scholarly journals “Verbindlichkeit”: Some drafts of a groundwork in moral philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Werner Moskopp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Empirical Inquiry ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The One ◽  
Common Sense Morality

Abstract All of metaethical positions today can be replaced by a universal architecture of moral philosophy, all but one: moral realism. Here, I use the term “metaethics” to refer to any theory of ethics concerning the groundwork of ethics, on the one hand, and the inquiry of the use of philosophical words, concepts or methods on the other. In this article, I will present my hypothesis that in moral philosophy, we do not need any specialized metaethics at all. Metaethics as a discipline of philosophy is only required by the work of moral realists, who try to show us a realm of values and norms that exist (per se) naturally, non-naturally or supernaturally. How can they know? The effort of metaethical realists cannot be proven either in ontology or in the philosophy of language or in cognitive science or in any meta-science that works en plus to ethics, because even in every additional discipline, we have to accept the presupposition of a validity of judgments. So, let us try it the other way around; we have to find a way to found ethics by following its structures, and that means, based on David Velleman’s concepts: a) We have to search for a ubiquitous point of ethical theory in its foundation – here, no kind of value or norm can be found that is not based on a universal formal structure of normativity. b) We have to start an empirical inquiry to collect norms and values in actual use. MFT, moral psychology and moral sociology are in charge here. The combination of such an abstract groundwork with mere empirical study has to be legitimized again. Hence, I am going to try to sum up the main ideas of such a project to show the relevance of a new architecture of moral philosophy today. There is a line of reasoning that addresses the possibility of a transcendental critique in practical philosophy; therefore, it has to look into the different notions of “intuition” in moral methods like it was used by Sidgwick (Rashdall, Green, Ross, Brentano, McTaggart) and Moore on the one hand and Brentano and Bergson on the other. In my view, there is a way to combine these perspectives using the two-level-model of Hare, Singer, Greene, where “intuition” is used to categorize habits and customs of the common sense morality in general while a critical reflection uses act-utilitarian calculus to provide a universal decision – in the sense of “concrete reason” – for any possible actor in a singular situation (Hegel, Peirce, Bloch etc.). The change between these levels may be explained by means of a pragmatistic kind of continuum of research with an ideal summum bonum in the long run and a concept of common sense morality as can be found in every group or society.

When Integration Fails: The Logic of Prescription and Description in Business Ethics

1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Donaldson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Inquiry ◽  
World Vision ◽  
The World ◽  
Ethical Guidance ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
The One

In an engaging and provocative paper, Linda Trevino and Gary Weaver spell out the differences between the methodological approach characteristic of the natural sciences on the one hand and that of normative inquiry on the other (Trevino and Weaver, 1991). Near the end of their paper they raise a haunting question that will have increasing significance as the management literature in ethics evolves: namely, “Can the two approaches be integrated?”As C. P. Snow (1962) noted, no one can deny either the stark differences between the two worlds of normative and empirical inquiry, or the mutual suspicion shown by their inhabitants. The methodology of natural science implies a non-normative, thoroughly descriptive vision of the world in which reality awaits discovery by the scientist prepared to use increasingly sophisticated techniques. In contrast, the methodology of normative inquiry, i.e., that of traditional moral philosophy, implies a world-vision in which most important issues are allocated to ethics, where empirical pursuits are frequently trivial and always require ethical guidance, and where empirical theories contain normative presuppositions unrecognized as normative even by their scientific adherents.

Ontology and Perception

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Galko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Complex Environment ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The One ◽  
Bodies Of Water ◽  
The Relationship

The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.

Subaltern mediators in the digital landscape

Target ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teresa Iribarren
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Capital ◽  
Web 2.0 ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Lingua Franca ◽  
Content Type ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The One ◽  
Digital Landscape

This article explores translational literary Web 2.0 practices and user-generated cultural creations on the Internet, focusing on video poetry that re-creates canonical poets’ bodies of work. It will be argued that the use of for-profit platforms like YouTube and Vimeo by indie creators and translators of video poetry favours the emergence of new translational attitudes, practices and objects that have positive but also contentious effects. One the one hand, these online mediators explore new poetic expressions and tend to make the most of the potential for dissemination of poetic heritage, providing visibility to non-hegemonic literatures. On the other hand, however, these translational digitally-born practices and creations by voluntary and subaltern mediators might reinforce the hegemonic position of large American Internet corporations at the risk of commodifying cultural capital, consolidating English as a lingua franca and perhaps, in the long run, even fostering a potentially monocultural and internationally homogeneous aesthetics.

scholarly journals Major projects in urban sites: Challenge of the Builders

2018 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
pp. 02003
Author(s):  
Ammar Dhouib
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
The Other ◽  
Observational Method ◽  
Urban Construction ◽  
Environmental Requirements ◽  
The One ◽  
Urban Sites ◽  
Displacement Measurements

Faced with the complexity of urban construction projects and difficulties in the field, engineers must, on the one hand, dimension with rigor and common sense the foundations with all the requirements of today of quality, conformity and respect of deadlines and budget and take into account, on the other hand, safety and environmental requirements and societal and sustainable development criteria, the purpose of this communication is to present concrete projects of foundations and excavation deep in geologically heterogeneous and highly urbanized sites, with monitoring and displacement measurements in order to compare predictions with reality and to promote the "observational method".

scholarly journals Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection

Philosophy ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Knowledge ◽  
Ethical Point ◽  
The One

The author begins with an outline of Bernard William's moral philosophy, within which he locates William's notorious doctrine that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. He then gives a partial defence of this doctrine, exploiting an analogy between ethical judgements and tensed judgements. The basic idea is that what the passage of time does for the latter, reflection can do for the former: namely, prevent the re-adoption of an abandoned point of view (an ethical point of view in the one case, a temporal point of view in the other). In the final section the author says a little about how reflection might do this.

scholarly journals A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Evidential Basis ◽  
Apparent Conflict

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.

Die Rahmung des Hintergrunds

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Freytag
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Individual Case ◽  
The Other ◽  
Late Work ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The University

This work undertakes a systematic reconstruction of the debates that took place over the course of several decades up to the beginning of the 21st century between Derrida on the one hand and Searle and Habermas on the other. It shows that the linguistic theories and the theories of communicative understanding developed by Searle and Habermas are based on inferences from the contingent individual case to the general. Searle draws ontological, Habermas anthropo-political conclusions, both with essentially naturalistic signatures. Derrida, on the other hand, raises epistemological objections and consequently develops a metaphysics of free subjects for whom conversation cannot necessarlily be presumed. The explicit dedication to ethics in Derrida's late work is due to his insight that the possibility of language and understanding is due to silence. Derrida's lasting merit lies in enriching the philosophy of language with a secretology. This study has been awarded the Kant Prize of the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Bonn and the "Prix de la République Française", awarded by the French Embassy and the University of Bonn.

Infoxication 2.0

2009 ◽  
pp. 60-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Benito-Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Web 2.0 ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Time Management ◽  
Information Overload ◽  
Future Generation ◽  
Language Learner ◽  
The Other ◽  
Know How ◽  
The One

This chapter reviews the issue of information overload, introducing the concept of “infoxication 2.0” as one of the main downsides to Web 2.0. The chapter describes some of its potential effects on the learner, on the one hand, and puts forward some solutions to deal with the informational and communication barrage worsened by Web 2.0 plethora, on the other. The review of the issue reveals that although the problem of information overload has existed for many years, the massive abundance of fragmented Web 2.0 informational and communicative resources for the language learner might become an obstacle, i.e. it is often difficult to find what’s useful. Two kinds of solutions are identified, those based on common sense and time management, and those based on technology agents such as RSS readers and especially the future generation of RSS mash-up tools. An emphasis is placed on the role of the teacher as the facilitator to provide the know-how on these tools.

The Failure of Self-Consciousness in Sartre's Being and Nothingness

Dialogue ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-756
Author(s):  
Kathleen Wider
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Sense Of Self ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Reflective Consciousness ◽  
Central Tenet ◽  
Ultimate Failure ◽  
The One

The central tenet in the ontology Sartre describes and seeks to defend in Being and Nothingness is that being divides into the for-itself and the in-itself. Self-consciousness characterizes being-for-itself and distinguishes it from being-in-itself. What it means for a being to exist for itself is that it is self-conscious. How Sartre characterizes self-consciousness in Being and Nothingness is, however, a question that remains to be asked. There is no simple answer to this question. For Sartre, there are really several levels of self-consciousness: the self-consciousness of consciousness at the pre-reflective level, at the level of reflection (both pure and impure) and at the level of being-for-others. There is a profound difference between the self-consciousness of being-for-others and impure reflection, on the one hand, and the self-consciousness of reflection and pre-reflective consciousness, on the other. With being-for-others and impure reflection, self-consciousness involves the attempt to grasp the self as an object for consciousness. Although the nature of this attempt and the reasons for its ultimate failure differ at each level, these levels are bound together by a common sense of self-consciousness as a consciousness of the self as an object.

Religion's ‘Foundation in Reason’: The Common Sense of Hume's Natural History

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-581
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Rational Argument ◽  
Regular Model ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Forceful Critique ◽  
Critique Of Religion

David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional (argumentbased) model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief (e.g., the design argument), to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and (usually) more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument (failing to proportion belief to the evidence), but (as Hume sometimes seems to) for failing to be the right sort of instinct.

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