Introduction

Author(s):  
Melvyn P. Leffler

This introductory chapter chronicles how the author's study of American foreign policy over the decades gravitated toward an analysis of the meaning of national security. This was not intentional. It resulted from a long struggle to wrestle with evidence that led to attempts to synthesize the three levels of analysis that scholars of international relations often talk about: the individual, the domestic/state, and the international. By using the concept of national security, the author was able to analyze the motives shaping U.S. policymakers, examine their perception of threat and opportunity, assess their willingness to incur commitments and responsibilities abroad, study their readiness to employ military power, and gain an appreciation of how they saw the links between external configurations of power and the preservation of democratic capitalism at home. As the author embraced complexity, studied the evolving literature on grand strategy, and grappled with contingency, his empathy for the policymakers grew.

Author(s):  
Melvyn P. Leffler

This chapter reflects on the concept of national security in early American foreign policy. It also illuminates the relationships between the concept of national security and the burgeoning numbers of books and articles dealing with grand strategy. Here, national security had come to mean the defense of core values from external threats. As understood by U.S. officials, national security was a dynamic, changing concept, responding to the evolution of threats abroad and the definition of core values at home. Core values themselves were elusive, forcing historians and scholars of international relations to discover and analyze precisely what interests, ideals, or values policymakers most wanted to defend. Similarly, external threats existed in the eyes of beholders; different observers perceived danger in dramatically different ways. What were real threats and what were perceived threats might only be resolved in the aftermath of events, and perhaps not even then. Nonetheless, to understand the making of national security policy, the historian had to empathize with the policymakers and had to understand their perception of threat (however accurate or skewed).


Author(s):  
Tony Smith

This introductory chapter provides an overview of Wilsonianism, which comprises a set of ideas called American liberal internationalism. More than a century after Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States, his country is still not certain how to understand the important legacy for the country's foreign policy of the tradition that bears his name. Wilsonianism remains a living ideology whose interpretation continues either to motivate, or to serve as a cover for, a broad range of American foreign policy decisions. However, if there is no consensus on what the tradition stands for, or, worse, if there is a consensus but its claims to be part of the tradition are not borne out by the history of Wilsonianism from Wilson's day until the late 1980s, then clearly a debate is in order to provide clarity and purpose to American thinking about world affairs today.


Rough Waters ◽  
2010 ◽  
pp. 161-184
Author(s):  
James R. Sofka

This chapter is the first of two to explore United States President Thomas Jefferson’s approach to the Tripolitanian War. It argues that Jefferson sought to protect and expand American commerce whilst eroding the trade networks of England and France as means of gaining a stronger position in the international economy. It suggests that Jefferson’s use of commerce as a tool of foreign policy was not related to pacifism and diplomacy, but rather an extra arm of defence on the world stage. It provides a thorough exploration of Jefferson’s political and economic motives for the war, and in doing so compares Jefferson’s speeches to the language of Realpolitik. It also explores the advocacy of economic warfare; and details the feud between Jefferson and Hamilton concerning British rule. It concludes that the Tripolitanian War can be considered a component of a larger geopolitical strategy to defend and advance the political and economic interests of America. It also asserts that historians should treat this war within the nineteenth-century political sphere, and refrain from making comparisons to twenty-first century American foreign policy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 152-164
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

This chapter summarizes the main findings and conclusions of the book, discusses the cross-national generalizability of the informational theory of strategy adjustment, considers directions for future research, and reflects on the implications of this book for American foreign policy in the 2020s.


Author(s):  
Kevin Narizny

Nearly everything a state does has distributional consequences, including grand strategy. Societal groups with different stakes in the international economy and defense spending often have conflicting strategic priorities, and these groups pursue their parochial interests by supporting the nomination and election of like-minded politicians. Thus, grand strategy is a product of political economy. An overview of American foreign policy over the last several decades illustrates this logic. In the 1980s, the Democratic and Republican coalitions had conflicting interests over the international economy, so the two parties diverged on grand strategy. The recovery of the Rust Belt in the 1990s and 2000s, however, brought increasing convergence. Political discourse over foreign policy was fiercely partisan, but, with the notable exception of George W. Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, the two parties shared essentially the same view of America’s role in the world. The disastrous outcome in Iraq led the Bush administration back to the middle ground in its second term, and Obama followed the same course. In contrast, the election of Donald Trump augurs change. Trump’s electoral coalition consists of a different balance of interests in the international economy than that of past Republican presidents, so he is likely to pursue different strategic priorities.


Author(s):  
James W. Pardew

Peacemakers is a candid, inside account of the US response to the disintegration of Yugoslavia by James Pardew, an official at the heart of American policy-making, diplomacy, and military operations, from the US-led negotiations on Bosnia in 1995 until Kosovo declared independence in 2008. The book describes in colorful detail the drama of war and diplomacy in the Balkans and the motives, character, talents, and weaknesses of the heroes and villains involved. The US engagement in the former Yugoslavia is a major American foreign policy and national security success with lasting implications for the United States, Europe, and the Balkan region. It involves aggressive diplomacy, the selective use of military force and extensive multilateral cooperation. The experience demonstrates the value of American leadership in an international crisis and the critical importance of America’s relationship with European democracies. US engagement in the former Yugoslavia shows the overwhelming benefits of the shared costs and the international legitimacy of multilateral cooperation when responding to a crisis. A capable and determined US-led coalition restores stability and gives the new nations of Southeastern Europe the chance to become successful democracies in the European mainstream. Peacemakers concludes with lessons learned from the Balkan experience and insights on international crisis management of potential value to envoys and foreign policy and national security decision-makers in the future.


Author(s):  
S. Kislitsyn

The research examines the main problems of a grand strategy in the US foreign policy. Attention is paid to the conceptual understanding of this term, its historical development, and the current state. The article analyzes the positions of American foreign policy elites and the expert community regarding the problem of the US self-positioning in the outside world. The article consists of three parts. The first analyses the main conceptual provisions of the “grand strategy” as a term. It describes its development from a military term, reflecting the general tactics in interstate confrontation to its comprehensive understanding as a coordination principle of long-term and medium-term goals with short term actions. The second part of the article focuses on the American foreign policy elites, their approaches, as well as public opinion on this issue. It is noted that the ideology of global leadership has become an important component of the establishment's thinking. It largely impedes the development of new foreign policy concepts and, as a result, reformatting the grand strategy. The third part is devoted to the positions of the expert community on the issue of grand strategy. Four main versions are considered: "Offensive", "Selective engagement", "Offshore Balancing", "Zero-sum". The author comes to a conclusion that the US foreign policy mixes several types of strategies at the moment. It is noted that as China strengthens, the United States faces a new competition, which, unlike the Soviet threat, implies not military-political, but economic confrontation. The implementation of the scenario of a "new Cold War" between Washington and Beijing can define the new goals of the grand strategy. At the same time, this also creates an ideological dilemma of recognizing a new challenge, an increasing alternative for American global leadership - the idea of which is still popular among representatives of American foreign policy elites.


Author(s):  
Shoon Murray ◽  
Jordan Tama

This chapter revisits the old paradox that the U.S. president is perhaps the most powerful person in the world and yet is constrained domestically by other political actors and a centuries-old constitutional framework. The chapter discusses key actors that shape American foreign policy, including the president, presidential advisers, the federal bureaucracy, Congress, the courts, interest groups, the media, and public opinion. Presidential candidates often call for major shifts in foreign policy, but once they are in office presidents are constrained by strategic and fiscal realities, the bureaucracy’s preference for continuity, America’s separation of powers system, rising partisanship, the fragmented media, and the openness of U.S. institutions to societal pressures. The result is that modern presidents struggle to build and maintain the domestic backing needed to carry out their foreign policy agenda.


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