scholarly journals 儒家視角下的死亡的尊嚴

Author(s):  
Jianhui LI ◽  
Yaming LI

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在當代的醫療實踐中,各種新的醫療技術在臨終階段的應用引發了關於如何維護死亡的尊嚴的激烈爭論。爭論的焦點集中在對什麼是人的尊嚴和什麼是死亡的尊嚴的概念的不同理解上。人的尊嚴概念在當代西方的倫理學中尚沒有得到清晰的闡釋,死亡的尊嚴概念更是存在混亂。儒家倫理學則可以在這種討論中為問題的解決提供新的思路。本文試圖重建儒家的人的尊嚴和死亡的尊嚴的基本含義,並對死亡的尊嚴與人的生物學生命的關係,死亡的尊嚴與人的痛苦的關係,死亡的尊嚴同人的自主性的關係,以及死亡的尊嚴同社會公平正義之間的關係做出分析說明。儒家關於人的尊嚴的觀點有助於化解西方死亡倫理研究中出現的概念混亂和理論矛盾。What does a death have dignity? In modern healthcare, the wide use of new technology has generated confusion around how to define and protect human dignity, especially in the case of death and dying. Those who advocate the legalization of assisted suicide often appeal to the right to “die with dignity” and the right to individual autonomy. The problem is that it is very difficult to justify one particular understanding of human dignity in the contemporary pluralistic world through a rational formulation without defining dignity.In this paper, the authors attempt to respond to the current debate on euthanasia and assisted suicide from a Confucian perspective. The paper first defines the Confucian concept of human dignity and shows how the concept could be used in the case of dignity in death and dying. The authors argue that in Confucianism, there are two kinds of dignity: One is intrinsic dignity, which is endowed by Heaven on everyone, and the other is extrinsic dignity, which arises from the cultivation of virtues. This extrinsic dignity is also called “personal dignity.” Unlike the individual-oriented human dignity model, Confucian ethics argue for a family-oriented model of human dignity. That is to say, the Confucian ideal of human dignity is not satisfied by a concept of human dignity that is centered on individual rights and freedom of choice; instead, it focuses on relations in a concrete community in which a person’s human dignity is actualized through morals and virtues. In the case of euthanasia and assisted suicide, therefore, the decision should not be solely based on freedom of choice, but on what kinds of values and obligations the person has. In addition, the paper shows that the Confucian view of human dignity does not support the idea of prolonging life through technological means without restraints.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 1292 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

2020 ◽  
pp. 175797592096735 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felicia M. Low ◽  
Peter D. Gluckman ◽  
Mark A. Hanson

The right to exercise choice is fundamental to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it is assumed that all individuals generally enjoy freedom of choice in managing their health. Yet closer examination of this assumption calls into question its credibility and validity, especially with regard to maternal and child health around the globe. We argue that the concept of individual ‘healthy choice,’ particularly as applied to those with inadequate support and who are relatively disempowered, is flawed and unhelpful when considering the wider social, economic, and political forces underlying poor health. We instead propose that the realistic promotion of healthy choices requires acknowledging that agency lies beyond just the individual, and that individuals need to be supported through education and other structural and policy changes that facilitate a genuine ability to make healthy choices.


Author(s):  
James R. Otteson

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue for “libertarian paternalism,” defined as the strategy to devise policy that will “maintain or increase freedom of choice” and at the same time “influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better”. These two goals are often in conflict, and striking the right balance between them has proved difficult in both theory and practice. Where does Adam Smith fall in this debate? This chapter argues that Smith developed his own version of “libertarian paternalism.” It differs in important ways from that of Thaler and Sunstein, but it shares with them an attempt to balance respect for individual autonomy with a desire to help people lead better lives. Smith’s position accommodates the importance of both liberty and paternalism in enabling individuals to construct lives worth living, while avoiding some of the problems that have beset more recent versions of libertarian paternalism.


1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franklin G. Miller

The problem of physician-assisted death (PAD), assisted suicide and active euthanasia, has been debated predominantly in the ethically familiar vocabulary of rights, duties, and consequences. Patient autonomy and the right to die with dignity vie with the duty of physicians to heal, but not to kill, and the specter of “the slippery slope” from voluntary euthanasia as a last resort for patients suffering from terminal illness to PAD on demand and mercy killing of “hopeless” incompetent patients. Another dimension of the debate over PAD concerns the evaluative question of what constitutes a good death. At stake are Issues of character and virtue in the face of death and dying and their Implications for legitimizing the practice of PAD. Critics of PAD argue that “natural” death in the context of comfort care, as provided by hospice programs, is the good death. In contrast, PAD amounts to an easy way out, an evasion of the ultimate human challenge and task of dying. Because hospice care is clearly preferable to PAD, the former should be encouraged and the latter remain prohibited.


Author(s):  
Yu CAI

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文首先探討了儒家的“誠”與作為人之本性的“仁”之間的關係,指出“誠”是“仁”的前提與基礎。筆者認為“誠”賦予“仁”三個基本特徵:“真摯性”、“無外在目的性”和“客觀性”。這三個特徵都與儒家家庭和家庭成員間的“親親之愛”緊密聯繫。其後,本文提出儒家排斥“鄉願”式的器官捐獻。同時,文章指出,由於“誠”的要求,儒家認為對家庭成員的“親親之愛”應該是對非家庭成員的仁愛的前提、基礎和不可或缺的必要條件。因而,個人捐獻原則是與“誠”的價值觀存在一定的矛盾,而家庭捐獻原則才是符合儒家倫理的。最後,本文對人體器官的家庭捐獻原則進行了制度設計。Organ donation is the gift of an organ to help someone who needs a transplant to survive. Yet with limited organs available, the following question arises. Who should be given priority in terms of donation procedures—the individual who has personally committed to offer his/her organs to anyone in need, or the legal next of kin, i.e., family members? This essay approaches this question with reference to the Confucian ethics of sincerity (cheng), which is viewed as a precondition for the ethics of humanness (ren), arguing that family members should be given priority in decisions on organ donation. The author recommends that a policy of family consent for organ donation be implemented, as such a policy would reflect the significant role that family should play in making decisions on critical issues such as organ donation. The essay concludes that rather than emphasizing the right of individuals to decide what will happen after they die, a policy of family involvement would encourage more people to become donors and avoid conflict in cases of disagreement between donors and family members.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 75 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Janilce Silva Praseres ◽  
Marcelo Ramos Saldanha

Abstract: human rights are a set of ethical values whose purpose is to protect and enable the realization of human dignity in its various dimensions and also prevent the reduction of the individual to the condition of object or, above all, the reduction of his condition as subject of rights, such as the right to life, freedom, security, equality. The universal character of human rights protection demonstrates some weaknesses, especially in the transposition into concrete legal systems, so what we propose is a brief analysis of human rights from Hannah Arendt.Uma Breve Análise Acerca dos Direitos Humanos a partir da Crítica de Hannah ArendtResumo: os direitos humanos são um conjunto de valores éticos que têm por finalidade proteger e possibilitar a realização da dignidade humana em suas várias dimensões e, ainda, impedir a redução do indivíduo à condição de objeto ou, sobretudo, a diminuição da sua condição na qualidade de sujeito de direitos, a exemplo o direito à vida, à liberdade, à segurança, à igualdade. O caráter universal de proteção aos direitos humanos demonstra algumas fragilidades, principalmente, na transposição para ordenamentos jurídicos concretos, assim, o que propomos é uma breve análise acerca dos direitos humanos a partir de Hannah Arendt.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Ferioli ◽  
Mario Picozzi

La richiesta di istituire biobanche oggi diventa sempre più impellente. Una biobanca è una struttura dove si raccolgono per un tempo lungo materiale biologico e dati di natura biomedica correlati al campione, che può provenire sia da pazienti che da cittadini. Da un lato si riconosce il ruolo che le biobanche possono avere sia nell’acquisire nuove conoscenze sia nel favorire nuovi trattamenti di diagnosi e cura, dall’altro è necessario riflettere sulle delicate e complesse questioni giuridiche ed etiche ad esse sottese. Il presente contributo, dopo aver fatto chiarezza sulla definizione e sui requisiti tecnici necessari per l’istituzione di una biobanca, si sofferma ad analizzare le principali questioni etico-giuridiche: a chi appartiene il tessuto e chi beneficia dei risultati ottenuti? Quale consenso informato è adeguato per protocolli sperimentali non prevedibili al momento del prelievo del tessuto? Come può essere garantita la riservatezza dei dati, anche in funzione dell’analisi genetica? Gli argomenti vengono analizzati a partire dalla letteratura internazionale, mostrando le diverse posizioni. In tema di proprietà del tessuto e di proprietà intellettuale dei risultati si evidenzia come sta emergendo una concezione solidaristica, in cui materiale e informazioni sono da considerarsi risorse a disposizione dell’intera collettività, che ne affida alla biobanca la gestione. Il modello di consenso informato che sembra prevalere è quello definito “ampliato”, di cui si evidenziano pregi e difetti, nell’ottica di un bilanciamento tra autonomia del soggetto, interesse della collettività ed esigenze della ricerca. La questione della riservatezza impone di riflettere sia sul diritto alla privacy sia sulla possibilità di utilizzo del dato per finalità di ricerca. Data la complessità delle questioni emerse, si ritiene che necessariamente la fiducia del paziente/cittadino verso la comunità scientifica giochi un ruolo fondamentale. Il Comitato di etica, a cui vanno assicurate competenze e risorse adeguate, diventa lo strumento di garanzia indispensabile per una gestione eticamente accettabile della biobanca. ---------- Today the request to create biobanks is more and more urgent. A biobank is a structure where biological specimens and related biomedical data, obtained from patients and/or citizens , are stored over time. On one hand, we acknowledge the role that biobanks may have in acquiring new knowledge and fostering new treatments for diagnosis and therapy, on the other we need to reflect upon the delicate and complex legal and ethical issues that biobanks rise. This paper, after defining the concept of biobank and the technical requirements needed to establish one, analyzes some major ethical and legal issues: Who owns the tissues and who can benefit from potential results? Which kind of informed consent is the most appropriate for experimental protocols not yet predictable at the time of tissue collection? How can data confidentiality be guaranteed also in relation to genetic analysis? The topics are analyzed with reference to the international literature, comparing different perspectives. Regarding the ownership of biological samples and the intellectual property rights of the potential research outputs based on the data, the recent literature introduces a new concept of solidarity which consider all samples and information at full disposal of the entire community and which indicates the biobank as the manager of the archive. The model of “broad” informed consent seems to prevail: we indicate its points of strength and weakness, considering a necessary balance among the individual autonomy, the collective interest and the research requirements. Finally, regarding the confidentiality of all data, we need to reflect upon the right to privacy along with the possibility to use the available data for research purpose. Considering the complexity of these issues, we believe that the patient’s trust towards the scientific community is the main matter. The Ethics Committee, to whom adequate resources and expertise must be granted, becomes the assurer entity for an ethically acceptable management of a biobank.


Author(s):  
Eva-Maria Svensson ◽  
Therese Bäckman ◽  
Torbjörn Odlöw

AbstractIn this chapter, the tension between self-determination and human dignity in the Swedish legal system of social care for older people is analysed with help of the capabilities approach. The core focus of this approach is the individual person’s capability to make decisions. Also important is a supportive societal system that enables the realisation of self-determination, specifically for individuals who are not fully capable of making arrangements for themselves. The capabilities approach emphasises the responsibility of the State and can be used to analyse the impact of legal and political obligations for nation-states, and to balance the increased focus on self-determination and the quest for increased capabilities among older people. In the context of a dismantled welfare state, a one-sided focus on individual autonomy might turn out to be a double-edged sword, leaving the individual with self-determination but no (or insufficient) available care to decide about. In this chapter, the underlying principles of practical decisions are theoretically explored and reflected upon. Of specific relevance is human dignity (in addition to enhancing individual freedom), normativity (a set of fundamental capabilities is identified) and the central role of the nation-state (as the responsible political subject for the achievement of minimum thresholds for all capabilities).


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Lesya Chesnokova

The article examines the individual’s right to information privacy as an opportunity to have a non-public area of life. It is argued that a person, being a vulnerable creature, feels the need for secrecy, closeness and opacity of his or her personality. The right to information privacy does not mean complete concealment of private life, but the possibility of regulating access, when individuals can choose whom, when and to what extent to reveal the details of their lives. This presupposes both a person who feels him or herself to be an autonomous person and a society that respects his or her rights and freedoms. There is a duty of restraint and tact, which prohibits violating someone else’s privacy. As one of the aspects of privacy, in addition to the inviolability of the body and home, the human right to information protection is recognized. The theoretical foundation of the right to privacy is the philosophy of liberalism, which protects the individual from unwanted interference from the state and society. The need for private space has evolved in human history along with the growth of individualism. Currently, the right to information privacy is gaining special relevance in connection with the development of digital technologies that allow collecting, storing and processing large amounts of data. As a result, a person, on the one hand, does not know who, when and for what purpose collects his or her data, and, on the other hand, he or she often voluntarily, in connection with the need for social recognition, leaves information about him or herself on social networks. As a result of such actions, the loss of control over personal information can lead to undesirable consequences.


Author(s):  
Mingxu WANG ◽  
Wen ZHANG ◽  
Xueliang WANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.從儒家倫理的視角解讀中國新實施的《人體器官移植條例》,以第8 條中“共同表示同意”為著力點,認為,儒家的家庭倫理不僅深刻地影響者中國人的思維方式和行為方式,而且至今被人們認為是構建家庭倫理的最根本原則,有著廣泛的社會基礎和現實根據。分析了儒家倫理支持器官捐獻的理據,結合案例指出:家庭的知情同意並不違背個人的知情同意;應當在儒家的家庭倫理的基礎上探討這一條例的相關問題,從而幫助完善和實施這一條例,使我國有關人體器官移植和屍體捐獻的立法更加完備,為推動器官移植技術的發展建立更為有效的法律保障機制。並提出在在條例實施過程中還有五個相關問題需要澄清和解決。Organ donation is the gift of an organ to help someone else who needs a transplant. Hundreds of people’s lives are saved each year by organ transplants. Yet the question remains: Who should give the priority in terms of donation procedures - the individual who feels a strong, personal commitment to offer his/her organ or the legal next-of-kin, i.e., the priority order of the family members? This has been greatly debated bioethical issue in China in recent years. Rather than emphasizing the right of individuals to decide what will happen after they die, or removing the burden of making a decision about organ donation from families dealing with the traumatic death of a loved one, the policy of family consent indicates the signif icant role of family in making the decision. That is to say, the consent, or lack of objection, of those closest to the patient is always sought before organs can be donated. The family involvement could avoid discomfort with the process on the one hand, but also cause conf licts when there is a disagreement between the donor and family members on the other.This paper focuses its discussion on the context and impacts of the“ Rules regarding Organ Transplant” implemented in China since 2007. Then, it turns to traditional Confucian ethics to talk about the meaning of life and Confucian concept of family to show that Confucianism would support the idea of organ transplant. To prove the claim, the paper offers two recent examples of organ donation. Organ transplant should be advocated but the rules should be tighten in order to prevent unqualified doctors and profithungry hospitals from abusing patients and organ donors.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 301 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


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