scholarly journals The Formal structure of Gorgias’ “On Non-Being or On Nature” according to Sextus Empiricus’ Adv. Math. 7.65–87

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 208-225
Author(s):  
Marina Volf
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
The One

The well-known evidence of Sextus Empiricus in Adv. Math. 7.65–87 is one of the two major evidence about Gorgias's treatise “On Not-Being or On Nature” along with “De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia”. The paper offers the analyses of the persuasive structure is this passage and discusses the arguments, which Sextus and, presumably, Gorgias use in this treatise. Also the paper compares formal persuasive structure of Gorgias’ treatise as it presented in Adv. Math., on the one hand, and MXG, on the other.

scholarly journals Formal power and real authority: the involvement of governance norms or principles

2018 ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Picavet
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Formal Treatment ◽  
The Real ◽  
Contemporary Research ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Or Economics ◽  
The One ◽  
Formal Power

In several avenues of contemporary research, much attention is devoted to the contrast between the real authority of institution and their formal power, in the analysis of institutional funtionings; also in the study of the relationships between institutions on the one hand, rules, principles or norms on the other hand. Such a contrast appears to be based on familiar observations: the capacity of institutions to get their preferred outcomes (their so-called „real authority”) is sometimes loosely connected with the hierarchical prerogatives of the considered institutions (their „formal power”). More particularly, current studies of the „migration authority” bring out possible shitts in real authority while there is no changein the formal structure of power. This article will partly consist  in the explanation of recent results of common reaserch in project „Delicom”, in which a formal treatment of the distinction has been put foward. This approach will be set against the background of recent contributions in political science or economics (in the works of Ph. Aghion and J. Tirole, J. Backhaus, L. Thorlakson). The revelance of the problematic for the study of competence delegation among institutions will be stressed all along.

Textual Authority in the Vita Nova’s Nineteenth-Century Editions

2021 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-38
Author(s):  
Jelena Todorović
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Print Media ◽  
Literary Text ◽  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Rightful Place ◽  
Textual Authority ◽  
Critical Approaches ◽  
The One

Abstract This article focuses on the nineteenth-century print circulation of Dante’s Vita Nova (1292–94) and especially on the response in print media to the tension between new critical approaches to text editing, on the one hand, and editors’ dependence on the text’s complex history on the other. At the center of this discussion is one of the thorniest aspects of the Vita Nova’s text: the divisions (technical prose of a scholastic nature in which Dante explains the formal structure of his poems). Over the centuries, Dante’s authority over his own text was brought into question on account of the inclusion in the literary text of what readers and editors considered to be commentary. Even though in the second half of the nineteenth century the editors began recognizing the divisions’ rightful place within the libello’s text, they continued—operating within the centuries-long tradition that did not consider them “text” but rather “gloss”—to engage in efforts to differentiate them from the rest of the text in order to point out their different textual nature.

Birtwistle's Gawain: An essay and a diary

1992 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rhian Samuel
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Dramatic Works ◽  
Second Viennese School ◽  
The One ◽  
Formal Design

Harrison Birtwistle's musico-dramatic works all show a preoccupation with intricate formal design. Thus they fall firmly in the Modernist tradition, inherited on the one hand from the Second Viennese School (consider Webern's Piano Variations Op. 27 with its mirrors upon mirrors) and on the other from Stravinsky's later ballets (Birtwistle has acknowledged Agon as a major debt). But in works such as Punch and Judy, Yan Tan Tethera and The Mask of Orpheus, the self-conscious elevation of formal structure (sometimes to its extreme, ritual) distances us, even more than in neo-Classical Stravinsky, from any tendency to realism in the drama. In The Mask of Orpheus, Birtwistle's priorities are clear: he has said repeatedly that this opera is not about Orpheus; it is about writing a particular kind of work with a particular set of problems to solve. He could have just as easily chosen Faust for his libretto (and almost did). With Gawain, however, he seems to be moving in a new direction. Wagner's spirit (particularly as expressed in Parsifal) has entered the work; a new emphasis on drama in its naturalistic sense, and a new relationship between linear, narrative flow and closed forms has transported Gawain to new territory.

Die pyrrhonische Abführmittelstrategie

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 346-361
Author(s):  
Christian Wirrwitz
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Beliefs ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
First Philosophy

In his ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ Sextus Empiricus compares the Pyrrhonean arguments with a purge, which forces the subject to give up both the philosophical beliefs and the Pyrrhonean arguments. It is shown that this strategy leads to serious troubles: Insofar the Pyrrhonean arguments are at least partly philosophical in nature, they lead to a contradiction in the subject’s beliefs about his own beliefs. But this does not help the Pyrrhonist to reach his goal: On the one hand, facing a contradiction, some, but not all beliefs of a given discourse should be given up. On the other hand, the contradiction is not avoidable: In this respect, the metaphor of a “purge” is misleading: The presupposed timely dimension (first philosophy is given up, then Pyrrhonism) has no counterpart in logical reasoning.

scholarly journals Eastern and Western Influences in the Cantus Publicus Tradition of the 12th and 13th Centuries

2014 ◽  
pp. 66-72
Author(s):  
Saida Z. Iskhakova
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Latin Poetry ◽  
Love Poetry ◽  
The South ◽  
Western Influences ◽  
The One ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Church ◽  
Poetry And Music

Considers the impact of Muslim­Arab culture (via Andalusia) on the one hand and of the Church poetry and music on the other on the troubadours’ art. The author argues that though troubadours’ love poetry was quite alike Arabic lyrics, the formal structure of the songs created in the South of France was directly related to the Church Latin poetry and music of the second half of the 11th century. However, the ambiguity about the issue is rooted in the poetic Arab influence on these Church “songs” that spread during the 9th and the 10th centuries.

scholarly journals “Verbindlichkeit”: Some drafts of a groundwork in moral philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Werner Moskopp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Empirical Inquiry ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The One ◽  
Common Sense Morality

Abstract All of metaethical positions today can be replaced by a universal architecture of moral philosophy, all but one: moral realism. Here, I use the term “metaethics” to refer to any theory of ethics concerning the groundwork of ethics, on the one hand, and the inquiry of the use of philosophical words, concepts or methods on the other. In this article, I will present my hypothesis that in moral philosophy, we do not need any specialized metaethics at all. Metaethics as a discipline of philosophy is only required by the work of moral realists, who try to show us a realm of values and norms that exist (per se) naturally, non-naturally or supernaturally. How can they know? The effort of metaethical realists cannot be proven either in ontology or in the philosophy of language or in cognitive science or in any meta-science that works en plus to ethics, because even in every additional discipline, we have to accept the presupposition of a validity of judgments. So, let us try it the other way around; we have to find a way to found ethics by following its structures, and that means, based on David Velleman’s concepts: a) We have to search for a ubiquitous point of ethical theory in its foundation – here, no kind of value or norm can be found that is not based on a universal formal structure of normativity. b) We have to start an empirical inquiry to collect norms and values in actual use. MFT, moral psychology and moral sociology are in charge here. The combination of such an abstract groundwork with mere empirical study has to be legitimized again. Hence, I am going to try to sum up the main ideas of such a project to show the relevance of a new architecture of moral philosophy today. There is a line of reasoning that addresses the possibility of a transcendental critique in practical philosophy; therefore, it has to look into the different notions of “intuition” in moral methods like it was used by Sidgwick (Rashdall, Green, Ross, Brentano, McTaggart) and Moore on the one hand and Brentano and Bergson on the other. In my view, there is a way to combine these perspectives using the two-level-model of Hare, Singer, Greene, where “intuition” is used to categorize habits and customs of the common sense morality in general while a critical reflection uses act-utilitarian calculus to provide a universal decision – in the sense of “concrete reason” – for any possible actor in a singular situation (Hegel, Peirce, Bloch etc.). The change between these levels may be explained by means of a pragmatistic kind of continuum of research with an ideal summum bonum in the long run and a concept of common sense morality as can be found in every group or society.

Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Perin
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Indirect Control ◽  
Pragmatic Reason ◽  
The One ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
At Will

According to Sextus Empiricus, the Skeptic suspends judgment in response to equipollence. This fact has two significant implications. First, the Skeptic has at most indirect control over his suspension of judgment and so does not suspend judgment at will. Second, the skeptic accepts the norm of truth for belief. This is a norm according to which one ought to believe that p only if p is true. However, there are passages in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism that imply the Skeptic accepts the norm of utility for belief. This is a norm according to which one ought to believe that p only if the belief that p promotes one’s tranquility. I first argue that if the Skeptic suspends judgment in response to equipollence, then a pragmatic reason can’t be the reason for which the Skeptic suspends judgment. I then argue that the norms of truth and utility for belief are incompatible just in the sense that the acceptance of the one precludes the acceptance of the other. If Sextus describes the Skeptic as accepting both of these norms for belief, as I argue he does, his conception of Skepticism in the Outlines is not coherent.

scholarly journals What the Tortoise Said to Achilles: Lewis Carroll’s paradox in terms of Hilbert arithmetic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Penchev
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Lewis Carroll ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Logical Paradox ◽  
The One ◽  
The Liar ◽  
As If

Lewis Carroll, both logician and writer, suggested a logical paradox containing furthermore two connotations (connotations or metaphors are inherent in literature rather than in mathematics or logics). The paradox itself refers to implication demonstrating that an intermediate implication can be always inserted in an implication therefore postponing its ultimate conclusion for the next step and those insertions can be iteratively and indefinitely added ad lib, as if ad infinitum. Both connotations clear up links due to the shared formal structure with other well-known mathematical observations: (1) the paradox of Achilles and the Turtle; (2) the transitivity of the relation of equality. Analogically to (1), one can juxtapose the paradox of the Liar (for Lewis Carroll’s paradox) and that of the arrow (for “Achilles and the Turtle”), i.e. a logical paradox, on the one hand, and an aporia of motion, on the other hand, suggesting a shared formal structure

scholarly journals Following Sextus: Demonstrative Argument in Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-29
Author(s):  
Stefania Giombini
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
The Third ◽  
Refined Formulation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
The One

The two extant versions of Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos (PTMO) have been preserved by an anonymous author (MXG) and by Sextus Empiricus (S.E.). Both versions have been differently interpreted by scholars who examine either the doctrine or the rhetorical-communicational dimen­sion (the first option being dominant). When comparing the PTMO with the rest of Gorgias’ works, the present paper aims to demonstrate that S.E. offers a more precise account of Gorgias’ modus argumentandi. Thus, S.E. shows the following, typical features of Gorgias’ demonstra­tive reasoning: 1) application of demonstrandum and quod erat demon­strandum, 2) continuous employment of reductio ad absurdum and 3) a refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (similar to the one in Pal. 25). The MXG, on the other hand, is accurate in the discussion of particular arguments (e.g. the third kephalaion), but presents an interpreter who is more interested in questioning Gorgias rather than doing justice to his thought. Hence, this article concludes that it was S.E., who had the text or at least a relatively accurate summa­ry of the PTMO.

scholarly journals Argumentation and counterfactual reasoning in Parmenides and Melissus

2020 ◽  
pp. e03004
Author(s):  
Flavia Marcacci
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Stone Age ◽  
Counterfactual Reasoning ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Modal Reasoning ◽  
The One ◽  
Excluded Middle

Parmenides and Melissus employ different deductive styles for their different kinds of argumentation. The former’s poem flows in an interesting sequence of passages: contents foreword, methodological premises, krisis, conclusions and corollaries. The latter, however, organizes an extensive process of deduction to show the characteristics of what is. In both cases, the strength of their argument rests on their deductive form, on the syntactical level of their texts: the formal structure of their reasonings help to identify the features and logical intersections of their thoughts. On the one hand, Parmenides uses modal reasoning, enforcing the employment of the principle of the excluded middle. On the other hand, Melissus radicalizes the use of modal reasoning and employs counterfactual statements in order to develop his doctrine of what is. Despite their differences, both deserve a place in the Stone Age of logic and theory of argumentation due to their common ambition to demonstrate what is.

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