scholarly journals Hva skjer med religion i Schatzkis ‘tidrom’-aktivitet?

Author(s):  
Geir Afdal

Social space has received increased interest in the social sciences and in study of religion. Studies of religion frequently use theorists like Lefebvre, Harvey, Foucault, de Certeau and Massey. Schatzki’s theory of ‘timespace activity’ has received attention in the social sciences, less so in research on religion. This article gives an interpretation of timespace activity and discusses possible implications for the understanding of religion. Schatzki understands time and space as interwoven with social practices or activities. This means that social practices are not only the ‘doing-mode’ of society and religion, but a social ontology that understands the social as nexuses of social and material practices. Social practices are stretched out in time and space, and simultaneously, social practices do or produce time and space. Schatzki understands time and space not as separate and relating, but as intertwined. This interwoven character is expressed in the concept ‘timespace activity’. Furthermore, timespace activity has a teleoaffective structure. Practices and actors have drives towards something that is emotionally valuable. The paper argues that timespace activity can contribute to the understanding of religion, in the sense that religion is fundamentally everyday, impure practices, often in nexuses with numerous other practices. On this account religion is not practiced, religion is practice. Religion as practice produce timespaces and realities and affective drives which constitute the active positioning and negotiation of the participating actors.

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Nadia Ruiz

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendi Yogi Prabowo

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to propose a new analytical framework in examining corruption from the social ontology perspective by using the Schatzkian practice theory to assess the interconnectedness among social practices constituting the social reality. Design/methodology/approach This exploratory paper is part of the author’s study to assess the complex corruption phenomenon in Indonesia from multiple perspectives to gain a better understanding of its nature and dynamics. By drawing from the existing literature on the Schatzkian practice theory, the COVID-19 pandemic and the corruption phenomenon, this study investigates the potential changes of the new constellation of practice-arrangement bundles within the social reality and how such changes may alter corruption practices in the future. Furthermore, this study also uses publicly available reports from several national and international agencies to explore possible future scenarios from the interconnectedness of corruption, anti-corruption and pandemic practices. This paper constructs a new analytical framework for assessing the corruption phenomenon and designing the most appropriate anti-corruption strategy from such an exploration. The framework also serves as a reference for future anti-corruption research. Findings The author establishes that all social phenomena are constructed by an interconnected, dynamic and ever-changing constellation of practice-arrangement bundles within the social reality. As a largely social phenomenon (at least in Indonesia), corruption is also constructed by webs of practice-arrangement bundles. For decades, corruption practices in Indonesia have always been interconnected with anti-corruption practices in ways that changes in one group of practices will drive changes in the others. With the adoption of the pandemic practices centered around social distancing, social restriction and social safety net, corruption practices appear to transform to adapt to the new environment. Therefore, future anti-corruption research should aim to examine the structure and dynamics of corruption, anti-corruption and pandemic practices to highlight changes or potential changes within the three groups of practices to determine the most appropriate intervention measures and anti-corruption strategy. Research limitations/implications This exploratory study is self-funded and relies primarily on documentary analysis to explore the corruption phenomenon in Indonesia. Future studies will benefit from in-depth interviews with former corruption offenders and corruption investigators. Practical implications This exploratory paper contributes to developing a sound corruption prevention strategy by proposing a new analytical framework for assessing various social practices, particularly those associated with corruption and the COVID-19 pandemic. Originality/value This paper highlights the importance of understanding the structure, interconnectedness and dynamics of social practices, particularly associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, to better understand the corruption phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Rubens Ramón Méndez

Cuando el Trabajo Social comenzó a sistematizarse y a organizarse a partir de Mary Richmond, se proponía como un programa de investigación distinto dentro de las Ciencias Sociales (Lakatos, 1999). Distinto porque toma los planteos teóricos dados en las Ciencias Sociales desde �las circunstancias históricamente determinadas y existencialmente posicionadas; creando nuevas perspectivas sobre esos planteos teóricos� (Méndez, 2006) y porque con su práctica profesional, evalúa y muestra el problema de las consecuencias efectivas y potenciales de la utilización de los conocimientos (Dewey, 1967) en la construcción de las prácticas sociales (discursivas o no discursivas).Presentar la emergencia de un discurso propio de las personas y documentar lo real de las prácticas sociales, mostrar cómo es que a algunos enunciados que no son en sí mismos ni verdaderos ni falsos, se les otorgan el �estatuto de verdad�; es lo que hace que el Trabajo Social deba ser vigilado y desarmado en sus efectos.Si el discurso no es el medio por lo que se establecen las luchas en esta sociedad de discursos; sino que es por el discurso, por lo que se lucha. Si el discurso es �aquel poder del que quiere uno adueñarse� (Foucault, 1983), las Ciencias Sociales no podían dejar al azar el discurso del Trabajo Social.When Social Work became systematized and organized after Mary Richmond, it was described as a different research program within the social sciences (Lakatos, 1999). It was different because it considered the theoretical propositions in the social sciences from �historically determined and existentially positioned circumstances, thereby creating new perspectives on those theoretical propositions� (Méndez, 2006) and because through professional practice Social Work assesses and highlights the problem of the real and potential consequences of the use of knowledge in the construction of social practices (Dewey, 1967), whether discursive or non-discursive.As Social Work presents the emergence of people�s own discourse and documents the reality of social practices while it also presents statements which are neither true nor false as necessary truths, Social Work should be watched and disarmed in its consequences.Discourse is not the means through which fights are established in our discourse society; it is discourse that is fought about. If discourse is �that power we wish to get hold of� (Foucault, 1983), then the social sciences should not ignore the discourse of Social Work.


Author(s):  
Виктор Александрович Куприянов

Статья посвящена анализу понятий «механизм» и «организм» в социальной философии С.Л. Франка. Социально-философская концепция Франка помещается в широкий контекст философии XIX-начала XX вв. В статье исследуются связи социальной философии Франка и органических теорий государства и общества. Автор статьи приводит обзор органических теорий: демонстрируется их генезис в немецком классическом идеализме и анализируются подходы, наиболее распространенные в XIX в. В статье обосновывается, что органические теории государства исторически связаны с телеологией И. Канта. Именно в философии Канта впервые появляется важное для философии XIX в. противопоставление организма и механизма. В статье указывается, что специфика этого подхода заключается не столько в естественнонаучной аналогии, сколько в интерпретации отношений части и целого. Автор показывает, что оппозиция механизма и организма сыграла важную роль в истории органических представлений об обществе. Русская социально-философская и политологическая мысль рассматривается в контексте общего развития социальных наук XIX в. Русские философы и обществоведы позаимствовали из западной философии идею оппозиции социального механизма и органицизма. На этой основе в России были выработаны аналогичные философско-правовые концепции, которые также можно отнести к традиции органицизма. Автор относит социально-философскую концепцию С.Л. Франка также к указанной традиции социального органицизма. В статье приводится реконструкция социальной философии Франка и отмечается, что его подход близок к идеям, получившим развитие в немецком классической идеализме. Указывается, что Франк критиковал не органическую теорию как таковую, а распространенную в его время натуралистическую концепцию, отождествлявшую общество с организмом. В этой связи автор показывает вклад Франка в историю органических представлений об обществе. The article is devoted to the analysis of the notions «mechanism» and «organism» in S.L. Frank’s social philosophy. The sociophilosophical conception of S.L. Frank is considered in the context of the philosophy of the XIXth - beginning of the XXth centuries. The article deals with the relations of S.L. Frank’s philosophy to the organic theories of society. The author gives an overview of the organic theories: their genesis in the German idealism and analysis of the widespread approaches in the XIXth century philosophy. The article shows that the organic theories were historically connected with the teleology of I. Kant. I. Kant was the first to propose the very opposition of organism and mechanism. The author points out that the speceficity of this approach consists rather in the interpretation of the relations between the part and the whole, than in the scientific analogy. The author shows that this opposition played a significant role in the organic theory of society. Russian social philosophy and political science are considered in the general context of the social sciences of the XIXth century. Russian philosophers and social sciences borrowed the idea of mechanism and organism from the western philosophy. Based on this approach they developed their own conceptions which can also be referred to the organic tradition. The author refers S.L. Frank’s social philosophy to the tradition of social organism. The article reconstructs the Frank’s social philosophy and points out that his approach is derived from the German classical idealism. It is shown that Frank did not criticized the very organic theory, his criticism was directed against naturalistic theories of his time. The author of the article shows the Frank’s contribution to the organic theory of society.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (31) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Lidiane Soares Rodrigues

Em sondagem realizada junto a marxistas brasileiros, as principais filiações distribuíram-se do seguinte modo: Gramsci(nianos) reuniu 33,2% da população; Lukács(ianos), 25,8%; Escola de Frankfurt(ianos), 10,5% e Althusser(ianos), 7,2%. A mesma sondagem indagou a fluência em língua estrangeira, obtendo respostas para: espanhol, de 49% da população; para inglês, de 46,0%; para francês, de 20%; para italiano, de 8% e, para alemão, de 2,9% (a cifra de 26% declarou não ter fluência em idioma estrangeiro). É notável que a língua nativa dos autores não corresponda à língua estrangeira de mais domínio dos marxistas (por exemplo, enquanto 33,2% são gramscinianos; apenas 8% declaram-se fluentes em italiano). Esta decalagem indica que o domínio da língua nativa dos autores de filiação consiste num recurso diferencial que confere vantagens  competitivas aos agentes. O presente artigo tratará dos efeitos da assimetria de capital linguístico no espaço social dos marxistas brasileiros.Palavras-chave: Marxismo. Ciências  sociais brasileiras. Capital linguístico.Power, sex and languages among brazilian marxistsAbstractIn a survey of Brazilian Marxists, the main affiliations were distributed as follows:-Gramsci(nianos) gathered 33.2% of the population; Lukács(ianos), 25.8%; Frankfurt(ianos) School, 10.5% and Althusser(ianos), 7.2%. The same survey asked for fluency in a foreign language, obtaining answers for: Spanish, 49% of the population; English, 46.0%; French, 20%; Italian, 8%; and German, 2.9% (the figure of 26% declared to have no fluency in a foreign language). It is notable that the native language of the authors does not correspond to the foreign language most spoken by Marxists (for example, while 33.2% are gramscinese; only 8% are fluent in Italian).This difference indicates that mastery of the native language of the authors of affiliation is a differential resource which gives a competitive advantage to the agents. This article will deal with the effects of the asymmetry of linguistic capital on the social space of Brazilian Marxists.Keywords: Marxism. Brazilian Social sciences. linguistic capital.


Author(s):  
Eric Fabri

This chapter addresses ontology, which is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of being. As a branch of metaphysics, ontology is mainly concerned with the modes of existence of different entities (tangible and intangible). Every subdiscipline in the social sciences relies on an ontology that defines which elements really matter when it comes to explaining the phenomenon they set out to elucidate. A specific branch of ontology is devoted to the modes of existence of social phenomena: social ontology. Two main positions emerge: realism and constructivism. Scientific realism assumes that social phenomena have an objective existence, independent of the subject. By contrast, constructivism claims that social phenomena have no objective existence and are a construction of the human mind. Its fundamental axiom is that, even if reality exists outside the subject’s perception, the subject cannot reach it without perceiving it. This implies the mediation of imaginary structures, which are provided by social groups. It is important to note, however, that many other positions exist apart from realism and constructivism.


Author(s):  
Jens Brockmeier

This chapter is concerned with changes in the understanding of remembering and forgetting. It pays particular attention to the emergence of alternative visions that challenge the traditional archival model of memory and offers new ways to conceive of mnemonic practices as cultural practices. Starting with a discussion of archival models in contemporary scientific memory research, it then examines new models of memory that aim to capture what archival models tend to ignore: the social, societal, and cultural dynamic of human remembering. In this way, the focus shifts to postarchival memory models that have emerged in clinical disciplines, the social sciences, and the humanities. The chapter concludes by discussing one approach to remembering and forgetting that conceives of them as inherently social practices—as practices that, it is suggested, should be understood after the model of conversation rather than the archival model of individual retrieval.


2019 ◽  
pp. 175069801987608
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Blustein

It is commonplace to attribute memories to groups of individuals both large and small. Attributions of memories to groups are also found in social science research. This article proposes using philosophical accounts from the literature on social ontology to help clarify and deepen our understanding of how these terms are being employed in the social sciences. Two contrasting accounts of collective remembering are presented: the joint commitment account derived from the seminal work of Margaret Gilbert, and the participatory intentions account based on Christopher Kutz’s analysis of collective action. The implications of these accounts for clarifying notions of collective memory and remembering in the social sciences are explored through two case studies—one involving a social media site that promotes sharing of memories among users and the other concerning organizational remembering.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Little

AbstractThis article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.


Author(s):  
Jan Hoogland

The concept of social practices has received growing attention in interpretative social sciences. This concept is based on a long tradition of hermeneutical, interpretative, action-theoretical, pragmatist, and phenomenological theories in the social sciences, starting with Weber's famous definition of social action. In this chapter, some crucial stepping stones of this tradition are highlighted. In the line of these theories, a new approach of normative practices will be introduced, partially based on core philosophical insights of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. Central features of this approach are 1) the multi-layered, intrinsically normative structure of social practices (constitutive side) and 2) the importance of regulative convictions, ideals, and attitudes leading the disclosure and development of those practices (regulative side).


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