scholarly journals Predictably Unpredictable Trade Policy – the United States versus All Others

Author(s):  
S. S. DMITRIEV

The article explores the Trump administration’s trade policy,  characterized by: attempts to rewrite the rules of international trade  according to the regulations established by the American side, “skepticism” with respect to the international regulatory  institutions of foreign trade, a course on the renegotiation of the  existing agreements. In a relationship with a number of countries,  manifestations of “ultimatizm” – the desire to negotiate with them from a position of strength are becoming increasingly evident.  Relapses of economic isolationism under the slogan “Restore the Greatness of America” periodically are being transformed into  concrete protectionist actions. The number of imposed import restrictions is growing, and their arsenal is expanding. It is  concluded, that tightening of the market access to the domestic  market for foreign suppliers is unlikely to lead to a significant  reduction in the US trade deficit. Bet on abandoning multilateral  arrangements in favor of bilateral trade agreements, conscious  downplaying of the role and importance of the WTO and other  international institutions can also be counterproductive. Focus on  dominance in the sphere of foreign economic activity apparently will remain the main direction of Trump trade policy until the end of the  term of his administration. However, under pressure from competitors, and because of the lack of real allies, the United States  will be forced to demonstrate greater flexibility and pragmatism, the  propensity to compromise and to establishment of temporary or  permanent blocs with their main trading partners. The idea of  “normality”, refraining from populism, will gradually begin to return  to the trade policy of this country. If, however the Trump  government will continue to act in isolation, without taking into  account the opinion of the world community, an increasing number  of partners of the United States will perceive it not as a leader, but as a violator of the rules of international trade. Under certain  circumstances, such a policy can provoke local and global trade  conflicts. In addition, the United States not necessarily will have to be the winner in them.

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Crump

AbstractIt is unusual to find a negotiation not linked to at least one other negotiation. In some domains, such as international trade policy, we can identify negotiation networks with parties simultaneously involved in negotiations in global, multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade policy settings. A single party (i.e., a national government) will manage similar issues in all four settings and also manage these same issues with multiple parties in a single setting. International trade policy is one of many "linkage-rich" environments.This study examines the relationship between two discrete but linked treaty negotiations: the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (SAFTA) and the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (USSFTA). Case analysis identifies five structural factors that enhance the potential and fundamentally shape the nature of negotiation linkage dynamics. If linkage occurs then role theory can be employed to define two functional role types, a link-pin party (Singapore in this study) and linked parties (Australia and the United States). Such theory and case analysis support the development of propositions and help establish guidance for managing negotiation behavior. Key structural characteristics that appear to create linkage dynamics in this study are used to build a four-part structural framework that maps the universe of negotiation-linkage phenomena and determines the fundamental nature of four discrete linkage conditions. This framework also provides descriptive and prescriptive guidance for managing strategy and power in linked negotiations.


Author(s):  
K. O. Chudinova

The increasing level of tension in the trade relations between the United States and other countries, especially China; the potential escalation of trade wars, when countries take more and more explicit retaliatory protectionist measures, becomes a sustainability risk to development of international trade. The US actions taken in 2018–2019 to protect the internal market turned into into a full-fledged trade war, directed primarily against China - the country the United States has the largest trade deficit with. The introduction of the US tariff restrictions on imports from China and several other countries has caused retaliatory measures, as a result the uncertainty of the prospects for international trade increases. Non-tariff measures, such as phytosanitary requirements and technical barriers to trade, have also seen an increase in restrictions.An important source of controversy is the different positions of countries regarding the permissible degree of state support for enterprises. Developed countries, especially the United States, Japan, and the countries of the European Union, have fairly rigidly regulated rules regarding free competition. A cause for great concern is not only the US trade war with China and its consequences for other countries, but also the problems of international trade regulation.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 394-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

This is a good deal, a good deal for Canada and a deal that is good for all Canadians. It is also a fair deal, which means that it brings benefits and progress to our partner, the United States of America. When both countries prosper, our democracies are strengthened and leadership has been provided to our trading partners around the world. I think this initiative represents enlightened leadership to the trading partners about what can be accomplished when we determine that we are going to strike down protectionism, move toward liberalized trade, and generate new prosperity for all our people.On January 2, 1988, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada signed the landmark comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries that already enjoyed the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The FTA was subsequently ratified by the legislatures of both countries, if only after a bitterly fought election on the subject in Canada. On January 1, 1989, the FTA formally came into effect.


2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-419
Author(s):  
Krishnakumar S.

With Donald Trump as President of United States, multilateralism in the world economy is facing an unprecedented challenge. The international economic institutions that have evolved since the fifties are increasingly under the risk of being undermined. With the growing assertion of the emerging and developing economies in the international fora, United States is increasingly sceptical of its ability to maneuvre such institutions to suit its own purpose. This is particularly true with respect to WTO, based on “one country one vote” system. The tariff rate hikes initiated by the leader country in the recent past pose a serious challenge to the multilateral trading system. The paper tries to undertake a critical overview of the US pre-occupation of targeting economies on the basis of the bilateral merchandise trade surpluses of countries, through the trade legislations like Omnibus Act and Trade Facilitation Act. These legislations not only ignore the growing share of the United States in the growing invisibles trade in the world economy, but also read too much into the bilateral trade surpluses of economies with United States and the intervention done by them in the foreign exchange market.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 256-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Michaels ◽  
Xiaojia Zhi

Do firms always choose the cheapest suitable inputs, or can group attitudes affect their choices? To investigate this question, we examine the deterioration of relations between the United States and France from 2002–2003, when France's favorability rating in the US fell by 48 percentage points. We estimate that the worsening attitudes reduced bilateral trade by about 9 percent and that trade in inputs probably declined similarly, by about 8 percent. We use these estimates to calculate the average decrease in firms' willingness to pay for French (or US) commodities when attitudes worsened. (JEL D24, F13, F14, L14, L21)


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
M. Anaam Hashmi

The Mercosur trade alliance formed in 1991 is composed of six full member countries. Historically, Mercosur member countries have been engaged in international trade with the United States, Japan, and the European Union, but recently, China has become a dominant player in the region, with increased foreign direct investment and international trade. Chinese commercial and trade involvement was followed by a visit to the region by President Jiang Zemin in 2001; therefore, this study relied on a 2000–2015 data series. Chinese enterprises are competing well with U.S. corporations in almost all Mercosur member countries. A majority of Mercosur members had a trade deficit with China in recent years, suggesting that Mercosur members cannot leverage their export industries and are losing their competitiveness. The future of the Mercosur-China trade relationship is bright because both sides require each other’s products. Future involvement also depends on the Chinese government’s strategic goals, and the competitiveness of U.S. corporations.


2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Muirhead

Abstract The articulated foreign economic policy of the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker following its election in June 1957 was to redirect trade away from the United States and toward the United Kingdom. This policy reflected Diefenbaker's almost religious attachment to the Commonwealth and to Britain, as well as his abiding suspicion of continentalism. However, from these brave beginnings, Conservative trade policy ended up pretty much where the Liberals had been before their 1957 defeat-increasingly reliant on the US market for Canada's domestic prosperity. This was a result partly of the normal development of trade between the two North American countries, but it also reflected Diefenbaker's growing realisation of the market differences between Canada and the United Kingdom, and the impossibility of enhancing the flow of Canadian exports to Britain.


2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jungho Baek ◽  
Won W. Koo ◽  
Kranti Mulik

This study examines the dynamic effects of changes in exchange rates on bilateral trade of agricultural products between the United States and its 15 major trading partners. Special attention is paid to investigate whether or not the J-curve hypothesis holds for U.S. agricultural trade. For this purpose, an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration is applied to quarterly time-series data from 1989 and 2007. Results show that the exchange rate plays a crucial role in determining the short- and long-run behavior of U.S. agricultural trade. However, we find little evidence of the J-curve phenomenon for U.S. agricultural products with the United States’ major trading partners.


2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 4950-4954 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rong Sheng Lv ◽  
Chun Hui Wang

China and the United States are the two largest economies in the world, and there is a strong complementarily between their economies, so the volume of their bilateral trade is also very large. However, with the development of trade exchanges, bilateral trade friction also intensifies; especially in recent years, American trade deficit with China has grown very rapidly. In order to reverse the situation, the United States launched several trade litigations and implemented tough trade sanctions against China. It led to trade disputes between the two countries, which seriously damaged the healthy development of Sino-US relation. So we compares the similarities and differences between the two trade frictions, pointing out both valuable experience and negative lessons from Japan in handling Japan-US trade friction, so as to provide reference to China for easing Sino-US trade friction.


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