The Role of International Trade and Trade Policy in the Labour Markets of Canada and the United States

World Economy ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel Gaston ◽  
Daniel Trefler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Labour Markets

Competitively-Linked and Non-Competitively-Linked Negotiations: Bilateral Trade Policy Negotiations in Australia, Singapore and the United States

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Crump
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Case Analysis ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Trade Policy

AbstractIt is unusual to find a negotiation not linked to at least one other negotiation. In some domains, such as international trade policy, we can identify negotiation networks with parties simultaneously involved in negotiations in global, multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade policy settings. A single party (i.e., a national government) will manage similar issues in all four settings and also manage these same issues with multiple parties in a single setting. International trade policy is one of many "linkage-rich" environments.This study examines the relationship between two discrete but linked treaty negotiations: the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (SAFTA) and the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (USSFTA). Case analysis identifies five structural factors that enhance the potential and fundamentally shape the nature of negotiation linkage dynamics. If linkage occurs then role theory can be employed to define two functional role types, a link-pin party (Singapore in this study) and linked parties (Australia and the United States). Such theory and case analysis support the development of propositions and help establish guidance for managing negotiation behavior. Key structural characteristics that appear to create linkage dynamics in this study are used to build a four-part structural framework that maps the universe of negotiation-linkage phenomena and determines the fundamental nature of four discrete linkage conditions. This framework also provides descriptive and prescriptive guidance for managing strategy and power in linked negotiations.

The Environment and International Trade

2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Vogel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Economic Impact ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Relationship

This article examines the increasingly important and often contentious relationship between international trade and environmental regulation in the United States. It begins by explaining why these two policy areas have recently become more interdependent and then explores some of the specific controversies surrounding the contemporary linkages between trade policy and environmental regulation. The article concludes by analyzing the long-term political and economic impact of the relationship between trade and environmental policy.

scholarly journals A Política de Comércio Internacional Agrícola de Brasil e Estados Unidos no Contencioso do Algodão na OMC (2002-2005)

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-65
Author(s):  
Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira ◽  
Camilla Silva Geraldello
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
Agricultural Trade ◽  
Least Developed Countries ◽  
Modus Operandi ◽  
Institutional Management ◽  
The Developed Countries

O objetivo deste artigo é compreender o modus operandi dos instrumentos e mecanismos institucionais no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos de formulação da política de comércio internacional agrícola centrada em três variáveis: a) mobilização de interesses, b) funcionamento de instituições e c) divulgação de informações. Como exemplo, utilizaremos o contencioso do algodão na Organização Mundial do Comércio contra os Estados Unidos, desencadeado por uma coalizão de países em desenvolvimento e Países de Menor Desenvolvimento Relativo sob liderança do Brasil entre 2002 e 2005. Palavras-chave: Brasil e Estados Unidos; Política de Comércio Internacional; OMC; Agricultura; Contencioso do algodão.     Abstract: This article´s objective is undertand of the modus operandi of the institutional mecanisms and instruments in Brazil and the United States in the formulation of international agricultural trade policy, focused on three variables: a) interest´s mobilization b) institutional management and c) information press. As an example, will be used the cotton dispute on the WTO against the United States, which took place by a strike of the developed countries and the least developed countries under Brazil´s lidership between 2002 and 2005. Key words: Brazil and United States; International Trade Policy; WTO; Agriculture; Cotton Dispute.     Recebido em: dezembro/2017 Aprovado em: maio/2018.

scholarly journals Predictably Unpredictable Trade Policy – the United States versus All Others

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. S. DMITRIEV
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Trade Deficit ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Us ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Import Restrictions

The article explores the Trump administration’s trade policy,  characterized by: attempts to rewrite the rules of international trade  according to the regulations established by the American side, “skepticism” with respect to the international regulatory  institutions of foreign trade, a course on the renegotiation of the  existing agreements. In a relationship with a number of countries,  manifestations of “ultimatizm” – the desire to negotiate with them from a position of strength are becoming increasingly evident.  Relapses of economic isolationism under the slogan “Restore the Greatness of America” periodically are being transformed into  concrete protectionist actions. The number of imposed import restrictions is growing, and their arsenal is expanding. It is  concluded, that tightening of the market access to the domestic  market for foreign suppliers is unlikely to lead to a significant  reduction in the US trade deficit. Bet on abandoning multilateral  arrangements in favor of bilateral trade agreements, conscious  downplaying of the role and importance of the WTO and other  international institutions can also be counterproductive. Focus on  dominance in the sphere of foreign economic activity apparently will remain the main direction of Trump trade policy until the end of the  term of his administration. However, under pressure from competitors, and because of the lack of real allies, the United States  will be forced to demonstrate greater flexibility and pragmatism, the  propensity to compromise and to establishment of temporary or  permanent blocs with their main trading partners. The idea of  “normality”, refraining from populism, will gradually begin to return  to the trade policy of this country. If, however the Trump  government will continue to act in isolation, without taking into  account the opinion of the world community, an increasing number  of partners of the United States will perceive it not as a leader, but as a violator of the rules of international trade. Under certain  circumstances, such a policy can provoke local and global trade  conflicts. In addition, the United States not necessarily will have to be the winner in them.

scholarly journals International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Sidak
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Patent Infringement ◽  
International Trade Commission ◽  
Patent Holder ◽  
Standard Essential Patents ◽  
Section 337 ◽  
The U.S

In the United States, a patent holder can pursue several remedies against a patent infringer. Section 284 of the Patent Act provides that, upon a finding of infringement, “the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty . . . .” In addition, § 283 provides that a court “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent.” Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 also allows a patent holder to petition the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)—a federal agency that investigates matters of international trade and advises on international trade policy— to issue an exclusion order against an infringer, a remedy that denies the importation and sale in the United States of products that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent.3 In a case of patent infringement, a patent holder may thus seek damages for the infringement, an injunction, and an exclusion order.

Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy, 1975–2000

2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof J. Pelc
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Trade Measures

AbstractThe role of legitimacy in international relations is a topic of much debate, yet there is little understanding of the mechanism behind it. Here I address this discrepancy by asking: are state threats perceived as (il)legitimate more or less likely to be successful? By operationalizing illegitimacy as unilateral action in the presence of a multilateral option, I consider the variation in the success of U.S. trade measures from 1975 to 2000. As I show, the (il)legitimacy of threats modifies the nature of the signal sent by concessions to those threats, and this effect can be measured and predicted. I find that, controlling for material pressure, perceived illegitimacy of U.S. trade threats decreases the likelihood of a target conceding by over 34 percent. Moreover, it pays to resist: targets that resist illegitimate unilateral measures from the United States are 25 percent less likely to encounter similar unilateral measures over the following five years.

The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
Trade Partners ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter examines the role of domestic political interests in the selection of U.S. cases for World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudication. It first considers how the United States has taken a lead role in the area of trade law enforcement before discussing how legislative constraints and interest group pressure operate in U.S. trade policy. The Kodak–Fuji WTO dispute between the United States and Japan is used to illustrate an example of politicized selection of a case for adjudication. The chapter also analyzes U.S. complaints about market access barriers by leading trade partners. By identifying potential trade disputes, it shows why some cases go forward to adjudication. It also explains how the WTO disputes served an important role in the executive strategy to manage domestic pressure from Congress for a more aggressive policy against China.

scholarly journals The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: A Glimpse into The Geoeconomic World Order

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 56-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Puig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
New Era ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
United States Mexico ◽  
Trade Deals

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) differs in a few important ways from prior trade deals signed by the United States but reveals a glimpse of the infrastructure for a new era in international economic governance. This new “Geoeconomic World Order,” will be characterized by great power rivalry between the United States and China, the intense use of protectionist tools to achieve strategic and political goals, and the diminished role of legal adjudication. This approach to trade policy will likely outlast the autocratic and/or nationalistic governments emerging around the world, including the current Trump administration. While international trade law will recover, it will look different in key respects—it will be less multilateral, predictable, justiciable, and enforceable. This more transactional view of international trade law implies a limit on the role of law and an increase in the use of power. It may force a retrenchment of international interdependence and a revival of zones of influence prevalent during the Cold War era.

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