scholarly journals Integrated Moral Agency and the Practical Phenomenon of Moral Diversity

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moehler
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Theory Building ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Moral Diversity ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Moral Theorizing

The practical phenomenon of moral diversity is a central feature of many contemporary societies and poses a distinct problem to moral theory building. Because of its goal to settle the moral question fully and exclusively and/or to provide better understanding of moral disagreement, traditional first-order moral theory often does not provide sufficient guidance to address this phenomenon and moral agency in deeply morally diverse societies. In this article, I move beyond traditional first-order moral theorizing and, based on multilevel social contract theory (Moehler 2018, 2020a), develop a practically sound notion of moral agency for morally diverse societies. The interrelational and dynamic notion of integrated moral agency developed in this article demands that agents actively exercise their rational and affective capacities, are receptive to the capacities of others, and are aware of the type of moral interaction in which they engage with others. The notion of integrated moral agency helps agents to reconcile conflicting first-order moral directives and to maximally protect agents’ autonomy in morally diverse societies.

Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl W. Spurgin
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Way

Abstract:In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore.

Minimal Morality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moehler
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Diversity ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Restricted Form ◽  
Pluralistic Societies ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
Just Society

This book develops a novel multilevel social contract theory that, in contrast to existing theories in the liberal tradition, does not merely assume a restricted form of reasonable moral pluralism, but is tailored to the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies that may be populated by liberal moral agents, nonliberal moral agents, and, according to the traditional understanding of morality, nonmoral agents alike. To develop this theory, the book draws on the history of the social contract tradition, especially the work of Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Gauthier, as well as on the work of some of the critics of this tradition, such as Sen and Gaus. The two-level contractarian theory holds that morality in its best contractarian version for the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies entails Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. The theory defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure, compared to violent conflict resolution, mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply morally pluralistic societies. The theory minimizes the problem of compliance by maximally respecting the interests of all members of society. Despite its ideal nature, the theory is, in principle, applicable to the real world and, for the conditions described, most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral diversity, is unattainable. If Rawls’ intention was to carry the traditional social contract argument to a higher level of abstraction, then the two-level contractarian theory brings it back down to earth.

Moral Responsibility, Socially Embedded

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Herzog
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Human Behaviour ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
The Face ◽  
Moral Theorizing ◽  
The Impact

This chapter asks whether we can hold on to the picture of the morally responsible subject as we knew it in the face of evidence from social psychology about the impact of contexts on human behaviour. Some theorists have taken this to present a major challenge to moral theorizing. However, the chapter argues that, while we should acknowledge the malleability of human behaviour, we should not give up the notion of responsible agency. Rather, we need to broaden our theoretical horizon in order to include individuals’ co-responsibility for the contexts in which they act. This argument is a general one, but it is of particular relevance for organizations: it is our shared responsibility to turn them into contexts in which moral agency is supported rather than undermined.

The Maximum Claims of Gauthier's Bargainers: Are the Fixed Social Inequalities Acceptable?

Dialogue ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-429
Author(s):  
David Braybrooke
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
Social Contract Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Relative Advantage ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Maximum Utility ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
Principle Of Maximum

A central feature of David Gauthier's impressively searching version of social contract theory is the principle of maximin relative advantage. Given certain assumptions—more than he originally thought—this principle may be described as calling for maximum equal advantage, which is easier to talk about; and I shall refer to the principle under this description. Maximum equal relative advantage is equivalent to minimum equal relative concession; hence the principle of maximum equal relative advantage has a twin and mirror, the principle of minimum equal relative concession. Relative advantage and relative concession are ratios with the same denominator, the difference for a given agent between the maximum utility (umax) that she might get from the societyt o be contracted for and the minimum utility (umin) that would give her an incentive to cooperate in establishing the society and in keeping it up. The numerator for the one ratio—relative advantage—is the difference between the utility that she is actually going to gain from society (ua) and her minimum cooperative utility (umin). The numerator for the other ratio—relative concession—is the difference between her maximum utility (umax) and the utility that she is going to get (ua), in other words, the amount of utility that she foregoes in not getting her maximum.

scholarly journals Moral distress: Ethically appropriate actions

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (Supplement_3) ◽  
Author(s):  
E Maeckelberghe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Distress ◽  
Original Description ◽  
Moral Integrity ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Given ◽  
Psychological Dimensions ◽  
Original Concept ◽  
Ethical Situation

Abstract Andrew Jameton in 1984 coined the concept of moral distress as: “knowing what to do in an ethical situation, but not being allowed to do it” This original description presupposes that the right moral act can be identified and precludes situations of doubt and uncertainty. The 1984 definition emphasizes barriers that make it impossible for someone to do what they ought to do. Whereas Jameton in a revision in 2013 of his original concept emphasized reduction of the psychological dimensions, Peter& Liaschenko stress the element of moral agency. Moral distress then is a threat to the moral integrity of the professional. This requires three-step ananlysis: first, what is the moral question?; two, what are morally adeguate answers to this question?; three, what ethically appropriate actions are under pressure in the given situation? This will be illustrated with examples from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Reciprocity in Morality and Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Thought

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.

Designing Realistic Utopia

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Sirsch
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Theory Building ◽  
Recent Criticism ◽  
Critical Perspective ◽  
Practical Guidance ◽  
Theoretical Thinking ◽  
Constructivist Approaches

Building on the work of John Rawls, this book offers a conception of ideal theory which provides practical guidance and a critical perspective on politics, institutions and society. The author develops this approach by discussing recent criticism of ideal theory by authors such as Amartya Sen and Raymond Geuss. Answering Sen’s criticism, the author proposes a novel account of feasibility in relation to ideal theory, especially with regard to ideal institutional design. As a reply to Geuss’ criticism, he discusses constructivist approaches of moral theory-building. Building on this discussion, the book develops an account of practical ideal–theoretical thinking that can be used for evaluating and criticizing societies and can guide institutional design under nonideal conditions.

Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 319-346
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kukla
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Perceptual Skills ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Crucial Component ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral perception, as the term is used in moral theory, is the perception of normatively contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in practical reason and judgment concerning these particulars. The idea that our capacity for moral perception is a crucial component of our capacity for moral reasoning and agency finds its most explicit origin in Aristotle, for whom virtue begins with the quality of perception. The focus on moral perception within moral theory has made a comeback in the last few decades, especially in the hands of self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelians such as John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Nancy Sherman. For these writers, our perceptual capacities are not static, and the laborious honing of our perceptual skills is a crucial moral task. On this picture, as Nancy Sherman puts it, “How to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry as what to do.”Moral particularists—including but not restricted to the neo-Aristotelians—have emphasized the centrality of moral perception to moral agency and judgment, as a corrective to moral theories that treat deliberation in terms of universal principles as the privileged keystone of moral agency.

scholarly journals The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
DALE DORSEY
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Act Consequentialism

Many find it plausible to posit a category of supererogatory actions. But the supererogatory resists easy analysis. Traditionally, supererogatory actions are characterized as actions that are morally good, but not morally required; actions that go ‘beyond’ the call of our moral obligations. As I shall argue in this article, however, the traditional analysis can be accepted only by a view with troubling consequences concerning the structure of the moral point of view. I propose a different analysis that is extensionally correct, avoids the problems of the traditional view, and, incidentally, also defuses any objection to act-consequentialism, or any other first-order moral theory, on grounds that it cannot accommodate the supererogatory.

scholarly journals Animal Ethics and Politics Beyond the Social Contract

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-222
Author(s):  
Alan Reynolds
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Political Problem ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Political Actions

This paper is divided into three sections. First, I describe the wide plurality of views on issues of animal ethics, showing that our disagreements here are deep and profound. This fact of reasonable pluralism about animal ethics presents a political problem. According to the dominant liberal tradition of political philosophy, it is impermissible for one faction of people to impose its values upon another faction of people who reasonably reject those values. Instead, we are obligated to justify our political actions to each other using reasons that everyone can accept. Thus, in the second section I suggest that our condition of reasonable pluralism inspires us to turn toward some form of contractarianism. The social contract tradition emerged precisely as an attempt to think about how a society characterized by deep moral disagreement could nonetheless agree about the basic principles of justice. I will show, in this section, that although the social contract tradition would seem to contain the best tools for thinking about how to deal with moral disagreement, it fails to help us think through the important issues of animal ethics. In the concluding section, I suggest some ways in which political philosophy might move beyond contractarianism when thinking about this issue, including embracing an agonistic style of politics.

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