Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Perin
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Indirect Control ◽  
Pragmatic Reason ◽  
The One ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
At Will

According to Sextus Empiricus, the Skeptic suspends judgment in response to equipollence. This fact has two significant implications. First, the Skeptic has at most indirect control over his suspension of judgment and so does not suspend judgment at will. Second, the skeptic accepts the norm of truth for belief. This is a norm according to which one ought to believe that p only if p is true. However, there are passages in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism that imply the Skeptic accepts the norm of utility for belief. This is a norm according to which one ought to believe that p only if the belief that p promotes one’s tranquility. I first argue that if the Skeptic suspends judgment in response to equipollence, then a pragmatic reason can’t be the reason for which the Skeptic suspends judgment. I then argue that the norms of truth and utility for belief are incompatible just in the sense that the acceptance of the one precludes the acceptance of the other. If Sextus describes the Skeptic as accepting both of these norms for belief, as I argue he does, his conception of Skepticism in the Outlines is not coherent.

scholarly journals The Inquisition of 1517. Inclosures and Evictions. Part II. Edited from the Lansdowne MS. 1. 153

1893 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 127-292
Author(s):  
I. S. Leadam
Keyword(s):  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Historical Review ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Society ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Legal Security ◽  
The One ◽  
At Will

In the ‘English Historical Review’ for April (1893) Professor Ashley offers some criticisms upon the ‘Introduction to the Inquisition of 1517,’ contributed by me to the ‘Transactions of the Royal Historical Society’ for 1892. One object of that Introduction, it may be remembered, was to disprove the assertion of Professor Ashley that at the time when the evictions for inclosure began, and until ‘towards the end of the period,’ ‘the mass of copyholders’ had no legal security. In my view, the manorial records, the compilations of laws in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the practice of the courts, even the treatises of the jurists when critically scrutinised, led to the conclusion not merely that copyholders enjoyed protection in legal theory, but that their predecessors in title, the villeins, had done so before them. I drew no distinction in this matter between customary tenants and copyholders, as Professor Ashley appears to suppose, but showed that security extended even to villeins by blood, or ‘nativi,’ on custo-mary lands. Professor Ashley's proposition that ‘customary tenants’ and ‘copyholders’ were equivalent terms was never doubted by me, and is irrelevant to my argument. Indeed, it is assumed by me on the very pages to which he refers. ‘Mr. Leadam,’ he says, ‘draws a sharp distinction between “copyholders” on the one side and “tenants at will” on the other—a distinction which one may doubt whether the men of the sixteenth century would have felt so keenly.’ The distinction, as those who turn to the passage will see, is between ‘copyholders,’ used in Fitzherbert's sense as equivalent to customary tenants, who were ‘tenants at will according to the custom of the manor,’ and ‘tenants at will at Common Law.’

scholarly journals On the gaseous transformation of water, by means of a pile in two separate compartments having no other electric communication between them besides conducting wires of copper, and giving, in the one oxygen alone, and hydrogen alone in the other

1851 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 911-911
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Fait Accompli ◽  
The One ◽  
At Will

After premising that, at the present time, it is the generally received opinion that water is a compound of oxygen and hydrogen, the author states that he now brings forward an experiment which proves, not that water is a compound, but really a simple element, the generator of oxygen and hydrogen, since, without being decomposed, a volume of water being given, it may be entirely transformed at will, either into oxygen or into hydrogen. Thus, he considers, it is no longer a decomposition of pre-existing elements which is effected, but really a gaseous transformation into two “sub-elements” which are formed at the expense of the water, by the transposition of its combined or coercitive electricity which places itself in excess in the water which becomes oxygen, at the expense of another volume which becomes hydrogen. He considers that this will, no doubt, appear very extraordinary, but that nevertheless it is now “un fait accompli et acquis a la science.” After describing the experiments which he considers support his doctrine, the author concludes by observing that these experiments prove,— 1st, that contrary to the indefensible theory, a compound electric fluid which is decomposed and recomposed, there is a true transfer of fluid in the current, which besides would be sufficiently evident by its motive power. 2nd. That the electric fluid is really the coercitive agent of cohesion. 3rd. That water is not a compound, is not an oxide, but truly a first element, the generator of oxygen and of hydrogen. 4th. In fine, it reveals a power unknown until now, and that very likely many other bodies are in the same case as water.

scholarly journals On the nature of pancreatic diabetes. (Preliminary com­munication)

1912 ◽  
Vol 85 (578) ◽  
pp. 218-223 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Normal Function ◽  
Heart Beat ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sugar Production ◽  
Pancreatic Diabetes ◽  
Venous Filling ◽  
The One ◽  
Lung Preparation ◽  
At Will

Many explanations have been proposed for the fact, discovered by von Mering and Minkowski (1), that extirpation of the pancreas is followed immediately by severe and fatal diabetes. It has been suggested on the one hand that the normal function of the pancreas is to diminish excessive production of sugar, and that, in the absence of its restraining influence, excessive sugar production and mobilisation are the results. On the other hand, the fact that carbohydrates are not utilised by the body when administered to animals in this condition has been interpreted as showing that the tissues have lost their normal power of assimilating and utilising glucose. It has also been suggested, though without much experimental support, that the sugar of the blood has to be built up into some other form before it can be utilised by the tissues. We have recently, in a research on the influence of mechanical conditions and of temperature on the heart beat, modified the procedure described by Jerusalem and Starling (2) for working with a heart-lung preparation, so that we are able to keep a heart, connected with the lungs but isolated from the rest of the body, beating for many hours in approximately normal conditions, i . e . working at a normal arterial pressure and with a normal output. In this preparation we are able to vary at will the venous filling of the heart, the arterial resistance, or the temperature. The total amount of blood employed is about 300 c. c., and as the heart of a small dog puts out about 150 to 250 c. c. of blood per minute, the whole of the blood in the apparatus circulates through the heart once in every two minutes. It occurred to us that it might be possible by using this preparation to throw i light on the pathogeny of pancreatic diabetes.

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth

Apeiron ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-344
Author(s):  
Whitney Schwab
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Epistemic Attitude ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The One ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment

Abstract This paper deals with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It argues that the central argument presented by Jonathan Barnes in favor of the view that skepticism precludes the possession of any belief fails. In brief, Barnes maintains that, because skepticism requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, no skeptic can, consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of truth; this entails, he argues, that no skeptic can make any judgments about anything and, hence, cannot come to possess any beliefs. I evaluate this argument in two ways: first, if we understand criteria of truth along the lines proposed by Sextus’ Hellenistic opponents, the argument fails because such criteria were introduced to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could count as knowledge, and not to guarantee the very possibility of making judgments in the first place. Second, if we broaden our conception of a criterion of truth, such that a criterion is any standard against which an impression can be evaluated, the argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of ‘possession’. On the one hand, in the sense in which someone must possess such a criterion in order to make judgments, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning their existence does not entail that she does not possess a criterion of truth. On the other hand, in the sense in which the skeptic does not possess such a criterion, possession of a criterion of truth is not a necessary condition for making judgments. Thus, I conclude that the skeptics’ epistemic attitude towards the existence of criteria of truth (i.e. suspension of judgment) does not entail that skeptics cannot possess any beliefs.

scholarly journals Ecological Constraints of Timescales, Production, and Perception in Temporal Experiences of Music

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 224
Author(s):  
Rolf Inge Godøy
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Body Motion ◽  
Ecological Constraints ◽  
Musical Sound ◽  
Musical Imagery ◽  
Musical Works ◽  
Musical Discourse ◽  
The One ◽  
Different Order ◽  
At Will

In trying to structure our discussions of temporal experience in music, it could be useful to have a look at some basic ecological constraints of timescales, produc­tion, and perception of music. This may hopefully help us to distinguish between on the one hand readily perceived features of sound and music-related body motion, i.e. con­crete sonic, kinematic, and proprioceptive features, and on the other hand, more generic, amodal, and abstract elements in musical discourse, manifest in various symbolic representa­tions such as notation, numbers, and diagrams. Given easily accessible music tech­nologies, it is actually possible to experiment with different editions of musical works, i.e. concatenate fragments in different order and then evaluate the emergent contex­tual effects in listening experiments. Also, given the faculties of musical imagery (de­fined as our ability to mentally re-experience musical sound and body motion in the ab­sence of physically present sound and body motion), we can at will recombine chunks of music in our minds and mentally scan through large musical works. The contention here is that such recombination in actual re-editing of musical sound or in musical im­agery, will still be related to the basic ecological constraints of the timescales, production and perception in music.

Die pyrrhonische Abführmittelstrategie

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 346-361
Author(s):  
Christian Wirrwitz
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Beliefs ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
First Philosophy

In his ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ Sextus Empiricus compares the Pyrrhonean arguments with a purge, which forces the subject to give up both the philosophical beliefs and the Pyrrhonean arguments. It is shown that this strategy leads to serious troubles: Insofar the Pyrrhonean arguments are at least partly philosophical in nature, they lead to a contradiction in the subject’s beliefs about his own beliefs. But this does not help the Pyrrhonist to reach his goal: On the one hand, facing a contradiction, some, but not all beliefs of a given discourse should be given up. On the other hand, the contradiction is not avoidable: In this respect, the metaphor of a “purge” is misleading: The presupposed timely dimension (first philosophy is given up, then Pyrrhonism) has no counterpart in logical reasoning.

A New Technology of Producing Color Gradient Products

2012 ◽  
Vol 215-216 ◽  
pp. 368-371
Author(s):  
Wen Ya Li ◽  
Xue Qin Ren ◽  
Yan Sun
Keyword(s):  
New Technology ◽  
Domestic Market ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
Color Gradient ◽  
Color Combinations ◽  
The One ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
At Will

The new technology is based on the original four-color gill box, and adding the application of the controller. On the one hand, achieve the sliver color’s order can be matched at will, and every single sliver can be changed about the color and length, and the length of changeover portion can be designed easily, so that the final product color can be achieved in a color from deep to shallow gradients, and also can be two colors that is one of them becomes shallow gradually while another color deepened gradually; on the other hand, achieve the ratio of the colored sliver is adjustable without basal sliver feeding. In the other words, on the premise of output sliver thickness to maintain constant, the cross-section’s color of the sliver is ensured to be any independent color of the four feeding sliver colors, you can also have two or more color combinations. Using this new technology to produce the gradient product has been very popular in foreign countries, but is still rare in the domestic market. So this new technology will have positive effect on textile field, it can provide more new opportunities to the textile enterprises.

Active Belief

2009 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 119-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Boyle
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Basic Difference ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
At Will

The man who changes his mind, in response to evidence of the truth of a proposition, does not act upon himself; nor does he bring about an effect.- Hampshire (1965, 100)A point of persistent controversy in recent philosophical discussions of belief concerns whether we can exercise some sort of agential control over what we believe. On the one hand, the idea that we have some kind of discretion over what we believe has appealed to philosophers working in several areas. This idea has been invoked, for instance, to characterize the basic difference between rational and non-rational cognition, to account for our epistemic responsibility for what we believe, and to explain how we are able, normally, to say what we presently believe without relying on self-observation or inference. On the other hand, most contemporary philosophers agree that, in one significant sense, what we believe is not up to us: we cannot simply believe “at will,” and, although what we wish were so can influence what we believe to be so, this influence hardly amounts to a form of control or agency.

Digitalization of work and heteronomy

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Mengay
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Flexible Structures ◽  
The Other ◽  
Labour Process ◽  
Indirect Control ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

Digitalization has two very different effects on work. On the one hand, it leads to a re-Taylorization of work, de-qualification and a loss of workers autonomy. On the other hand, digitalization of work leads to new forms of indirect control and algorithmic control that can be used to manage and instrumentalize the supposed autonomy of workers to actually enable an unequal and exploitative labour process. This article discusses the questions of heteronomy related to the digitalization of work, presents central aspects of new forms of control (direct, indirect, and algorithmic) and explains why formalization, data centred decision making and flexible structures are used to control the labour process and improve heteronomy of work.

scholarly journals The Formal structure of Gorgias’ “On Non-Being or On Nature” according to Sextus Empiricus’ Adv. Math. 7.65–87

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 208-225
Author(s):  
Marina Volf
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
The One

The well-known evidence of Sextus Empiricus in Adv. Math. 7.65–87 is one of the two major evidence about Gorgias's treatise “On Not-Being or On Nature” along with “De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia”. The paper offers the analyses of the persuasive structure is this passage and discusses the arguments, which Sextus and, presumably, Gorgias use in this treatise. Also the paper compares formal persuasive structure of Gorgias’ treatise as it presented in Adv. Math., on the one hand, and MXG, on the other.

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