The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1493-1526 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. S. Agnes Cheng ◽  
Henry He Huang ◽  
Yinghua Li ◽  
Jason Stanfield

ABSTRACT This paper examines the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance. We find that relative to matched control firms, businesses targeted by hedge fund activists exhibit lower tax avoidance levels prior to hedge fund intervention, but experience increases in tax avoidance after the intervention. Moreover, findings suggest that the increase in tax avoidance is greater when activists have a successful track record of implementing tax changes and possess tax interest or knowledge as indicated by their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 13D filings. We also find that these greater tax savings do not appear to result from an increased use of high-risk and potentially illegal tax strategies, such as sheltering. Taken together, the results suggest that shareholder monitoring of firms, in the form of hedge fund activism, improves tax efficiency. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; H26. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Author(s):  
C.S. Agnes Cheng ◽  
Henry Huang ◽  
Yinghua Li ◽  
Jason W. Stanfield

CFA Digest ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
Lee Kher Sheng

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant Richardson ◽  
Grantley Taylor ◽  
Roman Lanis

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of women on the board of directors on corporate tax avoidance in Australia. Design/methodology/approach The authors use multivariate regression analysis to test the association between the presence of female directors on the board and tax aggressiveness. They also test for self-selection bias in the regression model by using the two-stage Heckman procedure. Findings This paper finds that relative to there being one female board member, high (i.e. greater than one member) female presence on the board of directors reduces the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias and using several alternative measures of tax aggressiveness. Research limitations/implications This study extends the extant literature on corporate governance and tax aggressiveness. This study is subject to several caveats. First, the sample is restricted to publicly listed Australian firms. Second, this study only examines the issue of women on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness in the context of Australia. Practical implications This research is timely, as there has been increased pressure by government bodies in Australia and globally to develop policies to increase female representation on the board of directors. Originality/value This study is the first to provide empirical evidence concerning the association between the presence of women on the board of directors and tax aggressiveness.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anissa Dakhli

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the direct and indirect relationship between institutional ownership and corporate tax avoidance using corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a mediating variable. Design/methodology/approach This study uses panel data set of 200 French firms listed during the 2007–2018 period. The direct and indirect effects between managerial ownership and tax avoidance were tested by using structural equation model analysis. Findings The results indicate that institutional ownership negatively affects tax avoidance. The greater the proportion of the institutional ownership, the lower the likelihood of tax avoidance usage. From the result of the Sobel test, this study indicated that CSR partially mediates the effect of institutional ownership on corporate tax avoidance. Practical implications The findings have some policy and practical implications that may help regulators in improving the quality of transactions and in achieving more efficient market supervision. They recommend to the government to add regulations and restrictions to the structure of corporate ownership to control corporate tax avoidance in French companies. Originality/value This study extends the existing literature by examining both the direct and indirect effect of institutional ownership on corporate tax avoidance in French companies by including CSR as a mediating variable.


2021 ◽  
pp. 252-282
Author(s):  
Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal ◽  
Jan Schnitzler

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
Xin Dai ◽  
Yurun He ◽  
Maolin Wang

ABSTRACT This paper investigates how effective internal control protects shareholders' welfare in the context of corporate tax avoidance. Prior literature documents a positive association between internal control weakness and low tax avoidance. In this paper, we re-examine this association and complement prior research by finding that the direction of the association between internal control and tax avoidance depends on the level of tax avoidance. Specifically, for firms with low (high) levels of tax avoidance, internal control quality is positively (negatively) associated with tax avoidance. In additional analyses, we further explore how internal control mitigates agency costs for state-owned enterprises and tunneling activities. We show that for state-owned enterprises, which have lower incentives to avoid tax, effective internal control prevents managers from paying more taxes to cater to the controlling shareholders' interests. We also find that the association between tax avoidance and tunneling is reduced by effective internal control systems. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 447-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guanming He ◽  
Helen Mengbing Ren ◽  
Richard Taffler

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 706-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Su ◽  
Bin Li ◽  
Chen Ma

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of corporate dispersion on tax avoidance from geographical and institutional dispersion perspectives by using evidence from China. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel data of Chinese listed firms during 2003-2015, this paper estimates with correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis. Findings Both geographical and institutional dispersion are negatively associated with the degree of corporate tax avoidance. Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms and female chief executive officers can mitigate the negative relation between corporate dispersion and tax avoidance. The results also indicate that ineffective internal control is one of the channels through which corporate dispersion reduces tax avoidance. Originality/value This is the first paper about the impact of firm dispersion on the degree of tax avoidance, complementing the research content of diversification and corporate decision-making.


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