The Recognition of Panama by the Major Latin American States

1969 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Bradford Burns
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Panama City ◽  
Latin Americans ◽  
Isthmus Of Panama ◽  
American States ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
And Control

The Latin Americans watched with fascination and concern as the dramatic events of November of 1903 progressed in the Isthmus of Panama. There, early in that eventful month, the interests of Panamanian patriots who long had sought the independence of their region from Colombia and of the United States which wanted to begin the construction of a vitally needed inter-ocean canal coincided. The Panamanians declared their independence on November 3, and the presence of United States forces to prevent the suppression of that revolution by Colombia assured its success. On November 6, Secretary of State John Hay ordered the United States consul in Panama to enter into relations with the new government, thereby extending to it de facto recognition. De jure recognition followed on November 13, when Panama's representative to the United States, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was received officially in Washington. Five days later, Hay and Bunau-Varilla signed the treaty which gave to the United States the use, occupation, and control of a zone of land ten miles wide, extending across the isthmus from Colon to Panama City. In effect, Panama ceded sovereignty over that zone. The United States, for its part, guaranteed the independence of Panama, paid the sum of $10,000,000 to the new government, and promised an annual subsidy of $250,000.

Latin America and the United Nations

1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 714-727
Author(s):  
Bryce Wood ◽  
Minerva Morales M.
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
League Of Nations ◽  
Latin Americans ◽  
American States ◽  
International Bureaucracy ◽  
The Caribbean

When the governments of the Latin American states were taking part in the negotiations leading to the founding of the UN, they could hardly have done so with nostalgic memories of the League of Nations. The League had provided no protection to the Caribbean countries from interventions by the United States, and, largely because of United States protests, it did not consider the Tacna-Arica and Costa Rica-Panama disputes in the early 1920's. Furthermore, Mexico had not been invited to join; Brazil withdrew in 1926; and Argentina and Peru took little part in League affairs. The organization was regarded as being run mainly for the benefit of European states with the aid of what Latin Americans called an “international bureaucracy,” in which citizens from the southern hemisphere played minor roles. The United States was, of course, not a member, and both the reference to the Monroe Doctrine by name in Article 21 of the Covenant and the organization's practice of shunning any attempt to interfere in inter-American affairs against the wishes of the United States made the League in its first decade a remote and inefficacious institution to countries that were seriously concerned about domination by Washington.

The Issue of Religious Liberty in the United States Commercial Treaty with Colombia, 1824

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-301
Author(s):  
Wilkins B. Winn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
Latin American Nation ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The Republic ◽  
American Nation

The Republic of Colombia was the first Latin American nation to which the United States extended a formal act of recognition in 1822. This country was also the first of these new republics with which the United States negotiated a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. The importance of incorporating the principle of religious liberty in our first commercial treaty with Latin America was revealed in the emphasis that John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, placed on it in his initial instructions to Richard Clough Anderson, Jr., Minister Plenipotentiary to Colombia. Religious liberty was one of the specific articles stipulated by Adams for insertion in the prospective commercial treaty.

Mexico, Gilberto Bosques and the Refugees

2000 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedrich Katz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
American Military ◽  
Latin Americans ◽  
North Americans ◽  
Promised Land ◽  
Mexican Government ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right

In the eyes of many North Americans, Mexico is above all a country of immigration from which hundreds of thousands hope to pass across the border to find the promised land in the United States. What these North Americans do not realize is that for thousands of Latin Americans and for many U.S. intellectuals, Mexico after the revolution of 1910-1920 constituted the promised land. People persecuted for their political or religious beliefs—radicals, revolutionaries but liberals as well—could find refuge in Mexico when repressive regimes took over their country.In the 1920s such radical leaders as Víctor Raúl Haya De La Torre, César Augusto Sandino and Julio Antonio Mella found refuge in Mexico. This policy continued for many years even after the Mexican government turned to the right. Thousands of refugees from Latin American military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay fled to Mexico. The history of that policy of the Mexican government has not yet been written.

scholarly journals The “Cuban Question” and the Cold War in Latin America, 1959–1964

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-151
Author(s):  
Tanya Harmer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cuban Revolution ◽  
Cuban Missile Crisis ◽  
American System ◽  
American States ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Insight Into

This article explains how Latin American governments responded to the Cuban revolution and how the “Cuban question” played out in the inter-American system in the first five years of Fidel Castro's regime, from 1959 to 1964, when the Organization of American States imposed sanctions against the island. Drawing on recently declassified sources from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and the United States, the article complicates U.S.-centric accounts of the inter-American system. It also adds to our understanding of how the Cold War was perceived within the region. The article makes clear that U.S. policymakers were not the only ones who feared Castro's triumph, the prospect of greater Soviet intervention, and the Cuban missile crisis. By seeking to understand why local states opposed Castro's ascendance and what they wanted to do to counter his regime, the account here offers new insight into the Cuban revolution's international impact and allows us to evaluate U.S. influence in the region during key years of the Cold War.

The Los Angeles "Zoot Suit Riots" Revisited: Mexican and Latin American Perspectives

2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Griswold del Castillo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Los Angeles ◽  
Ethnic Group ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Mexican American ◽  
American Culture ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mexican Origin ◽  
Latin Americans ◽  
Zoot Suit

The so-called Zoot Suit riots in Los Angeles in June of 1943 made Latin Americans more aware of the negative racial attitudes within the United States toward Mexicans. Through the publicity surrounding the riots, they also first learned of the existence of a large ethnic group of Mexican origin. This knowledge, however, often came with an additional message that the Mexican American culture was not worthy of esteem by respectable people. / Los disturbios llamados "Zoot-Suit" que ocurrieron en Los Angeles en Junio 1943 hizo saber a los latino americanos que las actitudes de los norteamericanos hacia los mexicanos no eran muy positivas. A través de la publicidad durante los disturbios, aprendieron por la primera vez de la existencia de un gran grupo étnico de origen mexicano en los Estados Unidos. Desgraciadamente esta información vino con otro mensaje que la cultura de los mexicoamericanos no era digna de honor por la supuesta gente decente.

U.S. Influence in the Organization of American States

1975 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Meek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Latin American ◽  
New York Times ◽  
The United States ◽  
Organization Of American States ◽  
American States ◽  
Pro Forma

Literature on U.S. influence in the Organization of American States reveals a marked diversity of views. Some authors consider that U.S. influence is absolute or very nearly so; others hold that it is relative; still others think it is minimal.In the nearly-absolute school, former Guatemalan President Arévalo (1961: 126) says that the United States “always wins” in the OAS. The Ecuadorian writer Benjamín Cardón (1965: 29) says that the OAS “receives orders and complies with them, with the appearance of discussion, and the appearance of votes that satisfy pro-forma the hypocritical quakerism of the masters.” This view might be summed up by a comment attributed to a Latin American delegate to one Inter-American Conference: “If the United States wanted to badly enough, it could have a resolution passed declaring two and two are five ” (New York Times, March 8, 1954).

An Early Diplomatic Controversy between the United States and Brazil

1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-311
Author(s):  
William R. Manning
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Spanish American ◽  
The North ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
American States ◽  
The Government ◽  
Separatist Movement

It was two years after the United States formally declared for the recognition of the new Latin-American states and after several Spanish-American states had been recognized before the question of recognizing Brazil arose. When, in April, 1824, Rebello presented himself in Washington as the Brazilian chargé, a difference of opinion arose in Monroe’s cabinet, because Brazil was a monarchy, while all of the other American governments were republics, and some hoped that monarchy might have no foothold on the continent. Others, however, advocated the recognition of Brazil the more strongly because it was a monarchy in order to show the world that it was the fact of independence which actuated the United States rather than the form of government.The opposition to recognition was strengthened by recent news of a formidable separatist movement in the north, with Pernambuco as a center, the purpose of which was to establish an independent republic under the name of the Federation of the Equator. This; raised a serious doubt whether the government at Rio de Janeiro were really in effective control. It was reported, too, that the assistance of French naval vessels had been accepted in order to repress the Pernambuco revolt. This conjured up the specter of the so-called Holy Alliance, for the exclusion of which from America Monroe’s famous message of the preceding December had declared. There was also a strong suspicion, supported by persistent rumors, that Dom Pedro (who had allowed himself to be made Emperor when in 1822 Brazilian independence from Portugal was declared, who had summoned a constituent assembly and then quarreled with it and finally forcibly dismissed it because it proved too liberal to suit his ideas of prerogative, and who had appointed a council that had drawn up a fairly liberal constitution in harmony with his wishes which he had not yet taken the oath to observe) really wished to restore Portuguese sovereignty and rule Brazil as a vassal of his father, the King of Portugal. About the middle of May, however, word came that in the preceding March the Emperor had taken the oath to the constitution of the independent Brazilian Empire. After Rebello had given assurances concerning the suppression of the slave trade and the observance of treaties that had been negotiated with Portugal, he was formally received by President Monroe as Brazilian chargé on May 26, 1824. He expressed his gratitude that “the Government of the United States has been the first to acknowledge the independence of Brazil.”

The Coup d'Etat in Bolivia: Internal and External Factors

2021 ◽  
pp. 131-142
Author(s):  
Konstantin S. Strigunov ◽  
◽  
Andrei V. Manoilo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Organization Of American States ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
American States

The aim of the article is to reveal the mechanism of the coup d'etat in Bolivia in November 2019. Based on the research of Russian and foreign experts, as well as official documents of international organizations, a research center, speeches by world leaders, and the media, the authors analyze the internal causes and external factors that contributed to the overthrow of Evo Morales and the coming to power of the right opposition, oriented to the United States and supranational structures. The methods for the research were selected based on the requirements of a multilateral and systematic analysis of the domestic political situation in Bolivia, its cultural, historical, territorial, and economic characteristics, as well as foreign policy factors that influenced the situation in the country. A comparative analysis of the coup d'etat in Bolivia with the situation in some other Latin American states was done. The first section analyzes the domestic political situation in Bolivia, economic factors, and a number of actions by Evo Morales which led to the weakening of his position on the eve of the presidential election. The second section discusses the mechanism of influence of the Organization of American States on the election process in Bolivia. The influence of neo-fascist organizations, which receive external support and financing and became the main shock force of the coup d'etat, is investigated. The channels of influence of international players and organizations on the internal political processes of Bolivia are studied. The authors infer that the ousted president did not solve the task of creating and implementing a development project for all social and ethnic groups of Bolivia while maintaining their own support and state sovereignty. In addition, the authors give a critical assessment to the decision of the Bolivian leadership led by Evo Morales to entrust election monitoring exclusively to the Organization of American States where the US position dominates. The authors suggest that, for political support, in the monitoring of the election, Evo Morales should have involved representatives of states and organizations not controlled by Washington, for example, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For the first time, the authors reveal and thoroughly study the trigger mechanism for activating a coup d'etat using technologies for dismantling political regimes adapted to Bolivian conditions. They conclude that, in fact, counteraction to left-wing political regimes by the United States in Latin America is de facto a continuation of the formally completed Operation Condor, but using modern technologies to eliminate the unwanted regime in a particular country in new geopolitical conditions.

The Panama Star, Forerunner Of Isthmian Journalism

1945 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 346-348
Author(s):  
Aristides G. Typaldos
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
University Of Missouri ◽  
Panama City ◽  
The University

The author, assistant manager of the Panama City Star-Herald, was one of twelve Latin-American newspaper men studying journalism last year in universities of the United States. He was a student at the University of Missouri.

scholarly journals Latin America and the Question of Cuban Independence

2011 ◽  
Vol 68 (02) ◽  
pp. 209-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dalia Antonia Muller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Spanish America ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Spanish Colonialism ◽  
Latin Americans ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
The Voice

In a famous account of his travels, titled El destino de un continente, the Argentine writer Manuel Ugarte describes his somewhat disconcerting encounter with the Cuban ex-president José Miguel Gómez while traveling through Latin America during the 1920s. Ugarte, a committed advocate of panhispanismo—the idea that Spanish America was and should be unified by its shared Spanish heritage, especially in light of the “threat” from Anglo- Saxon culture—had come to Cuba to give a series of lectures. Shortly after one of his presentations, the Argentine was introduced to Gómez, who took Ugarte to task for his criticism of Cuba's close relationship to the United States. “You reproach us,” Gómez said, “for not defending our legacy of Spanish civilization, but what have all of you [Latin Americans] done to encourage us, to support us, to make us feel that we are not alone?” Taken aback and made suddenly self-conscious by the accusation, Ugarte concluded that the Cuban was admonishing him for failing to uphold the very principles he was espousing in his lectures. “It seemed as if, through the voice of her representative, all Cuba was saying, ‘It is not we who broke the link; it was you who broke it in allowing it to be cut.’” After some time and much thought, Ugarte came to the realization that “Cuba was not alone responsible for the Cuban situation. Some responsibility was also borne by Latin America.” Through his encounter with Gómez, Ugarte was forced to recognize the limitations of framing what he referred to as the “Cuban situation” exclusively in the context of a cultural war between the United States and Spain. Indeed, the expresident's challenge inspired him to reconsider Cuba's nineteenth-century struggles with both Spanish colonialism and U.S. imperialism in a distinctly inter-Latin American context.

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