Auditor Rotation: The PCAOB Considers a New Direction

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. C15-C20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela B. Roush ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Susan A. McCracken ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
Active Participation ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently undertook an exploration of the need for mandatory audit firm rotation with its issuance of the Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Auditor Rotation (PCAOB 2011a). The accumulation of evidence from PCAOB inspections of audit engagements over the last eight years has led the Board to consider additional steps to protect auditors' independence. We provide a brief synopsis of these matters based primarily on remarks by the PCAOB's chairman, James R. Doty (PCAOB 2011b, 2011c). In addition, we include relevant observations from prior academic studies and end with a call for the active participation of stakeholders in this important debate.

scholarly journals Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 37: PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. C15-C27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith L. Jones ◽  
Jagadison K. Aier ◽  
Duane M. Brandon ◽  
Tina D. Carpenter ◽  
Lisa M. Gaynor ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Exposure Period ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Comment ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY In August 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) issued a concept release to solicit public comment on the potential direction of a proposed standard-setting project on means to enhance auditor independence, objectivity, and professional skepticism. The Concept Release sought comments on and explores in detail the possibility of mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB provided for a 121-day exposure period (from August 16 to December 14, 2011) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the concept release. The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below (dated December 13, 2011) to the PCAOB on PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 37: PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation. Data Availability: Information about and access to the release are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/Release_2011-006.pdf

scholarly journals Impact of auditor and audit firm rotation on accounting and audit quality: A critical analysis of the EC regulation draft

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte ◽  
Markus Stiglbauer
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Rotation Period ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
A Current

In a current regulation draft of 2011, the European Commission (EC) plans the mandatory audit firm rotation principally after six years and with regard to a cooling off period of four years to increase auditor independence. This could complement the internal mandatory rotation (auditor rotation) by the 8th EC directive. The present paper gives a state of the art analysis of the empirical research results with regard to auditor and audit firm rotation. In contrast to the perception of the EC, the majority of the empirical results doesn’t find evidence for increased financial accounting and audit quality by audit firm rotation. Furthermore, the positive effects of the internal rotation period of seven years and the cooling off period of two years by the 8th EC directive are not empirically proved yet.

scholarly journals Audit Firm Rotation Concerns And Considerations

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Barbara Farrell ◽  
Patricia Healy
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Research Evidence ◽  
Accounting Restatements ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a concept release in 2011 which proposes a mandatory audit firm rotation. However, PCAOB indicates that there is a limited amount of empirical data and research evidence on the potential costs and benefits of such mandatory audit firm rotation. This study provides some empirical evidences related to PCAOBs concerns. Specifically, we find that the largest clients audited by Big 4 accounting firms have few material internal control weaknesses and accounting restatements. In addition, accounting restatements are often reported within four years after the beginning of accounting errors and are reported by the same auditor during the restatement period. These findings cast doubt on the benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation. We also find that the largest audit clients on average represent over 20% of the audit revenues of local offices of Big 4 accounting firms. Thus, mandatory audit firm rotations could significantly disrupt the normal operations of public accounting firms if audit clients are required to change auditors periodically.

Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The U.S

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) required the U.S. Comptroller General to study the potential effects of requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes in its recently released study of mandatory audit firm rotation that “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003, Highlights). However, the GAO also suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation could be necessary if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements do not lead to improved audit quality (GAO 2003, 5). We examine the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Comparing firms cited for fraudulent reporting from 1990 through 2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the available population of non-fraud firms, we find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. We fail to find any evidence that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure. Our results are consistent with the argument that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse effects on audit quality.

scholarly journals Does the Addition of Explicit Clarification of Auditor Independence Statement to the Auditor’s Report Matter to Equity Analysts?

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 156
Author(s):  
Xia Zhang ◽  
Kwadwo Ofori-Mensah
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Research Practice ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Equity Analysts ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Reporting

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) adopted a new auditing standard to enhance the relevance and usefulness of the auditor’s report. One of the changes introduced in the new reporting model is the addition of a statement that explicitly clarifies the auditor’s independence (AS 3101.09.g). We administer a survey to investigate whether explicitly clarifying the auditor’s independence in the auditor’s report affects equity analysts’ perceptions of auditor independence, perceptions of financial reporting reliability, and their judgment when it comes to making stock recommendations to clients. A total of 123 equity analysts are recruited via Qualtrics for the study. The findings of the survey provide evidence that corroborates the position of the PCAOB that explicit clarification of auditor independence provides relevant information useful to public users such as equity analysts. Our study is the first to evaluate equity analysts’ perceptions about auditor independence using the new PCAOB auditor reporting model regarding the explicit clarification of auditor independence in the auditor’s report. Our study contributes to research, practice, and policy. 

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwoon Kim ◽  
Hyoik Lee ◽  
Jong Eun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Financial Statement Audit ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
First Time

Recently, regulators and policy makers who witnessed the global financial crisis during 20072009 began considering a variety of ways to enhance auditor independence and financial reporting quality, ultimately aiming at investor protection. Since the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) requirement has once again received significant attention from regulators and policy makers around the world, including the European Union (EU) and the U.S. Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In this paper, we investigate whether MAFR enhances audit quality in Korea. We find that under MAFR, newly rotated auditors are more likely to issue first-time going-concern audit opinions to financially distressed firms during their initial (first-year) financial statement audit compared with under the Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). Moreover, firms audited by mandatorily rotated new auditors have less discretionary accruals and higher accrual quality than those audited by voluntarily switched new auditors during the initial audit engagement. These results of earnings quality are more pronounced for firms that received a first-time going-concern audit opinion during the initial financial statement audit under MAFR. Taken together, the findings suggest that MAFR produces better audit quality than the VAFC. Further, our study provides implications for regulators and policy makers of countries considering the adoption of MAFR.

scholarly journals Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on PCAOB Release No. 2016-003, Proposed Auditing Standard—The Auditor's Report on an Audit of Financial Statements when the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. C26-C40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus M. Doxey ◽  
Stephen H. Fuller ◽  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Willie E. Gist ◽  
Karl E. Hackenbrack ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Statements ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Reporting Standard ◽  
The Public ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Reporting

SUMMARY On May 11, 2016 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a request for comment on Proposed Auditing Standard—The Auditor's Report on an Audit of Financial Statements when the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards, a reproposal of its August 2013 proposed auditor reporting standard. The reproposal retains the pass/fail model of the existing auditor's report while seeking to enhance the form and content of the report. The reproposal solicited public comment on the following significant changes to the existing auditor's report: (1) add a description of “critical audit matters” that provides audit-specific information about especially challenging, subjective, or complex aspects of the audit as they relate to the relevant financial statement accounts and disclosures, (2) add a statement about auditor independence and the phrase “whether due to error or fraud” when describing the auditor's responsibilities to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements, (3) add a statement related to auditor tenure, and (4) standardize the form of the auditor's report, requiring the opinion be the first section of the auditor's report and requiring section titles to guide the reader. The comment period ended on August 15, 2016. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on the alternatives presented in the request for comment. Data Availability: The concept release, proposed and reproposed rules, and supplemental information are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket034.aspx

scholarly journals Auditing Issues with Chinese Reverse Merger Companies Traded in the United States

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Frederic M. Stiner ◽  
Susan A. Lynn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
The United States ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
The Public ◽  
Reverse Mergers ◽  
Public Company

Recently there have been two issues related to Chinese companies seeking capital in the United States.   The first issue is frauds that have been perpetrated by companies using reverse mergers in order to go public.   The second issue is fraud in continuing audit engagements when there has been reliance by an American audit firm on a foreign accountant’s audit work.  There is also conflict between the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) demanding to inspect audit workpapers for companies in China and the Chinese government’s refusal to let the PCAOB see these workpapers.   These issues relate to characteristics of the practice of accounting and auditing in China that threaten auditor independence and audit quality. The paper discusses: (1) issues involving reverse mergers and the response of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to these issues, (2) issues involving reliance on the work of foreign Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) and the response of the PCAOB to these issues, (3) issues involving conflicts between U.S.  regulatory agencies and the Chinese government over access to audit-related documents, and (4) suggestions for future research.

Does Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Enhance Auditor Independence? Evidence from Spain

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emiliano Ruiz-Barbadillo ◽  
Nieves Go´mez-Aguilar ◽  
Nieves Carrera
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Rotation Period ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY: In this study, we document evidence on the impact of mandatory rotation of audit firms on auditor independence using Spanish archival data. Rotation of audit firms every nine years was mandatory in Spain from 1988–1995. Although the rule was never enforced, the Spanish context provides a unique setting to examine the effects that mandatory audit firm rotation has on auditor behavior. We examine audit reports for a sample of financially stressed companies from 1991–2000 to compare audit reporting behavior in a regime with rotation (mandatory rotation period: 1991–1994) and one without rotation (post-mandatory rotation period: 1995–2000). We test two competing hypotheses concerning the impact of mandatory rotation on the likelihood of auditors' issuing going-concern modified audit opinions. We find no evidence to suggest that a mandatory rotation requirement is associated with a higher likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions. Our results suggest that auditors' incentives to protect their reputation have a positive impact on the likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions, while auditors' incentives to retain existing clients did not impact on their decisions in both the mandatory rotation and post-mandatory rotation periods. Overall, our results provide empirical support for the arguments put forward by opponents of mandatory rotation.

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