scholarly journals I had a different way of governing : the evangelical presidential style of Jimmy Carter and his mission for middle east peace

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Jason Berggren
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. p65
Author(s):  
Sri Michael Das

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, situated not only physically at the center of the world has also been the center of some of its most significant moments. These involved the Kingdom’s role in supporting peace between Israel and Egypt alongside former President and Humanitarian Jimmy Carter. Carter, demonized for his Southern style and failures in the Middle East, especially during the Iran Hostage Crisis, engineered one of its greatest diplomatic feats ever: Peace between ancient enemies, Israel and Egypt. Their long-standing vendetta which had real consequences for centuries nearly moved the modern world to the brink of World War 3. In stepped President Carter, Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin and eventually, the Royal Family of Jordan and all that changed. In this paper I would like to explore the personalities, roles and conditions that brought them together, re-celebrate their achievements, and challenge the world to model their characters and repeat their successes. Once again or even still, Israel is the pearl in the Middle Eastern oyster, and a weary world is eager move on. It is my hope my research will give us an inkling where to begin a process that could once again prevent a Global Conflict.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines the decline of détente during the period 1977–1979. Détente suffered in part from being identified with Richard Nixon. After 1973, conservatives increasingly questioned détente, felt that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) benefited the Soviet Union most, and were disturbed by an apparent pattern of communist adventurism abroad, in the 1973 Middle East War, Angola, and South-East Asia. The chapter first considers détente and policy-making during the time of Jimmy Carter before discussing the conflict in the Middle East, in particular the Lebanon Civil War, and the Camp David summit of 1978 that resulted in an Egyptian–Israel peace treaty. It then analyses the Ogaden conflict of 1977–1978), the ‘normalization’ of Sino-American relations, and the Sino–Vietnamese War. It concludes with an assessment of the SALT II treaty.


Worldview ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-49
Author(s):  
Mark Bruzonsky

Shortly after Camp David, The New York Review of Books blessed the Egyptian- Israeli deal Jimmy Carter had stumbled on. I.F. (Izzy) Stone's by-line heralding Camp David as "The Hope" neutralized legions of skeptics. "This is the beginning of peace between Israel and the Arabs and that is a prime event of history," Izzy proclaimed.That issue of NYRB arrived just as I was leaving for London, and I took it along on the flight. I was impressed, though not fully convinced, by Izzy's enlightened prophecy. I had just written for Worldview my own rather restrained judgment that "At best the Carter-inspired formula is an uneasy, unstable beginning to what might eventually become a firmer Middle East accommodation.


2014 ◽  
pp. 155-158
Author(s):  
Nevin Power

It is 1979. Cars wait for hours to get gasoline and fistfights erupt in the long queues. A riot over a lack of diesel fuel for truckers takes place in the centre of a model American middle-class suburb in Pennsylvania. Two years earlier President Jimmy Carter had appeared on national television explaining America’s first comprehensive energy policy before submitting it to Congress. Framing the need to reduce dependence on foreign oil as being the “moral equivalent of war”, Carter advocated conservation and the development of renewable sources of energy. This research proposes that, despite his efforts, between 1977 and 1979 Carter was unable to produce a grand strategy on energy because of foreign policy developments in the Middle East and their impacts on interconnected US domestic issues in the state of the economy, access to oil, and the public’s perception of limits to US power. The foreign policy developments in ...


1984 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Kennedy

On New Year's Eve, before the tumultuous events of 1978–79, President Jimmy Carter, while toasting the Shah in Tehran, referred to Iran as an “island of stability” in the Persian Gulf. President Carter's remarks reflected the consensus opinion about Iran not only among United States government officials but among most business firms operating in Iran as well. A typical U.S. corporate attitude was represented by a 1975 Business International (hereafter BI) report about business prospects in the Middle East.These characteristics (infrastructure development, population size and high absorptive capacity), which favorably distinguish Iran from the Arab Middle East, make the country the prime market in the area for many Western exporters. Political stability, the government's benevolent attitude toward private enterprise, and a well-protected internal market give Iran a similar edge in the eyes of foreign investors. Few international companies will thus want to stand aside as Iran races toward its goal of becoming the Japan of the Middle East.1


Author(s):  
Dilip Hiro

Having overthrown the pro-Washington Shah, Khomeini set out to purge the Iranian state and society of American influence. He was aided by the surprise occupation of the United States Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 by militant students. The capture of secret CIA reports on the Middle East by the Iranian occupiers gave credibility to the regime’s description of the Embassy as a “nest of spies,” and created a rationale for taking 52 US diplomats as hostage. The crisis lasted 444 days and ended with Ronald Reagan’s inauguration as president in January 1981 after his defeat of the incumbent Jimmy Carter, a Democrat. Quite independently, Saudi King Khalid faced an unprecedented challenge to the legitimacy of the House of Saud when on the eve of .the Islamic New Year of 1400 – 20 November 1979 – hundreds of armed militant Wahhabis, led by Juheiman al Utaiba seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Utaiba called for the overthrow of the royal family for deviating from Wahhabism. Aided by the American and French intelligence agencies and Pakistani soldiers, the government regained control of the Grand Mosque. It then took remedial action by imposing strict Wahhabi rules on the social-cultural life of citizens.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines the decline of détente during the period 1977–9. Détente suffered in part from being identified with Richard Nixon. After 1973, conservatives increasingly questioned détente, felt that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) benefited the Soviet Union most, and were disturbed by an apparent pattern of communist adventurism abroad, in the 1973 Middle East War, Angola, and South-East Asia. The chapter first considers détente and policy-making during the time of Jimmy Carter before discussing the conflict in the Middle East, in particular the Lebanon Civil War, and the Camp David summit of 1978 that resulted in an Egyptian–Israel peace treaty. It then analyses the Ogaden conflict of 1977–8, the ‘normalization’ of Sino-American relations, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. It concludes with an assessment of the SALT II treaty.


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