scholarly journals Impact of auditor and audit firm rotation on accounting and audit quality: A critical analysis of the EC regulation draft

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte ◽  
Markus Stiglbauer
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Rotation Period ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
A Current

In a current regulation draft of 2011, the European Commission (EC) plans the mandatory audit firm rotation principally after six years and with regard to a cooling off period of four years to increase auditor independence. This could complement the internal mandatory rotation (auditor rotation) by the 8th EC directive. The present paper gives a state of the art analysis of the empirical research results with regard to auditor and audit firm rotation. In contrast to the perception of the EC, the majority of the empirical results doesn’t find evidence for increased financial accounting and audit quality by audit firm rotation. Furthermore, the positive effects of the internal rotation period of seven years and the cooling off period of two years by the 8th EC directive are not empirically proved yet.

Does Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Enhance Auditor Independence? Evidence from Spain

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emiliano Ruiz-Barbadillo ◽  
Nieves Go´mez-Aguilar ◽  
Nieves Carrera
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Rotation Period ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY: In this study, we document evidence on the impact of mandatory rotation of audit firms on auditor independence using Spanish archival data. Rotation of audit firms every nine years was mandatory in Spain from 1988–1995. Although the rule was never enforced, the Spanish context provides a unique setting to examine the effects that mandatory audit firm rotation has on auditor behavior. We examine audit reports for a sample of financially stressed companies from 1991–2000 to compare audit reporting behavior in a regime with rotation (mandatory rotation period: 1991–1994) and one without rotation (post-mandatory rotation period: 1995–2000). We test two competing hypotheses concerning the impact of mandatory rotation on the likelihood of auditors' issuing going-concern modified audit opinions. We find no evidence to suggest that a mandatory rotation requirement is associated with a higher likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions. Our results suggest that auditors' incentives to protect their reputation have a positive impact on the likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions, while auditors' incentives to retain existing clients did not impact on their decisions in both the mandatory rotation and post-mandatory rotation periods. Overall, our results provide empirical support for the arguments put forward by opponents of mandatory rotation.

Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The U.S

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) required the U.S. Comptroller General to study the potential effects of requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes in its recently released study of mandatory audit firm rotation that “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003, Highlights). However, the GAO also suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation could be necessary if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements do not lead to improved audit quality (GAO 2003, 5). We examine the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Comparing firms cited for fraudulent reporting from 1990 through 2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the available population of non-fraud firms, we find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. We fail to find any evidence that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure. Our results are consistent with the argument that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse effects on audit quality.

Auditor Rotation: The PCAOB Considers a New Direction

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. C15-C20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela B. Roush ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Susan A. McCracken ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
Active Participation ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently undertook an exploration of the need for mandatory audit firm rotation with its issuance of the Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Auditor Rotation (PCAOB 2011a). The accumulation of evidence from PCAOB inspections of audit engagements over the last eight years has led the Board to consider additional steps to protect auditors' independence. We provide a brief synopsis of these matters based primarily on remarks by the PCAOB's chairman, James R. Doty (PCAOB 2011b, 2011c). In addition, we include relevant observations from prior academic studies and end with a call for the active participation of stakeholders in this important debate.

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwoon Kim ◽  
Hyoik Lee ◽  
Jong Eun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Financial Statement Audit ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
First Time

Recently, regulators and policy makers who witnessed the global financial crisis during 20072009 began considering a variety of ways to enhance auditor independence and financial reporting quality, ultimately aiming at investor protection. Since the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) requirement has once again received significant attention from regulators and policy makers around the world, including the European Union (EU) and the U.S. Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In this paper, we investigate whether MAFR enhances audit quality in Korea. We find that under MAFR, newly rotated auditors are more likely to issue first-time going-concern audit opinions to financially distressed firms during their initial (first-year) financial statement audit compared with under the Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). Moreover, firms audited by mandatorily rotated new auditors have less discretionary accruals and higher accrual quality than those audited by voluntarily switched new auditors during the initial audit engagement. These results of earnings quality are more pronounced for firms that received a first-time going-concern audit opinion during the initial financial statement audit under MAFR. Taken together, the findings suggest that MAFR produces better audit quality than the VAFC. Further, our study provides implications for regulators and policy makers of countries considering the adoption of MAFR.

scholarly journals Increased auditor independence by external rotation and separating audit and non audit duties? - A note on the European audit regulation

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte ◽  
Marc Eulerich
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
External Rotation ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Audit Regulation ◽  
Economic Need ◽  
Audit Reform

The European audit reform contains the implementation of an external mandatory auditor rotation (audit firm rotation) and a separation of audit and non audit duties to increase auditor independence. The central question is, whether these regulation measures are connected with an increased accounting and audit quality. First, this article presents an agency theoretical foundation of auditor independence. Then, a state of the art analysis of empirical research illustrates these ambivalent results, so that the economic need for the audit market regulation in Europe is controversial.

scholarly journals An Analysis of Mandatory Auditor Rotation Requirements in South Africa in light of International Legislative Trends

Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vela Madlela
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
The United States ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Company Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Rotation

An independent and objective external audit of companies is an integral element of sound corporate governance and of functional financial markets. The issues relating to auditor independence and objectivity have attracted considerable regulatory and public scrutiny in many leading jurisdictions. This is partly due to a general decrease in audit quality over the years as evidenced by high-profile accounting scandals and audit failures, both locally and internationally, as well as the vital role that an external audit is expected to play in ensuring transparency, accuracy and efficiency in the financial markets. In an attempt to restore confidence in the audit profession and to strengthen the independence of the external audit function for companies, legislatures in some leading jurisdictions have introduced a variety of regulatory strategies, including mandatory rotation of auditors in the form of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) and/or mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). In this article, the author examines the adequacy of the current provisions of section 92 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the recently promulgated rule of the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) on MAFR (the MAFR rule) in addressing the issue of mandatory auditor rotation in South Africa. The author considers whether the provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the MAFR rule are adequate to promote an independent and objective external audit function for companies, as well as transparency, efficiency and accountability, while providing certainty for companies and auditors. The author first examines some of the key principles and policy considerations relating to the external audit of companies – namely, the significance of audits and auditors in the financial markets as well as the value of auditor independence and objectivity. This is followed by an examination of the provisions of section 92 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the recently promulgated MAFR rule in light of legislative developments in the United States, Canada, the European Union, Australia and India regarding mandatory rotation of auditors and audit partners. Based on the lessons to be drawn from the experiences of the above jurisdictions, the author then makes recommendations for appropriate reforms for South Africa in this important area of company law. This is followed by some concluding remarks.

scholarly journals How Investors Perceive Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation in Korea

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sook Kim ◽  
Seon Kim ◽  
Dong Lee ◽  
Seung Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The Impact

Credible audit quality is a precondition for a firm’s sustainability. External auditors offer assurance with regard to the uncertain factors that can jeopardize a firm’s sustainability and provide audit opinions that help investors assess risk. After the global crisis and accounting scandals, mandatory audit firm rotation has been implemented globally. However, few studies have investigated either the cost or the benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation. Prior studies provide only indirect evidence on the effects of audit firm tenure on audit quality/perceived audit quality. By discussing prior arguments, we examine how investors perceive the implementation of mandatory audit firm rotation in Korea. Using a unique and direct setting to examine our research question, we analyze the relationship between firms with mandatorily switched audit firms and the cost of equity capital from 2006 to 2008. We find that the mandatory change in the auditors has a negative association with the cost of equity capital. The results are robust to using the arithmetic mean of the cost of equity capital, lagged control variables, and the manufacturing industry effect. The results indicate that investors perceive that mandatory audit firm rotation provides an environment for qualified audits by enhancing auditor independence and skepticism, and thus decreases the cost of equity capital. This study helps to improve our understanding of the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation the information risk evaluations and provides political implications for policy makers by showing the benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation.

Estimates of Optimal Audit Firm Tenure Across Different Legal Regimes

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li (Lily) Z. Brooks ◽  
C. S. Agnes Cheng ◽  
Joseph A. Johnston ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt
Keyword(s):  
Quadratic Form ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Optimal Point ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Legal Regimes ◽  
Key Variables ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

Based on a quadratic form of audit tenure in explaining audit quality, we estimate a reference point that is potentially optimal for audit firm rotation for 22 countries across legal regimes with high versus low levels of investor protection. We find that our estimate for the high investor protection regime is longer than that for the low investor protection regime (24 years vs. 14 years for our main measure). However, very few firms from our sample would have been affected if there were a requirement of a mandatory rotation term, suggesting that mandatory audit firm rotation may not be necessary. In additional analyses, we not only evaluate the empirical validity of the quadratic form but also use various measures of our key variables, to conduct several other robustness tests. We continue to find a longer optimal point for countries with stronger investor protection in these robustness tests. Our findings imply that stronger country-level investor protection is a substitute for a shorter term of mandatory audit firm rotation.

scholarly journals Effects Of Rotation On Auditor Independence And Quality Of Audit Service In Malaysian Banking Industry

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kabiru Isa Dandago ◽  
Nur Diyana Binti Zamro
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Requirement ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
The Impact

This study highlights the nature of auditor rotation in the Malaysian banking industry and its effects on auditor independence and quality of audit service in the industry. To generate primary data for analysis, interviews were conducted on officials of two banking institutions and one accounting/audit firm. The study finds that there have not been significant changes in the annual appointment of auditors in the Malaysian banking institutions over the last ten years, suggesting that there is a good working relationship between the auditors (especially the Big4) and the banks. This allows room for continuous debate on the need for mandatory rotation as a<br />means for ensuring auditor independence and high audit quality in the Malaysian banking industry. In the absence of statutory/mandatory requirement for auditor rotation, it is recommended that the Malaysian banking institutions should be carefully evaluating the impact auditor rotation would have on the quality of audit work on their current and future financial statements, as they decide whether to rotate their auditors or not.

Developments in France regarding the mandatory rotation of auditors: Do they enhance auditors’ independence?

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Fournès Dattin
Keyword(s):  
Research Evidence ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
French Case ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The Impact

Mandatory rotation of auditors or of audit firms has been the subject of extensive debate among academics, professionals, and regulators, especially since the financial crisis of the 2000s. Does rotation enhance auditors’ independence and audit quality? The research evidence on the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation on audit quality and auditor independence is inconclusive. This article offers a historical approach to understanding the implementation of mandatory rotation, based on the French case. The auditing profession in France is strongly regulated, with four main provisions designed to reinforce auditors’ independence: prohibitions on a priori and a posteriori incompatibilities, a 6-year audit tenure, a ban on non-audit services, and the use of joint audit. The rotation of auditors was merely an additional and non-compulsory tool. However, in 2014, the European Commission decided to implement the mandatory rotation of audit firms despite the opposition of the French accounting profession and regulators. Does this suggest that the French model was ineffective? It probably does not. In this specific context of France, a mandatory rotation of audit firms would seem unlikely to enhance audit quality.

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