Takeover

Uprooted ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregor Thum
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Washington State ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Population Exchange ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Washington State Department ◽  
German Reich ◽  
Full Swing ◽  
East Prussia

This chapter talks about the impending Polish takeover of the German territories. On August 2, 1945, the Allies decided to remove from the German Reich all territories east of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers and place them under Polish administration, with the exception of northern East Prussia, which was to be ceded to the Soviet Union. By this point in time a Polish mayor was already in office in Breslau and the population exchange was in full swing. However, before the Allies had reached an agreement about the precise location of the new German–Polish border, and while experts in the London Foreign Office and the Washington State Department were still reviewing the economic and logistical consequences of the various border proposals, the Soviet government and the Soviet-installed Polish regime had resolved the border issue on their own.

scholarly journals British Attempts to Forge a Political Partnership with the Kremlin, 1942–3

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-211
Author(s):  
Martin H. Folly
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
European Settlement ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Mixed Messages ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Different Cultures

In February 1943, the British Foreign Office launched an initiative to open discussions with the Soviet Union on postwar aims, a subject which had been off-limits since the disputes over Soviet frontiers during the negotiation of the Anglo–Soviet Treaty in early 1942. Joseph Stalin’s response was to treat the approach seriously, and to request concrete proposals that would lead to a firm formal agreement. The British immediately pulled back, and no progress on political issues was attempted until later in the war. This article analyses this rarely-discussed episode, focusing on how British indecisiveness, at a crucial stage of the war, and the lack of political will of Anthony Eden, led to confusion and mixed messages being sent to the Soviet government. Attempts to build a solid political component to the wartime alliance and to reach agreement on the key issues of a postwar European settlement prior to the end of the war were delayed not so much by the ideological gulf between the allies as their different cultures of diplomacy and the customary processes of their bureaucracies. Ultimately progress was made when each began to adopt elements of the approach of the other.

Generals, Statesmen, and International Politics in Europe, 1898-1945The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence, 1933-1940 by Martin S. Alexander. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992. xiv, 573 pp. $94.95 U.S.Churchill, edited by Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis. New York, W.W. Norton, 1993. xv, 579 pp. $46.99.Louis Loucheur and the Shaping of Modem France, 1916-1931 by Stephen D. Carls. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Louisiana State University Press, 1993. xv, 330 pp.Churchill: The End of Glory, A Political Biography by John Charmley. Toronto, MacFarlane Walter and Ross, 1993. viii, 742 pp. $45.00.The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914 by M. B. Hayne. Don Mills, Ontario, Clarendon Press, 1993. 328 pp. $78.95.When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics by Jon S. Jacobson. Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1994. xi, 388 pp. $18.00 U.S.Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War by R.A.C. Parker. London, Macmillan, 1993. 388 pp. £12.99.Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937 by Gaines Post, Jr. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1993. xiii, 363 pp. $48.50 U.S.

1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Jabara Carley
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
World Politics ◽  
State University ◽  
World War ◽  
Political Biography ◽  
Cornell University ◽  
Louisiana State University ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Office

Soviet Defectors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Riehle
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Privileged Information ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Threat Perceptions ◽  
Aggregate Analysis ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Decision Making System ◽  
The Stability

This book identifies 88 Soviet intelligence officers who defected from 1924 to 1954 and provides an aggregate analysis of their information to uncover Soviet strategic priorities and concerns. When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state, and thereby they open a window into a closed national security decision making system. The book provides the most comprehensive list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors compiled to date representing a variety of specializations. Through the information they provided in now-declassified debriefings, documents they brought with them, and post-defection publications and public appearances, this book shows the evolution of Soviet threat perceptions and the development of the "main enemy" concept in the Soviet national security system. It also shows fluctuations in the Soviet recruitment and vetting of personnel for sensitive national security positions, corresponding with fluctuations in the stability of the Soviet government. The shifting motivations of these officers also reveals the pressures that they were experiencing at the time, leading to their choice to break with the Soviet Union.

“Ballet Is a Flower”

2020 ◽  
pp. 97-128
Author(s):  
Anne Searcy
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
York City ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
George Balanchine ◽  
The Soviet Union

Chapter 4 analyzes New York City Ballet’s (NYCB’s) 1962 tour of the Soviet Union and the Soviet reception of NYCB choreographer George Balanchine. Previous scholarly accounts have claimed the Soviet reviews of Balanchine’s works were heavily censored, and that, as a result, the tour undermined the authority of the Soviet government with the intelligentsia. Chapter 4 re-examines this tour, using transliteration as a way of modeling the Soviet response to Balanchine. This re-examination shows that Soviet cultural authorities were not at all hostile to the choreographer or his company. The Soviet critics mostly accepted Balanchine’s ballets, but they reframed his accomplishments within their own debates about drambalet and choreographic symphonism. According to Balanchine’s Soviet critics, his works were successful precisely because they reaffirmed the value of the Russian systems of training, artistry, and meaning.

Stepping Back from the Third World: Soviet Policy toward the United Arab Republic, 1965–1967

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Laron
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Third World ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
United Arab Republic ◽  
The Third ◽  
Military Involvement ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Small Powers

This article shows that for two years prior to the June 1967 Six-Day Mideast War, Soviet-Egyptian relations had begun to fray because the Soviet Union wanted to loosen its ties with radical regimes in the Third World, including Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Soviet leaders urged Nasser to reform the Egyptian economy, decrease Egypt's military involvement in Yemen, and allow the Soviet Navy unfettered access to Egyptian ports. But like numerous other small powers during the Cold War, Egypt was able to fend off the pressure of its superpower ally. In May 1967, when Egypt unilaterally decided to bring its forces into the Sinai, Soviet leaders were divided over how to respond to the crisis that engulfed the Middle East. In the end, the more cautious faction in Moscow prevailed, and the Soviet government continued to be wary of becoming embroiled in conflicts initiated by radical Third World regimes.

scholarly journals Non-Soviet Perspectives on the Great Famine: A Comparative Analysis of British, Italian, Polish, and German Sources

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 444-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Fonzi
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Great Famine ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThe present contribution analyzes systematically diplomatic reports written by German, Italian, British, and Polish representatives in the Soviet Union at the time of the Great Famine. Based on both published documents and unpublished archival sources, the article examines comparatively the perception of the Great Famine in these four countries. After providing a short overview of the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the four countries at the time of the famine, this article examines how German, Italian, British, and Polish diplomats explained three key issues for understanding the Great Famine: (1) the role of the conflicts between state and peasantry in unleashing the famine; (2) the issue of whether the Soviet government intentionally caused the famine; and (3) the role of intentions in the development of the famine and the relationship between the nationalities policy of the Soviet government and the famine.

The Anti-Religious Campaign in the Soviet Union

1955 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. S. Timasheff
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Russian Orthodox ◽  
National Council ◽  
Orthodox Church ◽  
Russian Orthodox Church ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Religious Policy ◽  
Movie Theaters ◽  
The Soviet Union

During the years 1939–45, a spectacular change occurred in the anti-religious policy of the Soviet government. The pattern of direct persecution was discarded and replaced by a more subtle pattern of ostentatious compromise in combination with indirect pressure. The compromise was publicly demonstrated at the meeting of the National Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (January-February 1945) convoked, by permission of the Soviet government, to elect a new Patriarch in place of the deceased Sergius. The Council was attended by a number of high dignitaries of the non-Russian Orthodox Churches; many of them were flown to the Council in Soviet bombers. At the end of the Council, a gala reception was organized for its members by G. Karpov, the chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Orthodox Church; during that reception two choirs could be heard, the Patriarch's choir and the Moscow Philharmonic choir sponsored by the Soviet government. The enthroning of the new Patriarch Alexei was filmed and the film displayed in all the movie theaters of the Union.

The Oil Deal: Nariman Narimanov and the Sovietization of Azerbaijan

Slavic Review ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 372-394
Author(s):  
Sara Brinegar
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Identity Politics ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
The South ◽  
South Caucasus ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Soviet History ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Russia

This essay, with a focus on Baku, Azerbaijan, demonstrates that the need to secure and hold energy resources—and the infrastructures that support them—was critical to the formation of the Soviet Union. The Azerbaijani statesman Nariman Narimanov played a pivotal role in the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan by attempting to use Baku's oil to secure prerogatives for the Azerbaijan SSR. In part, Narimanov gained his position by striking a deal with Vladimir Lenin in 1920, an arrangement that I am calling the oil deal. This deal lay the foundations of Soviet power in the south Caucasus. Lenin charged Narimanov with facilitating connections between the industrial stronghold of Baku and the rural countryside of Azerbaijan and Narimanov agreed to do what he could to help supply Soviet Russia with oil. Lenin put Narimanov in charge of the Soviet government of Azerbaijan, with the understanding that he would be granted significant leeway in cultural policies. Understanding the role of the south Caucasus in Soviet history, then, is also understanding how the extraction and use of oil and other natural resources were entangled with more familiar questions of nationalities policy and identity politics.

Council of Foreign Ministers

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
German Economy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Foreign Ministers

Proposed Meeting of the Council: Meeting in Prague on October 20 and 21, 1950, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, eastern Germany and the Soviet Union issued a statement in reply to the communiqué on Germany released on September 19 by the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Charging that the position of the three western governments was merely a screen to conceal the aggressive objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the creation of mobile police formations was nothing less than the reconstitution of a German army, the eight foreign ministers stated that they considered as urgent 1) the publication by the three western powers and the Soviet Union of a statement of their intent to refuse to permit German rearmament and of their unswerving determination to create a united peace-loving German state; 2) the removal of all restrictions hindering the development of the peaceful German economy and the prevention of a resurgence of German war potential; 3) the conclusion of a German treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year of its conclusion; and 4) the creation of an all-German constituent council to prepare for a provisional German government. The text of the communiqué was communicated to the United Kingdom, the United States and France under cover of a Soviet note on November 3. Stating that the Prague declaration possessed “the greatest significance for the cause of assuring international peace and security” and touched the “fundamental national interests of the peoples of Europe,” the Soviet government proposed the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers „for consideration of the question of fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement regarding demilitarization of Germany.”

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