CEO Turnover, Financial Distress, and Contractual Innovations

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 959-990 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Harry Evans ◽  
Shuqing Luo ◽  
Nandu J. Nagarajan
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Ceo Incentives ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Incentive Problems ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled creditors to more effectively retain highly skilled CEOs with firm-specific knowledge and provide them with incentives to improve firm performance. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the article. JEL Classifications: G33; G34; M46.

Does the Ability of Operating Cash Flows to Measure Firm Performance Improve during Periods of Financial Distress?

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong Eun Lee ◽  
Robson Glasscock ◽  
Myung Seok Park
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Earnings Information ◽  
Operating Cash Flows ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS This study examines whether the associations between stock returns and earnings, and stock returns and cash flows from operations (OCF), vary during periods of firm-specific financial distress. We find that a firm's stock returns are more strongly associated with its OCF than its earnings when the firm is in financial distress. In a regression of stock returns on both OCF and earnings, and interactions of these two variables with an indicator for financial distress, the Shapley value, which measures contribution to the regression R2, is higher for the interaction of OCF with distress than for the interaction of earnings with distress. We also find that the strength of the observed return-OCF relation increases in a market-wide crisis. These findings support the view that investors, in times of firm distress, place significantly more weight on OCF information than on earnings information. JEL Classifications: G01; G10; M41. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

The Auditor's Going-Concern Opinion as a Communication of Risk

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen D. Blay ◽  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
David S. North
Keyword(s):  
Financial Distress ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Valuation ◽  
Audit Opinion ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Distressed Firms

SUMMARY In this study, we examine the proposition that the auditor's going-concern modified opinion is a valuable risk communication to the equity market that results in a shift of the market's perception of financially distressed firms. Specifically, our analyses reveal that the market valuation is significantly altered from a focus on both the income statement and balance sheet to a balance sheet-only focus in the year a company receives a first-time going-concern modified opinion. These results hold even after controlling for several common measures of financial distress and when examining a larger control sample of distressed firms. We also document that the market devalues a company's inventory and places increased weight on cash, receivables, and long-term assets and liabilities as a result of the auditor's modification. This indicates that the going-concern modification provides incremental information specifically related to abandonment or adaptation risk. Our results provide evidence that the market interprets the going-concern modified audit opinion as an important communication of risk that results in a substantial shift in the structure of the market valuation for distressed firms. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: M41.

scholarly journals Relevant but Delayed Information in Negotiated Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl E. Hackenbrack ◽  
Nicole Thorne Jenkins ◽  
Mikhail Pevzner
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Delayed Information ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
News Events ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY: Audit fee negotiations conclude with the signing of an engagement letter, typically the first quarter of the year under audit. Yet investors do not learn the audit fee paid until disclosed in the following year's definitive proxy statement. We conjecture that negotiated audit fees impound auditors' consequential private, client-specific knowledge about “bad news” events investors will learn eventually. We demonstrate that a proxy for the year-to-year change in the negotiated audit fee has an economically meaningful positive association with proxies for public realizations of “bad news” events that occur during the roughly 12-month period between the negotiation of the audit fee and the disclosure of the audit fee paid. Our results suggest that negotiated audit fees contain information meaningful to investors and that if disclosed proximate to the signing of the engagement letter instead of the following year, information asymmetry between managers and investors would be reduced. JEL Classifications: G19, D89, M40. Data Availability: Available from public sources identified in the text.

The Effects of PCAOB Inspections on Auditor-Client Relationships

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew A. Acito ◽  
Chris E. Hogan ◽  
Richard D. Mergenthaler
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Textual Analysis ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Client Relationships ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We investigate whether PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies lead to higher audit fees or turnover likelihood for clients of Big 4 auditors. To examine this, we identify areas of GAAP related to PCAOB deficiencies for each auditor. We then use textual analysis to identify how important the deficiencies are to clients to measure each client's exposure to deficient auditing. We find that this measure positively relates to audit fees and that this association is moderated by client bargaining power. Auditor turnover is also higher when deficiency exposure is high relative to what it would be for peer auditors, but we only observe this relation for smaller clients and do not find it is affected by client bargaining power. Finally, we find that companies switching Big 4 auditors tend to select an auditor resulting in lower deficiency exposure. These results have implications for understanding how PCAOB inspection reports affect the market for audit services. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: We obtain all data from publicly available sources.

scholarly journals Heaping of Executive Compensation

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjorn N. Jorgensen ◽  
Paige H. Patrick ◽  
Naomi S. Soderstrom
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Discrete Data ◽  
Cognitive Effort ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
External Stakeholders ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We investigate whether compensation grants are subject to “heaping,” the tendency of less informed individuals to provide round values when reporting estimates of discrete data. We document that an unexpectedly large number of CEOs receive round compensation (i.e., evenly divisible by 100,000 and/or 10,000). We investigate whether, consistent with heaping, the frequency of round compensation varies with proxies for boards of directors' effort in setting compensation. We find that round compensation is more common when boards have characteristics suggesting they provide weak oversight of compensation and thus face more uncertainty in estimating compensation. We also find less frequent round compensation when boards face stronger pressure from external stakeholders, encouraging boards to expend additional cognitive effort in setting compensation. Further, consistent with weak oversight of compensation, round compensation tends to be higher than non-round compensation. However, we do not find a consistent association between this higher, round compensation and future firm performance. JEL Classifications: G30; G41; M40; M46. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Come on Over: Analyst/Investor Days as a Disclosure Medium

2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (6) ◽  
pp. 1725-1750 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Stanimir Markov
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Short Duration ◽  
Price Impact ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Temporal Proximity ◽  
Conference Presentations ◽  
Close Temporal Proximity ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Our study introduces analyst/investor days, a new disclosure medium that allows for private interactions with influential market participants. We also highlight interdependencies in the choice and information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations, a well-researched disclosure medium that similarly allows for private interactions. Analyst/investor days are less frequent, but with longer duration and greater price impact than conference presentations. They are mostly hosted by firms that already have opportunities to interact with investors at conferences, but whose complex and diverse activities make the short duration and rigid format of a conference presentation an imperfect solution to these firms' information problems. Analyst/investor days and conference presentations tend to occur in different quarters, consistent with their competing for the time and attention of senior management. When these two mediums are scheduled in close temporal proximity to each other, analyst/investor days diminish the information content of conference presentations, but not vice versa, consistent with managers' favoring analyst/investor days over conference presentations as a disclosure medium. JEL Classifications: D82; M41; G11; G12; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

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