas' powerful if flawed attempt, is required to conceive participation in the democratic political sphere. Drawing on Jacques Derrida and others, the author then argues that deconstructive insights that introduce an openness to the non-identical contribute to a more complete democratic theory, offering a crucial mode of democratic inclusion of the other and an acknowledgment of difference that might assist in reforming current institutions. Thus a blend of Habermasian orientation toward deliberation and deconstruction's ethical sensibilities presents a promising development of democratic possibilities.

scholarly journals The Genesis of the Idea and Value of Political Peace in Early Modern Political Philosophy

2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-59
Author(s):  
Raul Raunić
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
William Of Ockham ◽  
Political Realism ◽  
Early Modernity ◽  
The Third ◽  
Marsilius Of Padua ◽  
The Many

The main intention of this paper is to reconstruct the conceptual and historical‎ genesis of the idea and value of political peace from the point of view of ‎political philosophy at the intersection between late scholasticism and early modernity. The paper consists of three related parts. The first part highlights‎ methodological and contextual reasons why the idea of political peace has ‎been overshadowed throughout history by dominant discourses on war. The ‎second part deals with conceptual clarifications. The nature of war is distinguished ‎from other types of conflict and three interpretative approaches to‎ war are analyzed: political realism, fundamentalist-moralistic view of the holy‎ war, and the many theories of natural law that give rise to conceptions of just‎ war, but also the first abolitionist perspective or idea of ending all wars. Early‎ theoretical articulations of the notion of peace indicated modern-day emancipation‎ of politics from the tutelage of metaphysics and classical ethics, thus‎ separating the value of political peace from its original oneness with cosmic ‎and psychological peace. The third part of the paper highlights key moments ‎in the historical genesis of the value of political peace in the works of Aurelius ‎Augustine, Marsilius of Padua, and William of Ockham.‎

scholarly journals ¿Es éticamente aceptable la propiedad intelectual de los derechos de autor?

2021 ◽  
pp. 91-130
Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The Commons ◽  
The One

We intend to analyze the plausibility of the two kind of ethical justi-fications that are most commonly used in order to defend the concept of an «intellectual property» of copyrights. Firstly, we will examine justifications of property based on natural law, like the one originally provided by John Locke. We will argue, with the help of authors like Lysander Spooner, that the same arguments that Locke uses for property in general are entirely appli-cable to intellectual property, although this is certainly a peculiar kind of property. Secondly, we will examine whether or not we can apply to inte-llectual property the same two arguments that Utilitarian authors use for justifying property in general: the «tragedy of the commons» argument and the scarcity argument. We will claim that the first one is fully pertinent here, and that the second one is not: but this is a problem of that kind of justifi-cation of property in general, and not a problem of intellectual property as such. Key words: Intellectual property, copyright, Ethics, John Locke, Lysander Spoo-ner, Benjamin Tucker, plagiarism, Utilitarianism, iusnaturalism, natural law, commons, scarcity. Código JEL: Z0. Resumen: Se trata aquí de examinar cuán razonables resultan los dos tipos más frecuentes de justificaciones éticas que se suelen dar para abogar a favor de la existencia de una propiedad intelectual de los derechos de autor. En primer lugar, analizaremos las justificaciones de corte iusnaturalista, re-montables a John Locke. Defenderemos, con ayuda de autores como Lysan-der Spooner, que, aun cuando la propiedad intelectual es un tipo de propie-dad en cierto sentido distinto a aquella en la que Locke seguramente estaba pensando, aun así son plenamente pertinentes para ella los mismos argu-mentos que Locke ya adujo para las propiedad «material». En segundo lugar, consideraremos la aplicabilidad al caso de la propiedad intelectual de los dos argumentos utilitaristas que se suelen usar con miras a justificar la propiedad privada en general: el argumento de la «tragedia» de los bie-nes comunales y el de la escasez de recursos. Argüiremos que el primer tipo de argumento es plenamente aplicable al caso de la propiedad de dere-chos de autor; y que, aunque el segundo ciertamente no lo es, en todo caso ello no representa seguramente un problema para la propiedad intelectual, sino para la capacidad de ese argumento a la hora de dar cumplida cuen-ta de todos los tipos de propiedades existentes. Palabras clave: Propiedad intelectual, derechos de autor, ética, John Locke, Lysander Spooner, Benjamin Tucker, plagio, utilitarismo, iusnaturalismo, dere-cho natural, bienes comunales, escasez.

Justice, Impartiality, and Reciprocity a Response to Edwin Hartman

1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia H. Werhane
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Organizational Ethics ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Moral Dimension ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Heuristic Device

Readers of Business Ethics Quarterly will be grateful to Professor Hartman for this very fine paper. He has, at last, advanced the dialogue on organizations. Instead of the usual attack on Peter French, et al., Hartman has introduced the notion of the commons as a heuristic device to get at the moral dimension (or lack thereof) or organizations. And unlike much of what goes on in business ethics, he has avoided the usual utilitarian/deontology/Rawlsian approaches. Instead he has depended on work of Frankfurt and Aristotle to introduce the notions of second-order desires, virtue, and community, all of which, at the very least, enriches the notion of an organization and the scope of its moral point of view.I cannot respond to all the arguments in the paper, and I found myself surprisingly in agreement with much of it. However, agreement is not one of the virtues of a commentator. So I shall comment on two points: first on what I shall label Hartman’s communitarian approach, and second, on the notions of exit, voice, and loyalty.In response to what is sometimes called “individualism” in ethics which, Hartman alleges, takes “time-honored moral principles as foundational and try[s] to figure out what communal or organizational arrangements best encourage people to treat one another according to them,” Hartman argues that a more propitious approach in organizational ethics is to “try to say something about what a good community looks like, and then see how a good community requires people to treat each other.” It turns out that a good community is, minimally, one in which “the commons is preserved, and [where] there is enough consensus that people are able to have extended conversations about morality from which moral progress may emerge.”

scholarly journals STREET VENDORS EXTERNALITIES

AdBispreneur ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sutarjo
Keyword(s):  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Open Space ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Street Vendors ◽  
Economic Point ◽  
The Commons ◽  
The Government

There are externalities as a result of street vendors economic activities. The externalities may be negatives and may be positives.The method used to collect data through literature and the data collected is secondary data from reports and research publication. Negative externalities caused by the street vendors are accessibility of public spaces, garbage, open space inharmony, dirty and untidy, traffic congestion, pedestrian interference and the possibility of diseases due to lack of sanitation. Tragedy of the commons happened due to excessive uses of public facilities resulting in reduced or loss of its function. The Positive externalities are generate jobs, as a distributor, security, bring the servicecloser to the customers and means of recreation. In the newinstitutional economic point of view, the government needs to intervene as a governing body to avoid the tragedy of the commons over excessive use of public resources in the form of an open area which supposed to be able to be utilised by the society.

The Tragedy of the Commons and Leviathan

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 65-82
Author(s):  
Sofia Guedes Vaz ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Environmental Public Policy

The type of authority needed for a good environmental public policy is discussed. We looked at some authors who saw in Leviathan, a type of authority possibly compatible with a model for environmental policy and to some others who refuted it. The need for a Leviathan, what type of Leviathan and could Hobbes’s arguments be used in environmental policy is then discussed. The tragedy of the commons, a rich metaphor for environmental policy is used as the main drive. This small essay will, even though very modestly, contribute for an almost absent environmental political philosophy, where traditional concepts such as authority, sovereignty or state are being challenged and need discussion.

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