The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy

Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis

This chapter examines the role of domestic political interests in the selection of U.S. cases for World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudication. It first considers how the United States has taken a lead role in the area of trade law enforcement before discussing how legislative constraints and interest group pressure operate in U.S. trade policy. The Kodak–Fuji WTO dispute between the United States and Japan is used to illustrate an example of politicized selection of a case for adjudication. The chapter also analyzes U.S. complaints about market access barriers by leading trade partners. By identifying potential trade disputes, it shows why some cases go forward to adjudication. It also explains how the WTO disputes served an important role in the executive strategy to manage domestic pressure from Congress for a more aggressive policy against China.

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Yagoub Elryah ◽  

Trade policy among the G20 has emerged as one of the challenges the group faces during the last decade after the 2008 global financial crisis. This paper aims at analyzing the current trade disputes between China and the United States and the efforts the G20 has taken to settle these disputes. The fundamental questions this study attempts to answer are as follows: (1) what the US–China trade dispute means for the world trading system? (2) what the G20 can do to prevent destructive trade wars? We confront this view by critically examining a large body of evidence on the effects of trade policy on economically important outcomes. We begin with a discussion of the role of G20 in stabilizing world economy. We show the G20’s recent economic and trade development challenges and measurements of trade policy and identification of its causal effects. We present the trade balance between the United States and China. We also illustrate the efforts made by the G20 in promoting the development of China–US trade cooperation. Data were collected from different sources. Data are collected from the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) publications, and the G20 summits’ reports. The results show that the United States has a trade deficit with China, and the global growth would be notably curtailed as investment and consumer spending fall back. The G20 should focus on supporting the WTO, being upfront about the mixed effects of trade and investment, and improving G20 measures to tackle protectionism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-142

In the fall of 2019, the Trump administration reached several trade arrangements, some of them tentative, with important U.S. trade partners. On October 11, 2019, China and the United States announced a preliminary trade deal subject to finalization—one that came after more than a year of escalating tariffs. Just a week earlier, the United States had signed two trade agreements with Japan, one regarding tariff reductions and the other regarding digital trade. None of these deals appear to require subsequent congressional approval in the eyes of the executive branch, unlike the earlier United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA), which was signed in November 2018 and whose fate in Congress appears promising as of mid-December of 2019. In addition to these trade arrangements, the fall of 2019 saw several developments in trade relations between the United States and the European Union tied to the long-running trade disputes.


2019 ◽  
pp. 58-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrey Urnov

As a self-proclaimed “Global Leader” the United States have made “the assertion, advancement, support and defense of democracy” throughout the world one of the pillars of their foreign policy. This aim invariably figures in all Washington’s program documents pertaining to Africa. A major component of these efforts is an assistance to regular, free and fair elections. The selection of arguments cited to justify such activities has been done skilfully. In each specific case it is emphasized that the United States do not side with any competing party, stand “above the battle”, work for the perfection of electoral process, defend the rights of opposition and rank and file votes, render material and technical help to national electoral committees. Sounds irreproachable. However, the real situation is different. The study of the US practical activities in this field allows to conclude that Washington has one-sidedly awarded itself a role of a judge and supervisor of developments related to elections in the sovereign countries of Africa, tries to control the ways they are prepared and conducted. These activities signify an interference into the internal affairs of African states. The scale and forms of such interference differ and is subjected to tasks the USA try to resolve in this or that country on the national, regional or global levels. However, everywhere it serves as an instrument of penetration and strengthening of the US influence, enhancing the US political presence in African countries. The right of the US to perform this role is presented as indisputable. Sceptics are branded as opponents of democracy. The author explores the US positions and activities connected with elections in Africa during the last years of B.Obama and first two years of D.Trump presidencies. He shows how their policy have been implemented on the continental level and in regard to several countries – South Sudan, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Nigeria, Somali, Kenya, Uganda.


Author(s):  
S. S. DMITRIEV

The article explores the Trump administration’s trade policy,  characterized by: attempts to rewrite the rules of international trade  according to the regulations established by the American side, “skepticism” with respect to the international regulatory  institutions of foreign trade, a course on the renegotiation of the  existing agreements. In a relationship with a number of countries,  manifestations of “ultimatizm” – the desire to negotiate with them from a position of strength are becoming increasingly evident.  Relapses of economic isolationism under the slogan “Restore the Greatness of America” periodically are being transformed into  concrete protectionist actions. The number of imposed import restrictions is growing, and their arsenal is expanding. It is  concluded, that tightening of the market access to the domestic  market for foreign suppliers is unlikely to lead to a significant  reduction in the US trade deficit. Bet on abandoning multilateral  arrangements in favor of bilateral trade agreements, conscious  downplaying of the role and importance of the WTO and other  international institutions can also be counterproductive. Focus on  dominance in the sphere of foreign economic activity apparently will remain the main direction of Trump trade policy until the end of the  term of his administration. However, under pressure from competitors, and because of the lack of real allies, the United States  will be forced to demonstrate greater flexibility and pragmatism, the  propensity to compromise and to establishment of temporary or  permanent blocs with their main trading partners. The idea of  “normality”, refraining from populism, will gradually begin to return  to the trade policy of this country. If, however the Trump  government will continue to act in isolation, without taking into  account the opinion of the world community, an increasing number  of partners of the United States will perceive it not as a leader, but as a violator of the rules of international trade. Under certain  circumstances, such a policy can provoke local and global trade  conflicts. In addition, the United States not necessarily will have to be the winner in them.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (57) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
José Oviedo Pérez

Over the past decade, Venezuela has entered into a deep recession, which has resulted in millions migrating abroad. In February of 2019, the United States and its allies recognized the interim government of Juan Guaidó, creating a standoff with the Chavista government of Nicolás Maduro. This article conducts a nuanced analysis of the situation in Venezuela across multiple levels as it problematizes our ontological understanding of individuals, states, and international system. Through a post-structuralist approach to security, I argue that individuals have been portrayed in contradictory humanitarian discourses as a means of advancing particular political interests. Furthermore, I critically analyze the role of space, time, and multilateralism, and their subsequent effects for 21stcentury global order.


Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis

This chapter examines the effectiveness of legal complaints to bring an end to trade disputes. Using quantitative data from the United States, it shows that when comparing similar kinds of disputes and trade partners, states gained better outcomes through the dispute mechanism. Conditioning on the fact that the most politicized cases are selected for World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudication, the legal forum is quite effective for dispute settlement. The chapter applies statistical techniques of matching to the sample of negotiated trade barriers to adjust for their propensity to be raised in adjudication, and then conducts regression analysis of dispute outcomes in terms of policy change. The results show that adjudication increases the probability of progress to resolve the complaint by one-third. Furthermore, a duration model that controls for the variables that influence strategy selection illustrates how adjudication reduces the time to removal of the barrier.


Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis

This chapter examines the role of courts in the ability of democratic politicians to support international commitments. Taking a closer look at the domestic political origins of trade disputes is necessary to understand the demand for adjudication. The logic of tied hands and two-level games in bargaining has influenced a large research agenda that brings together analysis of domestic politics and international relations. In particular, existing scholarship highlights the role for domestic politics in the area of trade. The chapter develops hypotheses about how variation in domestic politics affects the demand for use of adjudication in dispute settlement. It also explains how political pressures that shape conditions for liberalization of trade policy also affect trade law enforcement.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof J. Pelc

AbstractThe role of legitimacy in international relations is a topic of much debate, yet there is little understanding of the mechanism behind it. Here I address this discrepancy by asking: are state threats perceived as (il)legitimate more or less likely to be successful? By operationalizing illegitimacy as unilateral action in the presence of a multilateral option, I consider the variation in the success of U.S. trade measures from 1975 to 2000. As I show, the (il)legitimacy of threats modifies the nature of the signal sent by concessions to those threats, and this effect can be measured and predicted. I find that, controlling for material pressure, perceived illegitimacy of U.S. trade threats decreases the likelihood of a target conceding by over 34 percent. Moreover, it pays to resist: targets that resist illegitimate unilateral measures from the United States are 25 percent less likely to encounter similar unilateral measures over the following five years.


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