Accelerated Filing Deadlines, Internal Controls, and Financial Statement Quality: The Case of Originating Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colleen M. Boland ◽  
Scott N. Bronson ◽  
Chris E. Hogan

SYNOPSIS We examine whether regulations requiring accelerated filing deadlines and internal control reporting and testing affect financial statement reliability. Unlike prior research, we examine whether these regulatory changes are associated with an increase in the likelihood that misstatements originate in the period following the respective change. If the implementation of these rules causes a misstatement, then the misstatement would most likely occur in the period immediately following the rule change. We provide evidence that accelerated filers (AFs) experience an increase in the likelihood of an originating misstatement following the acceleration of filing deadlines from 90 to 75 days. Large accelerated filers (LAFs), however, do not experience a similar increase following this acceleration or the subsequent acceleration from 75 to 60 days. After the implementation of the SOX Section 404 internal control requirements, we find that the likelihood of an originating misstatement declined for AFs but not for LAFs. Taken together, the findings suggest that, although AFs experienced an initial decrease in financial statement reliability, this decrease was temporary. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Shefchik Bhaskar ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson

ABSTRACT The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits—in which substantial ICFR testing is required—may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. We compare a 2007–2013 sample of small U.S. public company firm-years receiving integrated audits (accelerated filers) to firm-years receiving FS-only audits (non-accelerated filers) and find integrated audits are associated with higher likelihood of material misstatements and discretionary accruals, consistent with lower FS audit quality. We also find evidence of (1) auditor judgment-based integration issues, and (2) low-quality ICFR audits harming FS audit quality. Overall, results suggest an important potential consequence of integrated audits is lower FS audit quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-103
Author(s):  
Diane J. Janvrin ◽  
Maureen Francis Mascha ◽  
Melvin A. Lamboy-Ruiz

ABSTRACT Auditing Standard No. 5 requires that auditors integrate their evaluation of large issuers' internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) into their financial statement audit process, but the PCAOB warns that auditors may not adequately test related manual and systems internal controls. We use a multiple method approach to examine how auditors evaluate one important component of ICFR, the financial close process, and whether they evaluate it differently when conducting a SOX 404(b) integrated versus a financial statement audit. Interviewees relied heavily on walkthroughs, and tended to perform only cursory reviews of entity-level controls related to the financial close process. In addition, they often failed to test the link between the general ledger and supporting systems, including evaluating related access controls. Financial statement-only auditors were more likely to re-perform key controls than rely on cursory walkthroughs. Auditors performing integrated audits appeared to over-rely on ICFR findings when conducting financial statement audits. Data Availability: Interview data are available from the first author. PCAOB inspection reports are publicly available.


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-74
Author(s):  
Ryan P. McDonough ◽  
Paul J. Miranti ◽  
Michael P. Schoderbek

ABSTRACT This paper examines the administrative and accounting reforms coordinated by Herman A. Metz around the turn of the 20th century in New York City. Reform efforts were motivated by deficiencies in administering New York City's finances, including a lack of internal control over monetary resources and operational activities, and opaque financial reports. The activities of Comptroller Metz, who collaborated with institutions such as the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, were paramount in initiating and implementing the administrative and accounting reforms in the city, which contributed to reform efforts across the country. Metz promoted the adoption of functional cost classifications for city departments, developed flowcharts for improved transaction processing, strengthened internal controls, and published the 1909 Manual of Accounting and Business Procedure of the City of New York, which laid the groundwork for transparent financial reports capable of providing vital information about the city's activities and subsidiary units. JEL Classifications: H72, M41, N91. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 159-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byron J. Pike ◽  
Lawrence Chui ◽  
Kasey A. Martin ◽  
Renee M. Olvera

SUMMARY To reduce redundancies and increase efficiency in the evaluation of internal controls (PCAOB 2007, 402–403), professional standards encourage coordination between external auditors and their clients' internal audit function (IAF). Recent surveys of internal auditors find that a component of this coordination is external auditors' involvement in developing the IAF's audit plans. Nevertheless, it is not known how such involvement affects external auditors' reliance on the internal control test work of the IAF, either before or after a negative audit discovery. Based on an experiment with 107 experienced auditors, we find that external auditors involved in the development of the IAF's audit plan perceive the IAF as more objective and that both objectivity and involvement contribute to these auditors' placing more reliance on the IAF as compared to external auditors with no involvement. This initial reliance results in the involved auditors' proposing reductions to the audit budget and re-performing less of the IAF's work. Consistent with an anchoring bias, we find that involvement leads to external auditors' continuing to place greater reliance on the IAF's work, even after they become aware of a negative audit discovery that should not have occurred had the client's controls been effective. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors on request.


2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) require management and the auditor to report on internal controls over financial reporting. Section 404 is arguably the most controversial element of SOX, and much of the debate around the costs of implementing section 404 has focused on auditors' fees (Ernst & Young 2005). In this paper, we examine the association between audit fees and internal control disclosures made pursuant to section 404. Our sample includes 660 manufacturing firms that have a December 31, 2004 fiscal year-end and filed the section 404 report by May 15, 2005. We find that the mean (median) audit fees for the firms in our sample for fiscal 2004 is 86 (128) percent higher than the corresponding fees for fiscal 2003. Audit fees for fiscal 2004 are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness disclosure compared to clients without such disclosure; however, audit fees for fiscal 2003 are not associated with an internal control material weakness disclosure (in the 10-K filed following fiscal 2004). We also find that the association between audit fees and the presence of a material weakness disclosure does not vary depending on the type of material weakness (systemic or non-systemic).


2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Barbara Farrell ◽  
Picheng Lee

SUMMARY: The main objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor has to report an assessment of the firm’s internal controls and attest to management’s assessment of the firm’s internal controls. Material weaknesses in internal controls must be disclosed in the auditor and management reports. The objective of this study is to examine if firms reporting material internal control weaknesses under Section 404 have more earnings management compared to other firms. The results provide mild evidence that there are more positive and absolute discretionary accruals for firms reporting material internal control weaknesses than for other firms. Since the findings of ineffective internal controls by auditors under Section 404 may cause firms to improve their internal controls, Section 404 has the potential benefits of reducing the opportunity of intentional and unintentional accounting errors and of improving the quality of reported earnings.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie K. Klamm ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson

ABSTRACT: This paper examines internal controls, from both an information technology (IT) and non-IT perspective, in relation to the five components of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization's Internal Control-Integrated Framework (COSO 1992), as well as the achievement of one of COSO's three objectives-reporting reliability. Our sample consists of 490 firms with material weaknesses reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 during the first year of compliance. We classify the weaknesses by COSO component and as IT-related or non-IT-related. Our results support the interrelationships of the COSO Framework. The results also show that the number of misstated accounts is positively related to the number of weak COSO components (i.e., scope) and certain weak COSO components (i.e., existence). Firms with IT-related weak components report more material weaknesses and misstatements than firms without IT-related weak components, providing evidence on the pervasive negative impact of weak IT controls, especially in control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy E. Ji

Problem/ Relevance: Managerial myopia is an important issue of interests to academics, practitioners, and regulators as managers have been condemned for their obsession with short-term earnings and myopic investment decisions that sacrifice firms’ long term value for shareholders. This article contributes by examining whether the quality of firms’ internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) is associated with managerial myopia. Research Objective/ Questions: The purpose of this study is to examine whether managers in firms reporting material internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 engage in myopic behaviors more than those in firms without reporting ICW. Methodology: The study uses the logit regression model to investigate a sample obtained from Compustat for the period of 2005-2013. Major Findings: The study finds a positive association between internal control weaknesses reported by auditors under Section 404 of the SOX and managerial short-termism which is measured by the probability of cutting R&D expenses in the current year from the previous year. Implications: Whereas prior studies mostly examine the impact of internal controls on accounting quality, this study demonstrates the implication of internal controls beyond financial reporting quality by showing an association between internal control quality and managerial myopia. Future research may further investigate the association between firms’ financial reporting quality and managerial investment decisions.


2011 ◽  
pp. 318-383
Author(s):  
Ashutosh Deshmukh

Internal controls have existed since the dawn of business activities. Internal controls are basically systems of checks and balances. The purpose is to keep the organization moving along desired lines as per the wishes of the owners and to protect assets of the business. Internal controls have received attention from auditors, managers, accountants, fraud examiners and legislatures. Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 now requires the annual report of a public company to contain a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. Section 404 of the Act also requires the auditor to attest to and report on management’s assessment of effectiveness of the internal controls in accordance with standards established by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuping Zhao ◽  
Jean C. Bedard ◽  
Rani Hoitash

SUMMARY Prior research shows that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Section 404(b) integrated audit is associated with a lower incidence of misstatements. We predict that under 404(b), the auditor's ability to detect misstatements increases relative to other internal control regimes when greater resources are exerted during the engagement. Supporting this prediction, we find that the benefits of 404(b) versus other regimes (including SOX 404(a)) in reducing misstatements increase with incremental audit effort (proxied by abnormal audit fees). We find no benefit of 404(b) in misstatement reduction when abnormal audit effort is low. This implies that the value of 404(b) testing is not uniform, but rather is greater when sufficient resources are available to thoroughly understand client controls. In contrast, we find no benefit of abnormal audit effort under other regulatory regimes. We further examine the conditions under which knowledge gained from auditor internal control testing is more valuable. We find that the benefits of increased audit effort under 404(b) do not vary across internal control regimes under AS2 versus AS5, and are more pronounced for engagements with shorter auditor tenure, non-Big 4 auditors, and industry-specialist auditors. JEL Classifications: M49. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.


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