scholarly journals Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur G. Kraft ◽  
Rahul Vashishtha ◽  
Mohan Venkatachalam

ABSTRACT Using the transition of U.S. firms from annual reporting to semi-annual reporting and then to quarterly reporting over the period 1950–1970, we provide evidence on the effects of increased reporting frequency on firms' investment decisions. Estimates from difference-in-differences specifications indicate that increased reporting frequency is associated with an economically large decline in investments. Additional analyses reveal that the decline in investments is most consistent with frequent financial reporting inducing myopic management behavior. Our evidence informs the recent controversial debate about eliminating quarterly reporting for U.S. corporations. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; G30; G31.

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy E. Ji

Problem/ Relevance: Managerial myopia is an important issue of interests to academics, practitioners, and regulators as managers have been condemned for their obsession with short-term earnings and myopic investment decisions that sacrifice firms’ long term value for shareholders. This article contributes by examining whether the quality of firms’ internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) is associated with managerial myopia. Research Objective/ Questions: The purpose of this study is to examine whether managers in firms reporting material internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 engage in myopic behaviors more than those in firms without reporting ICW. Methodology: The study uses the logit regression model to investigate a sample obtained from Compustat for the period of 2005-2013. Major Findings: The study finds a positive association between internal control weaknesses reported by auditors under Section 404 of the SOX and managerial short-termism which is measured by the probability of cutting R&D expenses in the current year from the previous year. Implications: Whereas prior studies mostly examine the impact of internal controls on accounting quality, this study demonstrates the implication of internal controls beyond financial reporting quality by showing an association between internal control quality and managerial myopia. Future research may further investigate the association between firms’ financial reporting quality and managerial investment decisions.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu Jiang ◽  
Baohua Xin

We explicitly model financial reporting discretion and earnings management in an investment setting where managers have incentives to behave myopically. We show that, when managers are sufficiently but not excessively myopic, granting them some discretion over the mandatory financial reports can lead to better investment decisions. This finding contrasts with the conventional argument that financial reporting discretion facilitates earnings management and exacerbates managerial myopia, leading to inefficient investments. Costly earnings management, while offering managers some ex post protection against bad luck by decreasing the incidence of low financial reports, reduces the expected net benefit of high financial reports ex-ante. Consequently, managers with negative private information find it too costly to mimic those with positive private information, facilitating separation of managers through efficient investment. Thus, curbing managerial myopia by removing or overly restricting earnings management may have the unintended consequence of impairing investment efficiency.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (7) ◽  
pp. 777-799
Author(s):  
O.I. Shvyreva ◽  
Z.I. Kruglyak ◽  
A.V. Petukh

Subject. This article discusses the issues related to the practice of financial reporting in the face of uncertainties caused by the coronavirus contagion, as well as the specifics of the audit strategy and formation of an audit opinion on this reporting. Objectives. The article aims to identify the quality characteristics of financial reporting prepared in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and justify the key aspects of assurance engagement completion in an extremely uncertain epidemiological and economic situation. Methods. For the study, we used an abstract-logical method, content analysis techniques, systematization, and classification. Results. Analyzing the impact of the extremely uncertain epidemiological and economic situation on financial statements, the article clarifies aspects of disclosure of events after the reporting date and threats to business continuity in the annual reporting of economic entities. The article identifies possible alternative procedures and algorithms to obtain proper evidence when it is insufficient in the face of the inability to meet certain audit standards requirements in a remote audit environment. The article defines the impact of COVID-19 risk disclosure on the structure of the audit report and opinion. Relevance. The results of the study can be used in the practical activities of economic entities that prepare financial statements in the face of significant uncertainty, as well as auditors and audit organizations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 187-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seil Kim ◽  
April Klein

ABSTRACT In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spencer Pierce

ABSTRACTFinancial accounting standards require derivatives to be recognized at fair value with changes in value recognized immediately in earnings. However, if specified criteria are met, firms may use an alternative accounting treatment, hedge accounting, which is intended to better represent the underlying economics of firms' derivative use. Using FAS 161 disclosures, I examine determinants of hedge accounting use and the effects of hedge accounting on financial reporting and capital markets. I find variation in firms' hedge accounting use and provide evidence that compliance costs of applying hedge accounting affect firms' decision to use hedge accounting. Firms decrease their reported earnings volatility via derivatives that receive hedge accounting and could further decrease their earnings volatility if hedge accounting were applied to all their derivatives. Inconsistent with arguments given for using hedge accounting, I fail to find a decrease in investors' assessments of firm risk from using hedge accounting.JEL Classifications: M40; M41; G32.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Hillegeist ◽  
Asad Kausar ◽  
Arthur Gerald Kraft ◽  
You-il (Chris) Park

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui Du ◽  
Kean Wu

ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) mandate on the timeliness of financial reporting, measured by the reporting lag between fiscal period end and the filing date. Using annual and quarterly filing data from 2007 to 2014, we compare the reporting lags of XBRL reports to the lags of non-XBRL reports in three separate filing categories as defined by the SEC. The results show that by using XBRL the reporting lag is shortened by one to two days when companies file annual reports while the reporting lag is shortened by one day in quarterly filings. However, the results are manifest for both large accelerated filers and accelerated filers. In the multivariate analysis, we do not observe the improved reporting lag when using XBRL among non-accelerated filers. While we provide the evidence that the XBRL mandate improves the timeliness of financial reporting for large filers, we question the public policymaking of the XBRL mandate that has the intention of benefiting small companies and their investors. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; G18; M48; Z18


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