Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality

2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 585-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aloke Ghosh ◽  
Doocheol Moon
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Information Intermediaries ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
One Year ◽  
Reported Earnings

We analyze how investors and information intermediaries perceive auditor tenure. Using earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, we document a positive association between investor perceptions of earnings quality and tenure. Further, we find that the influence of reported earnings on stock rankings becomes larger with extended tenure, although the association between debt ratings and reported earnings does not vary with tenure. Finally, we find that the influence of past earnings on one-year-ahead earnings forecasts becomes greater as tenure increases. In general, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that investors and information intermediaries perceive auditor tenure as improving audit quality. One implication of our study is that imposing mandatory limits on the duration of the auditor-client relationship might impose unintended costs on capital market participants.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Balsam ◽  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Joon S. Yang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Absolute Level ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response

This study examines the association between measures of earnings quality and auditor industry specialization. Prior work has examined the association between auditor brand name and earnings quality, using auditor brand name to proxy for audit quality. Recent work has hypothesized that auditor industry specialization also contributes to audit quality. Extending this literature, we compare the absolute level of discretionary accruals (DAC) and earnings response coefficients (ERC) of firms audited by industry specialists with those of firms not audited by industry specialists. We restrict our study to clients of Big 6 (and later Big 5) auditors to control for brand name. Because industry specialization is unobservable, we use multiple proxies for it. After controlling for variables established in prior work to be related to DAC and the ERC, we find clients of industry specialist auditors have lower DAC and higher ERC than clients of nonspecialist auditors. This finding is consistent with clients of industry specialists having higher earnings quality than clients of nonspecialists.

Audit Committee Director-Auditor Interlocking and Perceptions of Earnings Quality

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeng-Fang Chen ◽  
Yan-Yu Chou ◽  
Rong-Ruey Duh ◽  
Yu-Chen Lin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
Positive Effect

SUMMARY: Using earnings response coefficients (ERCs) from returns-earnings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, we analyze how investors perceive reported earnings when companies with interlocking audit committee directors are audited by the same audit firm (hereafter, AC director-auditor interlocking). Our empirical results show that the extent of AC director-auditor interlocking is significantly and positively associated with ERCs. By dividing the sample period into pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (pre-SOX, 1998 through 2001) and post-SOX (2002 through 2010) periods, we find that the significantly positive effect of AC director-auditor interlocking on ERCs only exists in the post-SOX period, indicating that investors have reacted more positively to AC director-auditor interlocking after the implementation of SOX, which requires that audit committee members be independent. Finally, using financial expertise data for the period 2003 to 2010, we find that the positive relationship between the extent of AC director-auditor interlocking and ERCs is more pronounced when interlocking audit committee directors are financial experts than when they are not financial experts.

Who Did the Audit? Audit Quality and Disclosures of Other Audit Participants in PCAOB Filings

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1939-1967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Callaway Dee ◽  
Ayalew Lulseged ◽  
Tianming Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Multivariate Model ◽  
Significant Decline ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Absolute Value ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We empirically test whether audit quality is affected when part of an SEC issuer's audit is outsourced to auditors other than the principal auditor (“participating auditors”). We find a significantly negative market reaction and a significant decline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for experimental issuers disclosed for the first time as having participating auditors involved in their audits. However, we find no market reaction and no decline in ERCs for a matching sample of issuers that are not disclosed as using participating auditors, nor for issuers disclosed for the second or third time as using participating auditors. We also find actual audit quality as measured by absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals is lower for the experimental issuers, although we find no difference in audit fees paid by the experimental and matching issuers in a multivariate model. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB's proposed rule requiring disclosure of the use of other auditors in addition to the principal auditor would provide information useful to investors in assessing audit quality for SEC issuers.

How does reciprocal rent-seeking between politicians and auditors influence audit quality? - Evidence from China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ku He ◽  
Xiaofei Pan ◽  
Gary Gang Tian ◽  
Yanling Wu ◽  
Chun Cai
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Capital Costs ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Audit Opinions

In this study, we propose a reciprocal rent-seeking game between politicians and individual auditors with political connections, and examine how these auditors' political connections influence their audit quality. Using hand-collected data from the Chinese market from 2008 to 2013, we find that politically connected auditors have a significantly lower tendency to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs). In addition, we also find that politicians' career prospects are significantly adversely influenced by MAOs being issued in their jurisdictions, while auditors' political connections enable them to charge higher audit fees, acquire larger market share, and reduce the likelihood of encountering regulatory sanctions. Further evidence suggests that compared with their non-connected counterparts, the politically connected auditors tend to issue less accurate audit opinions, reduce client firms' earnings response coefficients (ERCs), and increase client firms' capital costs. Collectively, our study results suggest that individual auditors' political connections facilitate the reciprocal rent-seeking activities between these auditors and politicians, which ultimately undermines audit quality.

scholarly journals Legal Systems and Earnings Quality: The Role of Auditor Industry Specialization

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Young Kwon ◽  
Chee Yeow Lim ◽  
Patricia Mui-Siang Tan
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
International Setting ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Industry Specialist

This paper extends prior studies in auditor industry specialization to an international setting and examines if the impact of industry specialist auditors on earnings quality is dependent on the legal environments. Using data for 28 countries over 20 industries from 1993 to 2003, we find that clients of industry specialist auditors have lower discretionary current accruals and higher earnings response coefficients than clients of nonspecialist auditors. In addition, we find that the impact of auditor industry specialization on earnings quality increases as the legal environment weakens. Collectively, the results suggest that the benefits from engaging the services of industry specialist auditors increase as a country's legal environment shifts from a strong to a weak environment. Our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables.

Auditor Tenure and Quality of Financial Reporting

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 528-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ling Chu ◽  
Jie Dai ◽  
Ping Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Informational Content ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Downward Bias ◽  
Reported Earnings

Prior studies in general suggest a positive association between auditor tenure (the length of an auditor–firm relationship) and reporting quality (the informational content of reported earnings). In this study, we present evidence that the association is reversed when clients represent increased litigation risks to their auditors. Featuring downward biases in reported earnings as a measure of reporting quality that stem from auditors’ minimization of costs from potential audit errors, we argue that the magnitude of such downward bias decreases in auditors’ experiences with their clients (tenure improves reporting quality). Furthermore, we predict that longer auditor tenure is associated with larger downward bias for firms with increased audit risks (tenure impairs reporting quality). Using non-operating accruals as proxy for downward bias in reported earnings, we find robust empirical evidence in support of our prediction.

Are There Adverse Consequences of Mandatory Auditor Rotation? Evidence from the Italian Experience

2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mara Cameran ◽  
Jere R. Francis ◽  
Antonio Marra ◽  
Angela Pettinicchio
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Year ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Italian Experience ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Mandatory Rotation

SUMMARY Mandatory auditor rotation was recently proposed for the European Union and is also under consideration in the United States. There has been little research into either the benefits or costs of rotation in a true mandatory setting that could inform intelligent policy making. Our paper helps fill this gap by examining Italy, where mandatory rotation of auditors has been required since 1975. We find that outgoing auditors do not shirk on effort (or quality), but final-year fees are 7 percent higher than normal, which may indicate opportunistic pricing. The fees of incoming auditors are discounted by 16 percent even though they have abnormally higher engagement hours in the first year (17 percent), which is suggestive of lowballing. However, subsequent fees are abnormally higher and exceed the initial fee discount. Thus, the costs of mandatory rotation are nontrivial. Higher costs could be acceptable if rotation improves audit quality, but we find evidence of the opposite. Namely, the quality of audited earnings is lower in the first three years following rotation, relative to later years of auditor tenure. Since rotation is costly and earnings quality improves with longer auditor tenure, the evidence from Italy does not support the case for mandatory rotation.

A Comparison of Analysts' and Investors' Biases in Interpreting Accruals: A Valuation Approach

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Kang ◽  
Yong Keun Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Stock Prices ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Earnings Expectations ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficient ◽  
Equity Value ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
One Year ◽  
Variable Problem

Elgers, Lo, and Pfeiffer (2003) argue that analysts' earnings forecasts are less biased than the market's earnings expectation in interpreting accruals. Their argument implies that analysts' earnings forecasts could potentially mitigate the market's mispricing of accruals by guiding investors to reduce their earnings prediction errors arising from the misinterpretation of accruals. Their results call for further investigation, however, owing to two questionable research design choices: (1) estimating the magnitude of the market's bias using the traditional earnings response coefficient (ERC) model, which is vulnerable to the well-known omitted-variable problem; and (2) examining only the bias in short-term (i.e., one-year-ahead) earnings expectations, ignoring possible bias in earnings expectations for longer future periods. To alleviate these concerns, we take an alternative approach in which we compare the bias of the market's equity value estimates (i.e., stock prices) against the bias of equity value estimates based on analysts' earnings forecasts in valuing accruals. By taking this alternative approach, we find that analysts' earnings forecasts are more biased than stock prices in interpreting accruals. Thus, contrary to Elgers, Lo, and Pfeiffer (2003), we conclude that analysts' earnings forecasts do not mitigate the market's mispricing of accruals.

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