Poetry, Prose, and Rhythm

PMLA ◽  
1922 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-310
Author(s):  
C. M. Lotspeich

The following study represents an attempt to determine the fundamental difference between poetry and prose and the relation of simple rhythm, or metre, to poetry. The reader should bear in mind that in all branches of science and art distinctions and classifications hold good, as a rule, only in a broad and general way; there are always border-line phenomena that defy classification. For example, we make a general distinction between animal and plant life, and yet of some of the lower forms of life it is difficult to say whether they belong in the one class or in the other. Or again, it is no uncommon thing to hear chemists and physicists dispute regarding the provinces of their respective sciences. And again, rhythm and melody seem to us to be very different things, and yet at bottom they are both rhythm, because differences in pitch depend upon differences in frequency of vibration, and in any melody these vibration frequencies stand in a rhythmical relation to each other. The farther we penetrate into any subject, the more difficult does exact classification become. And so our distinction between poetry and prose must be taken in a rather broad and general way. There are pieces of prose which seem to be highly poetic in nature, and there are poems in which the writer seems to have encroached upon the province of prose. Be this as it may, I believe we can at least say that in this direction lies the field of poetry, in that the field of prose. With this general reservation, then, let us ask the question: What is the essential difference between poetry and prose?

1956 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 761-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. J. Haddow

The biting-habits of mosquitos in the genus Eretmapodites Theobald, as shown by 24-hour catches, display a certain uniformity in that all the species studied are essentially diurnal and bite very close to the ground, in shade. They do not enter dwellings.When, however, two localities are compared (the Entebbe area and Bwamba County) it is found that there is a fundamental difference in behaviour. At Entebbe there is an exceedingly well-marked wave of activity before sunset. This does not occur in Bwamba, where the cycle shows no pronounced characteristics apart from its generally diurnal nature. It is shown that this difference arises from the fact that in Bwamba the first hour of biting-activity tends to be the most intense (no matter when it occurs) whereas in Entebbe the hour before sunset is almost always preferred.One group (the E. chrysogaster group) is present in both localities. In Entebbe it shows an activity curve of the one type, and in Bwamba a curve of the other type.It is concluded that some environmental influence must be involved. At the moment, however, no suggestion can be made concerning the nature of this influence, beyond the fact that the activity-patterns concerned are not easily explained in terms of microclimate.


Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Miles

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).


1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 480-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Gose

There is a strange and unacknowledged paradox in the historiography of the Incas. On the one hand, few would deny that theirs was a typically theocratic archaic state, a divine kingship in which the Inca was thought to.be the son of the Sun. On the other hand, the standard descriptions of Inca political structure barely mention religion and seem to assume a formal separation between state and cult.1I believe that these secularizing accounts are misguided and will show in this essay that the political structure of the pre-Columbian Andes took form primarily around a system of sacred ancestral relics and origin points known generically ashuacas. Each huaca defined a level of political organization that might nest into units of a higher order or subdivide into smaller groupings. Collectively they formed a segmentary hierarchy that transcended the boundaries of local ethnic polities and provided the basis for empires like that of the Incas. However, these huacas were also the focus of local kinship relations and agrarian fertility rituals. The political structure that they articulated therefore had a built-in concern for the metaphysical reproduction of human, animal, and plant life. Political power in the pre-Columbian Andes was particularly bound up with attempts to control the flow of water across the frontier of life and death, resulting in no clear distinction between ritual and administration.


2021 ◽  
pp. 61-69
Author(s):  
SERGEY V. BEREZNITSKY ◽  

The aim of the research is to search for the regularities of the mechanism of functioning of the mentality of the Tungus-Manchus and Paleoasiatics of the Amur-Sakhalin region in relation to their complexes of cults, beliefs, rituals, and life-supporting technologies. The Tungus-Manchu and Paleoasiatics mentality is understood as a way of thinking based on specific worldview archetypes, knowledge, life-supporting technologies, a complex of dominant needs, beliefs, cults, traditions, and values. The system of life activity is considered as a complex of historically formed and constantly evolving cultural, ideological, economic and household components that allow an ethnic group to be preserved and reproduced in a specific geoanthropogenic landscape, creatively develop and improve its basic ethno-cultural features as global values. According to the author, the interaction of the mentality and the system of life activity is a bi-directional process: on the one hand, the mentality determines the ways and forms of life activity, on the other - the elements of culture that form the basis of life activity, make up the patterns, patterns, models and results of thinking that characterize the features of the ethno-cultural mentality of the ethnic community...


Author(s):  
Strachan Donnelley

A struggle that began in the seventeenth century is still being waged today. It pits a mechanistic, reductionistic worldview that sets human being apart from the rest of being and mind or cognition apart from the rest of natural reality, on the one side, against a worldview that aims at ontological monism and the relational being of humans and nature, on the other. This chapter presents the terms and aspects of this debate in a close discussion of Descartes and then considers the work of Spinoza and Whitehead against the background of Cartesian thought. Descartes severs an ontological connection between thought and material being, thereby making it impossible to talk about an interconnected web of being. Spinoza rejects this and views all forms of life and material being as finite manifestations of one unbounded active being, Nature (God).


Slavic Review ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-474
Author(s):  
Ray J. Parrott

It is customary in Soviet criticism of Mikhail Mikhailovich Prishvin (1873–1954) to speak of the unique blend of fact and fantasy, of science and art in his work. In fact, this view is not restricted to Soviet discussions of the writer’s art. It is a reasonable view, if cautiously considered as no more than a convenient generality. Something of the same generalizing nature operates in discussions of the literary forms which Prishvin most often employed in his narrative art: the ocherk, the rasskaz, and, less frequently, the povestf. Scholars and critics speak of the writer’s inimitable mastery of these forms, but rarely in definitive terms. Briefly summarized, Prishvin’s preferred forms are the halfsketch and half-tale, or the novelette-sketch; his pieces represent an amalgam of fact and fiction. They are, above all, lyrical and poetic, but they are also “scientific.” They are the one and the other, but their specificity seems almost too elusive to capture and define.


Semiotica ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (219) ◽  
pp. 219-237
Author(s):  
Pierluigi Basso Fossali

AbstractGreimas’s intellectual trajectory can be seen as an intellectual journey full of challenges that left behind living remnants of a courage and an “energetism” of thinking which prohibits, even today, the construction of a dogmatism based solely on a single synchronic image of his semiotics. We can identify Greimas with his beloved topic, “the Fearless hero”: on the one hand, he extended the quest of a Sender, in keeping with the expectations of a deep narrative schema, while on the other hand, he structured his life around the permanence of a passion. Should we attribute this search to a “meta-will,” or to an endless implication in figurativity? “With passion, figurativity reigns,” Ricoeur told his friend Greimas, who worked on the origins of the modalities, with the predicament of raising the issue of an unanalysable ontic horizon. How can we explain the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the Greimassian challenge to deal with being, even speculatively, and, on the other, the search for an endless passion anchored in perception and its re-elaboration? Against the certainty of deep narrative logic is opposed the surface where forms of life coexist, where we find “the fidgeting, the uncertainty we are in.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-450
Author(s):  
Sara Heinämaa

AbstractIn his late reflections on values and forms of life from the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl develops the concept of personal value and argues that these values open two kinds of infinities in our lives. On the one hand personal values disclose infinite emotive depths in human individuals while on the other hand they connect human individuals in continuous and progressive chains of care. In order to get at the core of the concept, I will explicate Husserl’s discussion of personal values of love by distinguishing between five related features. I demonstrate that values of love (1) are rooted in egoic depts and define who we are as persons, (2) differ from objective values in being absolute and non-comparative, (3) ground vocational lives as organizing principles, (4) are endlessly self-disclosing and self-intensifying, and (5) establish transitive relations of care between human beings. On the basis of my five-partite distinction, I argue that Husserl’s concepts of love and value of love reveal the dynamic character of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Kholid Al-Walid

<p><em>Ibn Sînâ is known as a rational philosopher who is often confronted with theologians who consider his views contrary to the principles of religion (<em>na<em><span lang="IN">ṣ<em><span lang="IN">ṣ</span></em></span></em></em></em><em>). This paper reveals that Mashâiyyah philosophy built by Ibn Sînâ still relies on Islam and even make the verses of the Qur'an as a construct of ideas. In this paper, the author also tries to reveal epistemological ta’wîl employed by Ibn Sînâ in interpreting verse 35 of surat al-Nûr, which is generally understood sufistically, but in his view it might be understood differently. This proves that Ibn Sînâ hold on to <em>na<em><span lang="IN">ṣ<em><span lang="IN">ṣ</span></em></span></em></em></em><em>. What distinguishes him with most theologians or sufis is the understanding of <em>na<em><span lang="IN">ṣ<em><span lang="IN">ṣ</span></em></span></em></em></em><em>. Although it is apparent that Ibn Sînâ's epistemological outlook seemed to justify the Unity of Subject-Object theory as later Mulla <em>Ṣ</em></em><em>adrâ was proposed, there was a fundamental difference between the two. The epistemological ta’wîl is a new reading of the philosophical style in Qur’anic exegesis on the one hand, which is different from the rationalization of tafsîr or the epistemology of tafsîr in the other one.</em></p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 13-28
Author(s):  
Adam Świeżyński

The article is devoted to the presentation of the position of Judah Loew (Maharal) on the relationship between the scientific and religious view of the world. In his opinion, scientific and theological explanations are disproportionate and are located at various epistemic levels. Consequently, there can be no conflict between them. Each of them refers to a different history of their course, describing them as historia divina and historia naturalis. Although Loew clearly did not reject the path of scientific cognition, he expressed doubts about the effectiveness of contemporary scientific research due to the variety of scientific views and the multiplicity of the proposed solutions. The knowledge of religious revelation, which is, in his opinion, always reliable and accurate, is completely different. The consequence of the described position is his recognition that scientific knowledge remains potentially available to all people equally, regardless of their religion. However, there is a fundamental difference between Jews and other nations in terms of their internal, spiritual “equipment,” resulting from the experience, status and religious tradition of the Jews. Maharal’s position on the relationship between the natural science and Jewish theology seems to be an expression of religious exclusivity on the one hand and thus becomes close to the contemporary trends of religious fundamentalism, and on the other, expresses a strict separation of scientific and religious explanation of reality.


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