scholarly journals The Synthesis and Decoding of Meaning

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-70
Author(s):  
H. Georg Schulze
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Intelligent System ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Self ◽  
Dual Nature ◽  
Quantum Component ◽  
Ordered Pairs

Abstract Thinking machines must be able to use language effectively in communication with humans. It requires from them the ability to generate meaning and transfer this meaning to a communicating partner. Machines must also be able to decode meaning communicated via language. This work is about meaning in the context of building an artificial general intelligent system. It starts with an analysis of the Turing test and some of the main approaches to explain meaning. It then considers the generation of meaning in the human mind and argues that meaning has a dual nature. The quantum component reflects the relationships between objects and the orthogonal quale component the value of these relationships to the self. Both components are necessary, simultaneously, for meaning to exist. This parallel existence permits the formulation of ‘meaning coordinates’ as ordered pairs of quantum and quale strengths. Meaning coordinates represent the contents of meaningful mental states. Spurred by a currently salient meaningful mental state in the speaker, language is used to induce a meaningful mental state in the hearer. Therefore, thinking machines must be able to produce and respond to meaningful mental states in ways similar to their functioning in humans. It is explained how quanta and qualia arise, how they generate meaningful mental states, how these states propagate to produce thought, how they are communicated and interpreted, and how they can be simulated to create thinking machines.

Stable neural representations of mental states across target people and stimulus modalities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
The Self ◽  
Similarity Analysis ◽  
Multiple Modalities ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Conceptual Core ◽  
Stimulus Modalities ◽  
Huge Variety

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers are able to accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person’s? Is reading about someone’s anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. This suggests that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.

Being for no-one

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (I) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Chris Letheby
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Altered States ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Depersonalization Disorder ◽  
Total Lack ◽  
Fast Acting

Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” (SP) faces apparent counterexamples in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and certain mental states in depersonalization disorder (DPD). However, Billon & Kriegel (2015) have defended SP by arguing (inter alia) that while some of these mental states may be totally selfless, those states are not phenomenally conscious and thus do not constitute genuine counterexamples to SP. I argue that this defence cannot work in relation to certain experiences of ego dissolution induced by potent fast-acting serotonergic psychedelics. These mental states jointly instantiate the two features whose co-instantiation by a single mental state SP prohibits: (a) phenomenal consciousness and (b) total lack of self-consciousness. One possible objection is that these mental states may lack “me-ness” and “mineness” but cannot lack “for-me-ness”, a special inner awareness of mental states by the self. In response I propose a dilemma. For-me-ness can be defined either as containing a genuinely experiential component or as not. On the first horn, for-me-ness is clearly absent (I argue) from my counterexamples. On the second horn, for-me-ness has been defined in a way that conflicts with the claims and methods of its proponents, and the claim that phenomenally conscious mental states can totally lack self-consciousness has been conceded. I conclude with some reflections on the intuitive plausibility of SP in light of evidence from altered states.

Mental state dynamics explain the origin of mental state concepts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Milena Rmus ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Artificial Neural Network ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social World ◽  
The Social ◽  
Artificial Neural ◽  
Ebb And Flow

People’s thoughts and feelings ebb and flow in predictable ways: surprise arises quickly, anticipation ramps up slowly, regret follows anger, love begets happiness, and so forth. Predicting these transitions between mental states can help people successfully navigate the social world. We hypothesize that the goal of predicting state dynamics shapes people’ mental state concepts. Across seven studies, when people observed more frequent transitions between a pair of novel mental states, they judged those states to be more conceptually similar to each other. In an eighth study, an artificial neural network trained to predict real human mental state dynamics spontaneously learned the same conceptual dimensions that people use to understand these states: the 3d Mind Model. Together these results suggest that mental state dynamics explain the origins of mental state concepts.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Phenomenal States

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.

scholarly journals Propositionalism and Questions that do not have Correct Answers

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Felappi
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Do So

AbstractAs the label suggests, according to propositionalism, each intentional mental state, attitude or event is or involves a relation to a proposition. In this paper, I will discuss a case that seems prima facie not to be accountable for by propositionalism. After having presented the case, I will show why it is different from others that have been discussed in the literature as able to show that propositionalism cannot be correct. I will then consider what the propositionalist can say to fix the problem and I will show that no strategy that is genuinely propositionalist seems promising. I will not conclude that propositionalism is doomed. But I will show that if propositionalism can account for our case at all, it can only do so by losing its main appeal, i.e. its elegance and simplicity. But then propositionalism seems to have lost its advantage with respect to its obvious alternative, i.e. a pluralist account according to which mental states, attitudes and events are not all homogeneously relations to propositions, but rather our mental life should be accounted for in terms of a plurality of kinds of relata.

scholarly journals Understanding the Links between Inferring Mental States, Empathy, and Burnout in Medical Contexts

Healthcare ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 158
Author(s):  
Naira Delgado ◽  
Helena Bonache ◽  
Moisés Betancort ◽  
Yurena Morera ◽  
Lasana T. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effects ◽  
Patient Care ◽  
Emotional Exhaustion ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Healthcare Professionals ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Personal Accomplishment ◽  
Personal Distress

It is generally accepted that empathy should be the basis of patient care. However, this ideal may be unrealistic if healthcare professionals suffer adverse effects when engaging in empathy. The aim of this study is to explore the effect of inferring mental states and different components of empathy (perspective-taking; empathic concern; personal distress) in burnout dimensions (emotional exhaustion; depersonalization; personal accomplishment). A total of 184 healthcare professionals participated in the study (23% male, Mage = 44.60; SD = 10.46). We measured participants’ empathy, the inference of mental states of patients, and burnout. Correlation analyses showed that inferring mental states was positively associated with perspective-taking and with empathic concern, but uncorrelated with personal distress. Furthermore, emotional exhaustion was related to greater levels of personal distress and greater levels of inferences of mental states. Depersonalization was associated with greater levels of personal distress and lower levels of empathic concern. Personal accomplishment was associated with the inference of mental states in patients, lower levels of personal distress, and perspective-taking. These results provide a better understanding of how different components of empathy and mental state inferences may preserve or promote healthcare professionals’ burnout.

Maternal mental state language is associated with trajectories of Chinese immigrant children’s emotion situation knowledge

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stacey N. Doan ◽  
Helen Y. Lee ◽  
Qi Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
Mental States ◽  
European American ◽  
Chinese Immigrant ◽  
Children's Emotion ◽  
Mental State Language ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Over Time ◽  
State Language

We investigated the role of mothers’ references to mental states and behaviors and children’s emotion situation knowledge (ESK) in a prospective, cross-cultural context. European American mothers ( n = 71) and Chinese immigrant mothers ( n = 60) and their children participated in the study. Maternal references to mental states and behaviors were assessed at Time 1 when children were three years of age. ESK was assessed when children were 3, 3.5, and 4.5 years of age. Multi-group latent growth curve analyses were used to model children’s growth in ESK over time, as well as relations between mental state language and references to behaviors on children’s trajectories. Results indicated that maternal references to mental states were associated with concurrent levels of ESK for European American children, and change over time for the Chinese immigrant children. Maternal references to behaviors were negatively associated with concurrent ESK for both groups.

The 7E Model of the Human Mind: Articulating a Plastic Self for the Cognitive Science of Religion

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 450-476
Author(s):  
Flavio A. Geisshuesler
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Religious Studies ◽  
The Self ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Religious Mind ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Concrete Model

AbstractThis article proposes a 7E model of the human mind, which was developed within the cognitive paradigm in religious studies and its primary expression, the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This study draws on the philosophically most sophisticated currents in the cognitive sciences, which have come to define the human mind through a 4E model as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. Introducing Catherine Malabou’s concept of “plasticity,” the study not only confirms the insight of the 4E model of the self as a decentered system, but it also recommends two further traits of the self that have been overlooked in the cognitive sciences, namely the negativity of plasticity and the tension between giving and receiving form. Finally, the article matures these philosophical insights to develop a concrete model of the religious mind, equipping it with three further Es, namely emotional, evolved, and exoconscious.

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