From Delusion to Illumination: A Larger Structure for L'Allegro-Il Penseroso

PMLA ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Structure ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Thematic Units ◽  
The Mind

The virtues of L'Allegro are incorporated into II Penseroso, and both mirth and melancholy serve the progress of the soul. The activities of II Penseroso complement those of L'Allegro, but at each point they are nearer to the contemplation of God. The progress of the poems culminates in the final section of II Penseroso, which has no parallel in L'Allegro. This vertical structure encompasses image patterns that range from humor psychology to music, and from hermeticism to topology. These patterns are further organized into parallel thematic units. Chief among these are the education of a superior mind, the subordination of flesh to mind and of mind to spirit, the syncretic nature of Christian vision, and the progress of the mind and soul through the complementary disorders of black melancholy and vain deluding joy. The delights of L'Allegro are real and valued, but they cannot stand against the ecstasy of Christian contemplation.

scholarly journals Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong

Philosophy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Johann Glock
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Conceptual Thinking ◽  
The Mind

AbstractThe debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a ‘non-negotiable constraint’. At the same time they insist that by distinguishing between sign-types and – tokens the Fregean objection cannot just be circumvented but revealed to be fallacious. My paper rehabilitates the Fregean argument against subjectivism. The RTM response rests either on an equivocation of ‘concept’—between types which satisfy the non-negotiable constraint and tokens which are mental particulars in line with RTM doctrine—or on the untenable idea that one and the same entity can be both a shareable type and hence abstract and a concrete particular in the head. Furthermore, subjectivism cannot be rescued by adopting unorthodox metaphysical theories about the type/token and universal/particular contrasts. The final section argues that concepts are not representations or signs, but something represented by signs. Even if RTM is right to explain conceptual thinking by reference to the occurrence of mental representations, concepts themselves cannot be identical with such representations.

scholarly journals A Frequency Ratio Account of Temporal Atomism

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Carey R. Carlson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Frequency Ratio ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Relative Duration ◽  
Time Duration ◽  
Physical Universe ◽  
Temporal Succession ◽  
Energy Ratios ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Frequency Ratios

This article examines the time duration of individual occasions in the light of the discovery that temporal succession produces frequency ratios. The frequency ratios are used to define energy ratios and the quantum. The manifold and the common particles are constructed graphically using the arrows of time, with the mass-ratios of the particles derivable from the graphs. The formal reduction of physics to time compels us to adopt Whitehead's conception of the physical universe as occasions of experience engaged in temporal/causal succession. The relative duration of the constituent occasions of the particles are determined by their graphs. In the final section, a refined account of the mind-brain interaction sequence confirms the duration of a human occasion as one tenth of a second.

Towards International Relations beyond the mind

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-105
Author(s):  
Dirk Nabers
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Final Section ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Ontology ◽  
Large Segment ◽  
The Mind

The analysis focuses on the centrality of the mind and the mental, and their relationship with the notion of discourse in International Relations theorizing. While many forms of discourse theory are linked with anti-materialist idealism, the article develops an alternative argument, that is, that discourse theory should primarily be situated ‘beyond the mind’. The analysis starts with a discussion of prominent International Relations work on ideas and discourse and argues that that a large segment of International Relations work is insufficiently clear on these crucial notions. I therefore contend subsequently that this state of the art is reflected in how the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the mind have been treated in prominent International Relations work by following a particular version of Cartesian rationalism. It is on this basis that the article proposes to transcend the antinomies between mind and world as well as ideas and materiality by advancing a political ontology that stresses a particular concept of discourse in the final section. On that basis, it will become possible in the conclusion to summarize a path towards International Relations beyond the mind that engages in the study of the political more seriously.

Descartes', Sixth Meditation: The External World, ‘Nature’ and Human Experience

1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 73-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cottingham
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
External World ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
General Point ◽  
The Third ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Material Things ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

The Sixth Meditation deals, as its title proclaims, with ‘the existence of material things, and the real distinction between the mind and body of man’. In this paper, I want to start by examining Descartes' argument for the existence of material things—for the existence of an ‘external’, physical world around us. Next, in section two, I shall use this argument concerning the external world to bring out an important general point about the ‘dialectical’ way in which Descartes presents his reasoning in the Meditations. This will lead me on to the third section of the paper, which will analyse the concept of ‘nature’ and the role it plays in Descartes' reasoning, particularly in the Sixth Meditation. And this in turn will bring me to the fourth and final part of the paper, which will focus on what is by general consensus the most fascinating part of the Sixth Meditation—Descartes' account of the relation between mind and body. What I shall try to do in this final section is to highlight a curious tension between Descartes' recognition of the facts of human experience on the one hand, and on the other hand his doctrine that we are essentially incorporeal or non-physical substances.

Dewey, Whitehead, and Process Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
pp. 52-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Speculative Philosophy ◽  
Process Metaphysics ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Mind

This chapter is divided into three main sections: Dewey’s metaphysics, Whitehead’s metaphysics, and the connections between them. The Dewey section begins with a discussion of current perceptions among scholars of Dewey’s metaphysics, which runs the gamut from those who claim that he did not do metaphysics to those who think he did it well. Next there is a discussion of Dewey’s starting point, with an emphasis on “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism.” This seminal essay is crucial to understanding Dewey’s approach to philosophy in general. There is then a brief defense of Deweyan metaphysics, followed by a shortlisting of his generic traits of existence. The Whitehead section covers speculative philosophy, Whitehead’s categories, and his theory of prehensions. The final section discusses two of the many items that connect Dewey and Whitehead: their starting points and their take on the mind/body problem.

Descartes', Sixth Meditation: The External World, ‘Nature’ and Human Experience

1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 73-89
Author(s):  
John Cottingham
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
External World ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
General Point ◽  
The Third ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Material Things ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

The Sixth Meditation deals, as its title proclaims, with ‘the existence of material things, and the real distinction between the mind and body of man’. In this paper, I want to start by examining Descartes' argument for the existence of material things—for the existence of an ‘external’, physical world around us. Next, in section two, I shall use this argument concerning the external world to bring out an important general point about the ‘dialectical’ way in which Descartes presents his reasoning in the Meditations. This will lead me on to the third section of the paper, which will analyse the concept of ‘nature’ and the role it plays in Descartes' reasoning, particularly in the Sixth Meditation. And this in turn will bring me to the fourth and final part of the paper, which will focus on what is by general consensus the most fascinating part of the Sixth Meditation—Descartes' account of the relation between mind and body. What I shall try to do in this final section is to highlight a curious tension between Descartes' recognition of the facts of human experience on the one hand, and on the other hand his doctrine that we are essentially incorporeal or non-physical substances.

Trio A: Genealogy, Documentation, Notation

2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 12-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvonne Rainer
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Final Version ◽  
The Gaze ◽  
Individual Sequences ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Mind

I worked on Trio A alone for six months in 1965. The dance initially consisted of a five-minute sequence of movement that would eventually be presented as The Mind Is a Muscle, Part I at Judson Church (on January 10, 1966). There it was performed by me, David Gordon, and Steve Paxton simultaneously but not in unison. An interim version of an extended, but not complete, The Mind Is a Muscle (Judson Church, May 22, 1966) was performed by William Davis, David Gordon, and Steve Paxton. In the final section of this version, called “Lecture,” Peter Saul executed a balletic solo version—that is, with pirouettes and jumps. In the final version (Anderson Theater, April 11, 1968) Trio A was performed by me in tap shoes (without balletic furbelows) at the end of the evening while Paxton, Gordon, and Davis performed it as a trio at the beginning.The individual sequences last from four and a half to five minutes, depending on each performer's physical inclination. Two primary characteristics of the dance are its uninflected continuity and its imperative involving the gaze. The eyes are always averted from direct confrontation with the audience via independent movement of the head, closure of the eyes, or simple casting down of the gaze.

Contemplation as an alternative to curiosity: St Bonaventure on Ecclesiastes 1:3–11

2015 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-33
Author(s):  
Tyler Atkinson
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Human Perception ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Song Of Songs ◽  
Union With Christ ◽  
Human Labour ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Abstract Existence

AbstractThis article seeks to offer a christological interpretation of the opening poem in Ecclesiastes (1:3–11) through engagement with St Bonaventure's exegesis of the passage. It begins with a brief survey of contemporary treatments of the passage, which are characterised by an emphasis on cosmic monotony as an illustration of the futility of human labour. Then, it examines the Seraphic Doctor's version of the contemptus mundi interpretation of the book, relating it to his metaphysics of emanation, exemplarity and consummation. It will be suggested that Bonaventure's version of contemptus mundi informs an alternative interpretation to the critical status quo.In his exegesis of the opening poem, Bonaventure begins by describing three kinds of existence: existence in the eternal and unchanging Word, material existence in the cosmos, and abstract existence in the mind. While Bonaventure does not consider existence in the Word in relation to Ecclesiastes 1:3–11, because such existence is not subject to the vanity of mutability, the conclusion of the article will propose that such existence is in view in the text. When Bonaventure considers material existence, his metaphysics will not allow him to read the cosmological motion in Ecclesiastes 1:5–7 as monotonous, but rather as creaturely movement which invites contemplation. When he considers abstract existence, he contrasts the movement of heavenly and elemental creatures with the dissatisfaction of human perception, constrained by curiosity, the vice which characterises the protagonist's pursuits in Ecclesiastes 1:12–2:26. Thus, it will be suggested from Bonaventure's exegesis that the problem in Ecclesiastes 1:3–11 is not an oppressively monotonous universe which shows humans how pointless their own movement is, but rather humanity's failing to treat the cosmos as a book which speaks of God.In the article's final section, a relationship between the contemplative reading of Ecclesiastes 1:3–11 and Bonaventure's Itinerarium will be outlined. The consideration of material existence in Ecclesiastes 1:4–7 will be related to contemplation through vestiges. Then a contrast between the perceptual rupture of Ecclesiastes 1:8–11 and contemplation through the divine image in humanity will be shown. Finally, a christological reading of Ecclesiastes 1:10a will be offered, suggesting that this verse gestures towards the incarnate Word, who reforms the divine image in humanity and thus places humanity back on course towards similitude. It will be suggested in closing that, in signalling this hope, Ecclesiastes 1:10a prepares one for the union with Christ which Song of Songs depicts.

scholarly journals Om interesser og den symbolske magts relative autonomi

2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Bourdieu
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Symbolic Order ◽  
Symbolic Power ◽  
Major Question ◽  
Relative Autonomy ◽  
Strategic Design ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Mind

On Interests and the Relative Autonomy of Symbolic Power: A Rejoinder to Some Objections This article is a rejoinder to different attempts to apply the framework of Bourdieu’s theory. In order to clarify the many misconceptions of his work, he spells out once again his notions of “interest“ and “strategy“ as being an integral part of his theory of habitus. The relation between habitus and the field(s) and social po¬sitions that produced it is explained as a sort of ontological complicity, a complicity that manifests itself in what is called the sense of the game, an in¬tentionality without intention, which functions as the principle of strategies devoid of strategic design. A major question of this article is various mis¬un¬derstandings concerning Bourdieu’s theory on the relative autonomy of symbolic power. To condense his argument: when he writes “knowledge“, his critics read connaissance connaissante, scholarly knowledge, conscious knowledge; the specific mode of thought of the scientist, is projected into the mind of the observed agents. This is what Bourdieu calls the scholastic fallacy: encouraged by the situation of scholé, the practical bracketing of the necessities of practice. Another reason for his critics misunderstanding Distinction is that they read the empirical analyses in a realist and substantialist way and thereby reduces, what Bourdieu un¬derstands as “the specific logic and autonomy of the symbolic order“, to a mere reflection of the social order. In the final section of the article he comments on the problem of social classes and a number of other specific question.

Centaurs of the Mind

2018 ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Freya Sierhuis
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Courtly Love ◽  
Love Poetry ◽  
Faculty Psychology ◽  
Religious Controversy ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Poetic Fiction ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Erotic

This chapter champions the erotic sonnets of the Caelica cycle, often ignored in favour of the philosophical and religious poems of the middle, and final section of the sequence; highlighting both their playful eroticism and philosophical depth. The love poetry which scrutinizes the relationship between the mistress and the lover in terms of projection and fetishization, on closer inspection turns out to share the same philosophical grounds as the poems which examine the mechanisms of spiritual slavery later in the cycle. While certain poems, such as Caelica 39, 43, and 56 explicate the link between courtly love and idolatry, this chapter argues how Greville’s poetry contributes to the debates on the status of the imagination in Renaissance poetics, faculty psychology, and religious controversy, by exploring its affective investment in the act of poetic fiction-making.

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