Executive Orders

Author(s):  
Andrew Rudalevige

This chapter provides some background on the collation of executive orders generally, then details the creation of the institution of “central clearance” in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Central clearance has served as both a proactive and protective process for presidents since the 1930s, especially after OMB (then known as the Bureau of the Budget) moved into the Executive Office of the President from the Treasury Department in 1939. It matches well with the kind of “governance structure” an information-seeking president might rationally construct in order to evaluate and winnow proposals for executive action.

Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron

This chapter delves into the depths of one of the most important developments within modern American politics, the creation and institutionalization of executive privilege. In facing a fervent Congress in the grips of McCarthyism, Eisenhower issued a letter denying testimony to the Senate for the Army-McCarthy hearings. His letter included a memo from Attorney General Brownell that claimed the president had an inherent constitutional privilege to deny information to Congress or the public if it was in the public interest and for national security. This action institutionalized the Cold War Paradigm in the executive branch and created an extra-constitutional power for the president. Eisenhower issued several executive orders concerning classification and public dissemination of government information, along with the creation of the Office of Strategic Information (OSI) within the Commerce Department to oversee these policies. Eisenhower claimed historic precedent to justify his inherent constitutional power, regardless, it showed a learned response that changed executive power. Congress would respond in 1955 by creating the Special Subcommittee on Government Information chaired by Rep. John Moss, given jurisdiction for oversight on all executive branch information policies and practices. With the issue of freedom of information institutionalized in Congress, a 12-year legislative power struggle would unfold between Congress and the White House ending with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Dylan Sellers

AbstractI examine gubernatorial use of executive orders, and assess how executive action influences statute adoption. I argue that strong governors use executive orders to pursue policy objectives when they perceive legislation as unlikely to pass. Multilevel Event History Analysis of executive orders and the adoption of statutes that protect the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community from 1975 to 2013 reveals that partisan control of government and intrastate factors influence both forms of policy adoption. My findings support the strategic model that argues that executives turn to executive orders when confronting unfavourable legislative conditions, and that governors issue protections more when entering office. Legislatures respond to partisan control of the legislature and social characteristics. Further, states that have pro-LGBT executive orders in place are more likely to adopt similar statutes. My results suggest that stronger governors are more likely to issue executive orders, but it is states with weaker governors that are more likely to adopt legislation.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 797-815 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Patchell

The need to advance the conventional understanding of production systems as fixed flows of goods and services to dynamic systems based on learning is discussed. The theory advanced is based on research on the Japanese robot industry. The paper opens with a discussion of the meaning of flexibility in a dynamic economy to expose the social division of labour as the foundation of the creation and evolution of production systems. Production systems are established to obtain the scale and scope economies offered by the independent firms of the social division of labour. The necessity to organize production requires the creation of some type of an internal or external governance structure. The Japanese have developed a social technology that resolves the transaction cost trade-offs confronting North American industry between internal and external governance structures. Asanuma's relation-specific skill is discussed as the crux for comprehending the shift from production systems to learning systems.


2014 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Bauch ◽  
Christina Sheldon

Whereas instruction on how to conduct original research can build on beginning college students' tacit information literacies, the explicit articulation of existing processes for information gathering is rarely elicited by instructors prior to students' submission of a final research paper. In this essay, authors Nicholas Bauch and Christina Sheldon introduce surf maps and concept ladders as potential assignments to guide beginning college students in producing original scholarship in their Cultural Geography course. They find that these tools help novice researchers realize their information-seeking patterns and skills as well as potential gaps in their current practices. For students, a key outcome of harnessing their tacit information literacies is that it offers broader disciplinary relevance to their research projects, introducing them to the complexities of making claims and, most generally, the production of knowledge. For educators, identifying students' tacit information-seeking skills and shortcomings helps in the creation of assignments that further advance students' research skills.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1045-1053

The United States' total trade deficit in 2016 was $502.3 billion. President Trump believes that the deficit—and especially its consequences (“wealth … stripped from our country”), causes (“bad trade deals”), and images (“shuttered factories”)—played a prominent role in his electoral success in 2016. Since taking office, Trump has signed a series of executive orders and memoranda on trade in order to fulfill various campaign promises on this front. The executive orders and memoranda focus mainly on gathering information and laying groundwork for future executive action. Taken together, they signal the Trump administration's intention to address the United States' trade deficits, especially with China.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hemel

102 Cornell Law Review 633 (2017)Existing statutes give the President and his Treasury Department broad authority to implement important elements of the administration’s tax agenda without further congressional action. And yet only infrequently does the Executive Branch exercise this statutory “power to tax.” Instead, the President often asks Congress to pass revenue-raising measures achieving what the President and his Treasury Department already could accomplish on their own. And even when Congress rebuffs the President’s request, present and past administrations only rarely have responded by exercising the regulatory authority they already possess. Contrast this with the fact that present and past Presidents have stretched the limits of executive authority in a taxpayer-friendly direction—even over Congress’s expressed preferences.This article attempts to explain the peculiar patterns of executive action and inaction observed in the tax policymaking domain. It draws on public choice theory and game theory to build a strategic model of interactions between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The model generates several counterintuitive implications. Among others: a strong anti-tax faction in Congress may increase the probability that revenue-raising regulatory measures are implemented; judicial deference to Treasury regulations may reduce lawmakers’ willingness to pass revenue-raising fixes to existing tax statutes; and statutory rules requiring legislation to be “deficit-neutral” may discourage the administration from taking deficit-closing regulatory actions.


1997 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-449
Author(s):  
Ralph W. Roberts ◽  
George S. Nagle

Is improved world leadership in forestry feasible and is it imminent? The way UN international forest institutions are governed has a profound effect on their performance. The availability of resources and the responsiveness to sector issues in developing appropriate and coherent policies and programs are defining features of the quality of leadership. By any measure, funding and human resources are in extremely short supply among a fractionated and scattered number of small and relatively ineffective UN international forest institutions. A critical objective of institutional reform will be to enhance the effective representation of ministers responsible for forests (and not surrogates from agriculture, trade or environment ministries), the commercial private sector and representative citizen groups. Three options are explored for institutional reform with particular emphasis on the third.The first would be a minimalist approach. It would see the creation of a World Forest Programme in association with FAO similar to the World Food Programme. The second option to creating a new governance structure for more direct representation of forest interests would lead to the creation of a new UN "Forest Council" of ministers responsible for forests apart from FAO and other UN forest agencies that would guide international forest policy dialogue. A third option would result in the creation of a "hybrid" institution, the Global Alliance for Forests and Sustainable Development (GLOBALFOR), which would be established out-side the UN but could be more successful than other options in building a sound and modern governance structure among all interested parties, including governments, industry and NGOs that is open, inclusive and participatory.Institutional reform of international forest institutions is important and urgent and demands the attention of UN reformers and independent assessors. Reform could result in fewer institutions at lower cost and increased resources for more effective global forest related activity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Rita Sevastjanova ◽  
Wolfgang Jentner ◽  
Fabian Sperrle ◽  
Rebecca Kehlbeck ◽  
Jürgen Bernard ◽  
...  

Linguistic insight in the form of high-level relationships and rules in text builds the basis of our understanding of language. However, the data-driven generation of such structures often lacks labeled resources that can be used as training data for supervised machine learning. The creation of such ground-truth data is a time-consuming process that often requires domain expertise to resolve text ambiguities and characterize linguistic phenomena. Furthermore, the creation and refinement of machine learning models is often challenging for linguists as the models are often complex, in-transparent, and difficult to understand. To tackle these challenges, we present a visual analytics technique for interactive data labeling that applies concepts from gamification and explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) to support complex classification tasks. The visual-interactive labeling interface promotes the creation of effective training data. Visual explanations of learned rules unveil the decisions of the machine learning model and support iterative and interactive optimization. The gamification-inspired design guides the user through the labeling process and provides feedback on the model performance. As an instance of the proposed technique, we present QuestionComb , a workspace tailored to the task of question classification (i.e., in information-seeking vs. non-information-seeking questions). Our evaluation studies confirm that gamification concepts are beneficial to engage users through continuous feedback, offering an effective visual analytics technique when combined with active learning and XAI.


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